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The role of information systems has evolved from providing decision
support into enabling the majority of our daily operations, and the way
users interact with information systems has changed dramatically as a re-
sult. The goal of this dissertation is to study phenomena that stem from the
close interaction between users and information systems using empirical
methodologies.
The first essay of this dissertation focuses on the issue of sentiment
manipulation. We show that strategic players might be incentivized to man-
ufacture content on social media platforms and opinion forums, in the con-
text of the movie industry. We then identify unusual patterns on Twitter
that are consistent with sentiment manipulation.
We study the effectiveness of social media advertising in the second
vi
essay. Advertisers on popular social media platforms such as Facebook are
able to publish ads with popularity and social information. We design and
conduct a randomized field experiment to study the extent to which these
types of information have an effect on ad performance.
In the third essay we study how individuals might be biased toward
contents that appear to be written more politely. We use data from an online
question answering platform, StackExchange, to show that an individual
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Users and information systems often interact and co-evolve with each other.
As technology permeates every aspect of our lives, it is critical that we un-
derstand the relationship between users and information systems. The goal
of this dissertation is to advance our understanding of this relationship
through a series of empirical studies.
In the first essay, we study the issue of sentiment manipulation. On-
line platforms are prone to abuse and manipulations from strategic par-
ties. For example, social media and review websites suffer from sentiment
manipulations, manifested in the form of opinion spam and fake reviews.
The consequence of such manipulations is the deterioration of information
quality as well as loss in consumer welfare. We study the issue of sentiment
manipulation on Twitter in the context of movie tweets. Through a regres-
sion discontinuity design (RDD) approach and using the movie release as a
source of an exogenous shock, we find that both the average Twitter senti-
1
ment and the proportion of highly positive tweets exhibit a significant drop
on the movie’s release day. In addition, independent productions and low
budget movies tend to experience a larger drop than major studio produc-
tions and high budget movies. To examine the effect of competition on firm
manipulation, we construct a movie competition measure based on both
the time and theme dimensions through topic modeling, and we find that a
higher level of competition leads to a larger drop in Twitter sentiment. To
strengthen our identification, we adopt a difference-in-discontinuity design
where we compare Twitter with a more controlled movie platform, IMDb,
and the results are consistent with sentiment manipulation. In addition, we
consider movie studios’ earnings announcement dates and severe weather
condition as additional sources of exogenous shocks, as well as control for
demand-side expectations through Hollywood Stock Exchange (HSE) and
Google Trends data, and the results are robust. Discussing and ruling out
alternative explanations, we argue that the observed drops of Twitter sen-
timent come from firms’ strategic manipulation. This study sheds light on
the reliability of sentiment analysis, and contributes to our understanding
of strategic manipulation.
In the second essay we study the effectiveness of popularity and so-
cial information in the context of social media advertising. Social media
platforms such as Facebook show ads with popularity or word-of-mouth
(WOM) signals such as “likes”. Additionally, these ads can display social
endorsement from friends. This paper examines the effectiveness of dis-
playing these different signals on social media ads in generating user at-
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tention and actual conversions in the form of app installs through a ran-
domized field experiment on Facebook. We partnered with a mobile app
company and conducted an ad campaign on Facebook to randomly target
sixteen unique user groups to install the mobile application. We find that
the overall “likes” associated with the ad do not help the user’s decision
on clicking the ad and the app-installing decision conditional on clicking.
Further, ads endorsed by friends have a lower click performance as com-
pared to the ones without such endorsement. However, the negative effect
of “likes” on the app install performance conditional on clicking is attenu-
ated for ads with social endorsement. Our results have implications for the
design of ads on social media platforms.
In the final essay we study the issue of politeness bias in a knowl-
edge management context. Knowledge management is a major research
topic in the information systems literature. Popular knowledge manage-
ment platforms such as community-based question answering sites (CQAs)
and electronic networks of practice (ENPs) rely on accurate quality assess-
ment of user contributed content to ensure effective knowledge creation
and exchange. However, quality assessment is subjective in nature. We
first study the issue of content quality assessment through an innovative
context-free linguistic analysis and hypothesize that, based on psycholin-
guistic theories, the use of pronouns and other function words is correlated
with the content’s perceived quality, moderated by the specific quality mea-
sure adopted. We then use the politeness theory to explain why two pop-
ular quality assessment methods would lead to diverging results. We em-
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pirically test our hypotheses through a random coefficient logit model and
a fixed-effect negative binomial model with data obtained from StackEx-
change, a popular CQA platform. Our analysis shows that the politeness
bias might significantly affect people’s evaluation of content quality. We
also uncover potential limitations posed by an overreliance on subjective
quality measures. We suggest that care be taken in choosing the appropri-
ate quality measure to meet platforms’ operational objectives. This study
contributes to the literature in knowledge management, strategic commu-




Online Platforms and Opinion
Forums
2.1 Introduction
Much economic activity involves the understanding of consumers’ prefer-
ences and the subsequent recommendations of products of interest, both of
which are instrumental to product-selling firms’ performances. Thanks to
their popularity and ability to reach diverse demographic groups, internet
platforms have established themselves as powerhouses where consumers
seeking information can interact among themselves as well as with sell-
ers, and sellers can actively identify target consumers and channel their
advertisements accordingly. These online platforms include e-commerce
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websites such as Amazon; social media sites such as Facebook, Twitter, and
Foursquare; and recommendation and review websites such as Yelp, Tri-
pAdvisor, and Expedia. What these platforms have in common is the abil-
ity for consumers to voice their opinions, and for sellers to inform poten-
tial consumers of the quality of their products or services in various ways.
Both consumers and sellers can benefit from active participation on these
platforms because they provide consumers with much more detailed infor-
mation on products, while providing firms the opportunity to reach out to
target consumers.
However, popular online platforms are prone to abuse and manipu-
lation from strategic parties, and these manipulations can cause dire conse-
quences. For example, to increase product visibility, producers might want
to manipulate platform data by adding positive sentiments themselves, so
the sentiment analysis results will be more favorable to their products. Fur-
thermore, because the goal of many online platforms is to increase visi-
tor traffic and encourage more user participation, eradicating such firm-
generated data pollution is not necessarily a priority. These platforms have
also been used by political parties as tools to spread propaganda.1
Generally speaking, manipulation is a result of lack of awareness, the
absence of verification mechanisms, platform incentives, or the nature of
the chosen business model. Online platforms do not always have a proper
1Popular news outlets have reported several political uses of social media platforms:
Pro-Chinese individuals have used fake Twitter accounts to influence public opinion about
troubled regions including Xinjiang and Tibet; Ukraine protesters have been attacked by
Pro-Russian fake Facebook accounts; The United States military reportedly engaged in the
creation of fake social network accounts to spread pro-American propaganda.
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verification mechanism to filter out opinion spam—that is, fictitious and of-
ten fraudulent reviews that are written specifically to deceive readers (Ott
et al. 2011; Ott et al. 2012; Mukherjee et al. 2013). They are especially
susceptible to sentiment contamination, by which advertisers deliberately
manipulate public opinions by exploiting spamming techniques to create
manipulated word of mouth.
To better understand the effect of manipulation, we conduct an em-
pirical analysis to examine the reliability of Twitter sentiment in the context
of movie tweets. Since direct detection of manipulated tweets is difficult,
we adopt a regression discontinuity design approach (RDD) using movie re-
lease as a source of an exogenous shock, and we find that the average Twitter
sentiment and the proportion of highly positive tweets both exhibit a signif-
icant drop on the movie’s release day. In addition, independent productions
and low budget movies tend to experience a larger drop than major studio
productions and high budget movies. To examine the effect of competition
on movie sentiment manipulation, we construct a movie competition mea-
sure based on both the time and theme dimensions through topic modeling.
Our finding suggests that a higher level of competition leads to a larger drop
in Twitter sentiment on the release day, and hence more manipulation.
To strengthen our identification argument, we use a cross-platform
identification strategy (Chevalier and Mayzlin 2006; Proserpio and Zervas
2014) where we exploit the institutional difference between Twitter and a
more controlled movie platform, IMDb, to identify sentiment manipula-
tion. A cross-platform identification strategy is a powerful way of find-
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ing a proper control group (Proserpio and Zervas 2014): whereas a typi-
cal matching procedure finds a similar control unit for each treated unit,
a cross-platform analysis compares the observation of the same unit across
different platforms, which helps reduce the concern of endogeneity-related
biases (Imbens 2004). We conduct our cross-platform study on Twitter and
IMDb through a difference-in-discontinuity approach (Grembi et al. 2016),
which is essentially a combination of difference-in-differences (DID) and
RDD. The difference-in-discontinuity approach is powerful because the ef-
fects of most potential confounders will be differenced out through the esti-
mation procedure. Our difference-in-discontinuity analysis results are con-
sistent with those from the RDD analysis, further suggesting the existence
of sentiment manipulation.
To further alleviate the concern that the movie release shock might
not be entirely exogenous, we use two additional sources of exogenous shocks:
movie studios’ earnings announcement dates and severe weather condi-
tions. The accounting and finance literature suggests that movie studios
have an incentive to disclose good news prior to earnings announcements.
While earnings announcements might affect movie studios’ behavior, they
are less likely to affect ordinary moviegoers’ tweeting or commenting be-
haviors. Using movie studios’ quarterly earning announcement dates as
exogenous shocks, we find that there is a significant sentiment drop on the
announcement date, which is consistent with potential sentiment manipu-
lation.
Severe weather conditions have been shown to significantly reduce
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people’s willingness to go out and watch movies (Moretti 2011), and these
weather conditions have been widely used as a source of exogenous shocks
(Angrist and Krueger 2001; Miguel et al. 2004; Moretti 2011; Qiu, Tang
and Whinston 2015). The intuition behind this exogenous shock is that,
when weather condition is severe, less people would want to watch movies
in the movie theater, and hence the movie studio’s manipulation incentive
will decrease. We combine the movie theater location (from the U.S. Census
data) and weather data (from Weather Underground) to construct a mea-
sure to reflect the percentage of movie theaters in the U.S. experiencing
severe weather conditions—namely, cold, heavy rain, or heavy snow—on a
given movie release day. We then incorporate these severe weather condi-
tions into our RDD analysis. The results show less sentiment drops when
there is a severe weather condition on the movie release day, which fur-
ther suggests that the sentiment drop is likely coming from movie studios’
strategic sentiment manipulation.
It is possible that Twitter sentiment could be related to consumers’
expectation of movie quality and other demand-side expectation. For ex-
ample, consumers might expect movies to be of high quality after watching
movie trailers or being exposed to other marketing campaigns. Any dif-
ference in sentiment before and after movie release could be coming from
the gap between the expected quality and the actual quality of the movie.
Therefore, in addition to controlling for movie studios’ daily advertising
budget, we also control for demand-side expectation by using the Holly-
wood Stock Exchange (HSE) and Google Trends data, both of which to cer-
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tain extent reflect consumers’ expectation of the movie. We still observe
significant sentiment drops even after controlling for these demand side
variables, which serve as a further evidence of sentiment manipulation.
Our research contributes to the literature on social media and sen-
timent analysis by analyzing movie tweets through a regression disconti-
nuity design approach, developing a movie competition measure based on
topic modeling results, as well as using a difference-in-discontinuity and
other sources of exogenous variations to validate our empirical results. Our
analyses also suggest that practitioners should be cautious when conduct-
ing sentiment analysis on user generated content, since the designs of these
platforms make them susceptible to strategic manipulation.
2.2 Literature Review
User generated content (UGC) and social media data have been used in all
aspects of decision making processes. However, several studies have empir-
ically shown the existence of widespread manipulation practices on these
sites. Mayzlin et al. (2014) examined the prevalence of difficult-to-detect
fake reviews on popular review websites. More specifically, they used a
difference-in-differences approach to study how hotel characteristics and
ownership structure affect the level of review manipulation, which consists
of posting positive reviews for one’s own business and manufacturing nega-
tive reviews for competitors, on travel websites Expedia.com and TripAdvi-
sor.com. Luca and Zervas (2015) investigated the presence of restaurant re-
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view fraud on another review website, Yelp.com. They found that positive
review fraud is related to reputational concerns, whereas negative review
fraud is more likely due to competitions. Anderson and Simester (2014)
offered a different perspective on the nature of deceptive reviews. Using a
dataset from a private apparel retailer, they found that, in addition to firms’
strategic behaviors, customers without clear financial incentives to manipu-
late product ratings might still write reviews on products they did not pur-
chase. Hu et al. (2012) developed a statistical method to examine whether
strategic manipulation is present in product reviews. Several computer sci-
ence studies including Ott et al. (2011), Ott et al. (2012), and Mukherjee et
al. (2013) also used statistical and machine learning techniques to identify
and estimate the prevalence of opinion spam.
Besides review websites, social media platforms also suffer from ma-
nipulative behaviors. Stringhini et al. (2012) detailed the existence of Twit-
ter Account Markets that aim at inflating one’s number of followers as well
as sending out advertising tweets at a large scale.2 Messias et al. (2013)
constructed fake accounts on Twitter to demonstrate how these accounts’
influence measures can be significantly improved by following simple au-
tomated strategies. The results of these studies imply that the credibility of
UGC and social media data can be questionable. Therefore, decisions based
on questionable data can be harmful to the decision maker’s welfare. Ma-
nipulation on these platforms also has behavioral implications. Adomavi-
2For example, advertisers can purchase Twitter accounts online and use these accounts
to generate synthetic sentiment. http://buyaccs.com/en is an example of such websites
that allow anyone to purchase Twitter accounts in bulk.
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cius et al. (2013) examined the effect of recommendation on consumers’
preference formation. Their findings suggest that strategic recommender
systems can intentionally provide recommendations that would result in
systematic biases. Forman et al. (2008) studied the issue of identity dis-
closure in online communities, and they found that reviewers’ identity dis-
closure affects community members’ judgment and product sales. Strategi-
cally misrepresented identities, then, might mislead consumers and result
in inferior decision making. Goh et al. (2013) examined the differential
impact of user generated and marketer generated contents on consumers’
purchasing decisions. These effects are less clear, however, if consumers
are uncertain about the true identities of content contributors. Tsikerdekis
and Zeadally (2014) provided an overview of online deception in social me-
dia platforms. They discussed several deception techniques and identified
challenges facing deception researchers, including a lack of a unified theory
and methods for deception detection.
There have been several theoretical studies that examine the issue of
sentiment manipulation. Dellarocas (2006) constructed a theoretical model
on firms’ manipulative behaviors. He showed that manipulations could be
beneficial to consumers if firms’ manipulation strategies are monotonically
increasing in their true qualities. He also showed that, under certain thresh-
old conditions, firms would actually benefit if manipulation were not possi-
ble. Mayzlin (2006) examined marketers’ incentives to generate anonymous
promotional messages online. Using a game theoretic model, her results
showed that, contrary to traditional advertising strategies, firms producing
12
low quality products would engage in more promotional chat than those
producing high quality products. This is because high quality products
benefit from positive WOM which substitutes for advertising, whereas low
quality products do not.
Recently, researchers have begun to investigate the relationship be-
tween media sentiment and firm stock performance. A stream of literature
on the financial value of social media has shown that social media-based
metrics and social media sentiment have a strong relationship with firm
equity value (Luo et al. 2013; Yu et al. 2013). More specifically, in the
setting of the movie industry, Chen et al. (2012) showed a significant ef-
fect of movie reviews on movie studios’ stock performance. While there
exist theories and evidences on the effects of media sentiment on firm eq-
uity value, there are very few studies examining firms’ strategic sentiment
manipulation in social media to boost stock performance prior to earn-
ings announcements. Notice that the prior accounting literature identifies
two main strategies to manage reported earnings: (1) accounting method
changes and accrual-based earnings management that do not affect cash
flows and (2) real actions that affect cash flows. The early evidence on earn-
ings management concentrates on accrual-based strategies. Sentiment ma-
nipulation belongs to the second strategy: it can affect movie sales, and
hence have an impact on cash flows of movie studios. Our research sheds
light on understanding sentiment manipulation as a form of earnings man-
agement.
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2.3 Institutional Background and Data
2.3.1 Movie Industry
In our empirical analysis we examine how the sentiment measure reflected
on Twitter is affected by manipulation, in the context of the movie industry.
Before we describe our empirical analysis, we first provide some institu-
tional background of the movie industry to explain topics such as revenue
sharing and advertising. We then argue that, since manipulation activi-
ties can be perceived as a type of promotional activity, movie studios have
incentives to conduct sentiment manipulation, especially before movie re-
lease.
There are three major categories of players in the movie industry:
producers, distributors, and exhibitors (McKenzie 2012; Walls and McKen-
zie 2012). A producer may buy a screenplay, buy a book to adapt into a
screenplay, or hire a writer to develop an idea, and then make a movie. A
distributor distributes the movie; it also makes important operational de-
cisions such as choosing a release date and designing and implementing
an advertising campaign. Finally, exhibitors are movie theaters that show
movies to audiences. Recently there has been a trend of vertical integra-
tion in the movie industry: movie studios increasingly both produce and
distribute movies themselves (Corts 2001; Gilchrist and Sands 2015). Corts
(2001) found that movie producers and distributors generally act like inte-
grated firms. Therefore, in our study, we regard a movie studio as both a
producer and distributor.
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From the extant literature on the movie industry we know that one of
the most important decisions a movie distributor/movie studio has to make
is to implement an effective advertising campaign (McKenzie 2012; Walls
and McKenzie 2012; Gilchrist and Sands 2015), and sentiment manipula-
tion can be a strategy distributors/studios use to advertise movies. More-
over, several reasons suggest that studios might be incentivized to conduct
more sentiment manipulation prior to movie release, and less afterward.
This observation turns out to be instrumental for our empirical analysis,
and we enumerate these reasons in detail below.
(1) Distributors/movie studios typically charge fees as percentages of
box office revenues rather than a flat fee. More importantly, the share di-
vision of a distributor/studio changes over weeks of the movie’s run, with
a smaller share for the distributor/studio in later weeks: for a major mo-
tion picture, for example, it is common for the distributor/studio to keep
as much as 90% of revenues in the opening week, and hence the incen-
tive for the distributor/studio to conduct sentiment manipulation should
be very high before the opening weekend release. After the opening week,
the distributor’s share drops dramatically to 50% or even 30% (notice that
the exhibitor tends to get a larger share after the opening week) (Moul 2007;
McKenzie 2012; Gilchrist and Sands 2015).
(2) In the movie industry, it is widely believed that the opening week-
end is critical for studios. A movie that fails to open strongly almost always
loses the attention of the media, audiences, and exhibitors. According to
Box Office Mojo, the opening weekend accounts for a very large fraction
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of a film’s box office, typically 30% - 45%.3 Additionally, if the opening
weekend box office revenue is low, the exhibitors (movie theaters) may drop
the movie or reduce the number of screens on which the theater shows the
movie some point after release. Krider et al. (2005) showed that exhibitors
closely monitor box office sales and respond with screen allocation deci-
sions.4 Therefore, the incentive of the distributors/studios to conduct sen-
timent manipulation should be very high before the movie release, and then
drop significantly after the release.
(3) The vast majority (90%) of a movie’s advertising budget is spent
before the movie release (Elberse and Anand 2007). One important under-
lying reason is that the revenue sharing division of the distributor/studio
drops significantly in later weeks, as mentioned earlier. Considering the
similarity between advertising and sentiment manipulation (both of them
promotion efforts of distributors/studios), the level of sentiment manipu-
lation may also drop significantly. In a related context, Hu et al. (2011)
found that the manipulation level in online book reviews decreases with
the passage of time.
Based on the above arguments, movie distributors/studios have in-
centives to conduct sentiment manipulation, and they may conduct more
manipulation prior to the movie release.
3http://www.boxofficemojo.com/alltime/weekends/
4In general, “a film’s opening weekend is usually the most lucrative one for its studio.
Financial agreements with theaters normally give the filmmaker a greater percentage of the
box office during the first weeks of release. And in this glutted market, studio executives
also worry that theaters will replace a film with another if it doesn’t win audiences quickly”
(Corts 2001).
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2.3.2 Twitter and Manipulation
Here we briefly discuss why Twitter is a well-suited platform to study senti-
ment manipulation. Compared with other professional movie review plat-
forms, Twitter is a relatively open platform, which makes it much easier
for interested players to engage in strategic and manipulative behaviors.
While Twitter is perhaps not a major platform that consumers would visit
in search of product reviews, many companies today adopt tweeting as a
new marketing tool.5 The prior literature has shown that tweets can have
significant effects on movie box office revenue (Rui et al. 2013) and on the
viewership of TV shows (Gong et al. 2015;6 Seiler et al. 2015).7 In reality,
people may follow Twitter trends or movie studio’s official Twitter accounts
to obtain latest movie news, and movie studios can use fake Twitter ac-
counts or hire real Twitter accounts to post overly positive messages about
their movies and attract customers. These fake accounts or hired accounts
are called hidden paid posters or termed “Internet water army” in China.8
The New York Times reported that Sony was fined by the Connecti-
cut attorney general for creating fake reviews for at least four of its movies.9
The phenomenon of online manipulation in movie industry is neither new
5http://www.msi.org/reports/does-tweeting-impact-the-bottom-line/
6Gong, Shiyang, Juanjuan Zhang, Ping Zhao, and Xuping Jiang (2015). “Tweeting
Increases Product Demand.” Working paper, MIT Sloan School of Management, Mas-
sachusetts Institute of Technology.
7Seiler, Stephen, Song Yao, and Wenbo Wang (2015). “The Impact of Earned
Media on Demand: Evidence from a Natural Experiment.” Stanford Univer-






nor exclusive to the US. Sina Weibo (often described as “China’s Twitter”)
has been used by opportunistic companies,10 and the movie industry has
quickly adopted sentiment manipulation for promotion and advertising in
China.11 The Chinese movie “The Last Supper” admitted hiring an “Inter-
net water army” to raise its rating on film review websites and to endorse
the movie on Sina Weibo. Some insiders suspected that using a water army
as part of a movie’s online promotion is already widely known in the Chi-
nese movie industry: many movies resorts to sentiment manipulation, each
at a cost of over 1 million Chinese yuan (around 160,000 US dollars).12 Such
paid posting is a well-managed activity by Internet PR companies involv-
ing thousands of individuals and tens of thousands of different online IDs.
There is even a quality control team who checks that the fake posts meet a
certain “quality” threshold. For instance, a post would not be validated if it
is deleted by the host or is composed of garbled words.13
The recent marketing literature has studied the causal effect of tweet-
ing on TV show viewing (Gong et al. 2015; Seiler et al. 2015). TV show pro-
ducers can hire influential users to tweet and boost viewership significantly.
Although it is not the same as sentiment manipulation, it shows that view-
ers can be affected by the endorsement effect of tweets. Meanwhile, Twitter








and a handful of bots were programmed to tweet.14 Other movie review
platforms, such as IMDb, have stricter authentication steps for new user
registration and a user reputation system to prevent automated registra-
tions and manipulation activities. Therefore, since the main focus of our
paper is to study manipulation activities, Twitter appears to be well-suited
for our investigation.
2.3.3 Illustrative Example
A platform for movie distributors/studios to conduct sentiment manipula-
tion is Twitter. Specifically, studios can easily manufacture tweets that ap-
pear to be posted by individual consumers in order to influence consumers’
movie-going decisions. Here we describe an illustrative example where we
select two movies, At Any Price (2012) and After Earth (2013), and collect all
tweets related to these movies, starting 60 days before the release date, un-
til 60 days after the release date. We train a Naive Bayes Classifier based on
the corpus described in Go et al. (2009), and use this classifier to measure
the probability of any given tweet being positive. We then use this probabil-
ity as a measure of sentiment polarity. The consumer sentiment on Twitter
might experience a release shock near the release date, because movie studios
have more incentives to conduct sentiment manipulation prior to movie re-
lease, as described in the previous section. Therefore, one of our main em-

























Figure 2.1: Twitter Sentiment of
Movie At Any Price (2012)





















Figure 2.2: Twitter Sentiment of
Movie After Earth (2013)
prior to movie release.
We use a graphical analysis to examine the aforementioned release
shock, and the result is shown in Figures 2.1 and 2.2, where we plot the pat-
terns of Twitter sentiment over time. We can see that there appears to be a
discontinuity on the release day in Twitter sentiment for both movies. No-
tice that the local linear fit is generated via a local linear regression. While
refraining from making any causal statements, we do point out the obser-
vation that Twitter sentiment exhibits an interesting pattern around the re-
lease day, which leads us to suspect that some kind of manipulation might
be involved in the observed Twitter sentiment.
20
2.3.4 Identification Strategy
Since firms’ manipulation decisions are unobservable and often difficult to
detect, we need an empirical strategy that will allow us to examine ma-
nipulation indirectly. Regression discontinuity design (RDD) is a quasi-
experimental econometric strategy to establish the causal effect of an inter-
vention or a treatment, and has been used extensively in economics liter-
ature. RDD works by considering observations close to a threshold value
which determines whether an intervention or treatment is assigned. By
comparing observations lying slightly above and below the threshold one
is able to estimate the causal effect induced by the treatment. Lee and
Lemieux (2010) provided a detailed introduction on the theory and imple-
mentation of RDD. In this study, we use a RDD approach by which the
subjects that receive treatments are the movies, and the “treatment” is the
movie release shock that happens to all movies. The release shock is a rea-
sonable choice of treatment because movie studios’ pre-release and post-
release manipulation incentives/advertising strategies are different, with
the former being much larger than the latter. Notice that, distinct from most
RDD studies that compare different subjects above or below some thresh-
old value, we compare the same subject—that is, the same movie—prior
to and after facing the release shock. This setup is similar to Goes et al.
(2016) where they used an RDD approach to examine whether an individ-
ual’s motivation to contribute to an online knowledge exchange is affected
by whether or not a goal is reached. To ensure the validity of the RDD,
it needs to be shown that the subjects cannot perfectly manipulate their
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Table 2.1: Summary Statistics of Twitter Movie Sentiment
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Number of Tweets for Each Movie 482 36,415.96 67,527.09 1 511,874
Number of Tweets for Major Studio Movies 82 54,241.38 63,255.41 33 411,317
Number of Tweets for Low Budget Movies 219 14,103.19 33,081.59 1 311,314
Average Sentiment Score of Each Movie 482 0.624 0.0571 0.371 0.923
Average Sentiment Score of Major Studio Movies 82 0.614 0.0472 0.490 0.742
Average Sentiment Score of Low Budget Movies15 219 0.631 0.0590 0.371 0.923
treatment status. In other words, in our setup, we need to show that movie
studios cannot perfectly manipulate the release shock. It might seem at first
glance that movie studios should be able to choose their movie release day;
however, it should be noted that our treatment is the behavioral impact and
the surge of genuine consumer comments that are produced after the movie
release, irrelevant to the actual choice of dates. In addition, the magnitude
of this impact cannot be perfectly controlled by the movie studios. There-
fore, this insight enables us to establish the validity of our RDD approach.
In the following sections, we develop and test several hypotheses through a
RDD approach. In addition, we conduct several additional empirical anal-
yses, including a difference-in-discontinuity design using a cross-platform
identification strategy, severe weather shocks, and earnings announcement
shocks as robustness checks to strengthen our empirical results, in case the
movie release shock is not entirely exogenous.
2.3.5 Data Collection
15Here low budget movies are those with a budget less than 3 million US dollars.
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The illustrative example described in the previous section motivates us to
explore in depth how the release shock would affect the Twitter sentiment.
We compile a list of 482 movies released in the United States in the years
2012 and 2013, and for each movie, we use its corresponding hashtag (#)
to identify and collect its tweets that are written in English, starting 60
days prior to its release day and up to 60 days after the release day.16 We
then use the trained Naive Bayes classifier to classify the polarity of these
tweets, and aggregate them daily to construct a daily average Twitter sen-
timent measure for each movie, with 0 being the lowest possible sentiment
level and 1 the highest. We also collect movie characteristics data, includ-
ing movie runtime, budget, color, movie genre, whether or not the movie
is produced by a major studio, and so on, from the website Internet Movie
Database (IMDb). Note that not every movie has tweets associated with it
during the complete 120-day window; therefore, our data set is an unbal-
anced panel. Summary statistics of the movie data set are listed in Table
2.1. In addition, we acquired a detailed data set on daily movie advertising
expenditure across different advertising channels from Nielsen.
16We used a simple heuristic approach where we combined every word in a movie title,
removed spaces in between words, to form the hashtag for a given movie. This is the ap-
proach users generally use when composing hashtags since hashtags do not allow spaces.
See https://support.twitter.com/articles/49309. When we collected the tweets we man-
ually checked, for each movie, if there is any possibility of an attribution problem: for
movies that share the same title as some books, cartoons, or games, etc., we removed them
from our data set.
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2.4 Empirical Analysis
2.4.1 Hypothesis Development and Empirical Results
Recall that the illustrative example shows there is a significant drop in the
sentiment level after the release day, which suggests the potential existence
of manipulation. We therefore propose the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1 There will be a significant drop (discontinuity) in a movie’s Twit-
ter sentiment level on its release day if the sentiment is manipulated.
Following the literature on regression discontinuity design (Lee and
Lemieux 2010), we specify the following parametric polynomial model with













where sentimentjt is movie j’s average Twitter sentiment on day t; postjt is
a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if day t is on or after movie j’s re-
lease day, and 0 otherwise; durationjt is the number of days after movie j’s
release, where a positive value means that day t is after the movie release,
and vice versa; νj is the movie fixed effects; and εjt is a normally distributed
error term. An interaction term is included to allow the regression function
to differ on both sides of the cutoff point (Lee and Lemieux 2010, Goes
et al. 2016). To explore the sensitivity of results to a range of different
model specifications, we include models with different polynomial orders
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for robustness check, with p̄ ranging from 0 to 3, and report AIC and BIC
of each model. Note that the model with the minimum AIC/BIC is gen-
erally preferred. The regression results are shown in Table 2.2, where the
main variable of interest is post. The results show that the coefficient of
post is negative and significant across different model specifications. This
indicates a drop in Twitter sentiment, which suggests the existence of sen-
timent manipulation. We argue that this gap should not be coming from
a movie expectation-realization gap, because on average there should be as
much overestimate and underestimate in sentiment for each movie—not
a consistent overestimate of movie sentiment prior to movie release. This
argument is consistent with the identification strategy in Moretti (2011)
where he used the residual from a regression of opening-weekend sales of
movies on number of screens during the opening weekend as the measure of
movie-specific surprises, where surprises were defined as deviations from
expected demands, which correspond to the expectation gaps in our setup.
He argued that, although there might be movie-specific surprises, on av-
erage, theaters would predict the movie demand correctly, as reflected in
their choice of number of screens. Parallel to his reasoning, we rule out
the possibility of an expectation-realization gap, and Hypothesis 1 is sup-
ported. Note that the median of movie sentiment in our sample is 0.624.
If we reduce this median by 0.034 (the coefficient on post), then the re-
sulting sentiment level, 0.590, will be very close to the 25th sentiment per-
centile of movie sentiment, 0.595. Hence the magnitude of the coefficient
associated with the post variable is considerable. To further control for the
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demand-side expectation, we conduct additional robustness analyses using
several measures of the demand-side expectation such as the Hollywood
Stock Exchange and Google Trends as control variables. We also employ a
cross-platform identification strategy as well as using different sources of
exogenous shocks. The results of these analyses are robust, and we describe
them in detail in later sections.
In addition to analyzing sentiment manipulation using the average
sentiment level, we also consider the measure proposed by Mayzlin et al.
(2014)—namely, the proportion of highly positive tweets among all tweets,
as a measure of positive sentiment manipulation. Their study looked at
review manipulation on travel websites’ hotel reviews, where hotels were
given ratings ranging from 1 star to 5 stars. They used the proportion
of 5-star reviews among all reviews as a building block of the dependent
variable where a difference-in-differences procedure was then used to ex-
amine the effects of hotel ownership and competition on positive review
manipulation. This measure is informative and important for our analy-
sis because both positive and negative sentiment manipulation can coexist,
which would correspond to a potentially large proportion of both highly
positive and highly negative tweets. However, we will not be able to ob-
serve the distribution of extreme sentiments by only observing the average
sentiment level. Therefore, we follow their approach and replace the depen-
dent variable in Equation (2.1) with the proportion of highly positive movie
tweets as the dependent variable, where highly positive tweets are defined
as those with a raw sentiment score greater than or equal to 0.8. The results
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Table 2.2: RD Estimates of the Effect of Movie Release on Twitter Sentiment

































































Observations 52,829 52,829 52,829 52,829
AIC -84836.44 -84870.79 -84880.99 -84881.4
BIC -84818.69 -84835.29 -84827.74 -84828.15
of this alternative model are consistent with the regression model specified
by Equation (2.1), with the coefficients of the post variable still significantly
negative across different polynomial specifications; therefore, we suspect
there is sentiment manipulation. These regression results are shown in Ta-
ble A.1 in the appendix.
In addition, a movie’s budget has direct influences on the cast mem-
bers, equipments, costumes, and special effects that it can afford, and con-
27
sumers often use these movie characteristics to predict the quality of the
movie. Therefore, the budget provides an indicator of the ex-ante movie
quality, and we propose the following:
Hypothesis 2 Low budget movies tend to have a larger drop in Twitter senti-
ment than high budget movies.
The corresponding regression model is as follows:









β4,p · postjt · duration
p
jt + νj + εjt, (2.2)
where we define low budget movies to be those with budgets in the low-
est 10% percentile, which corresponds to movies with a budget less than
3 million US dollars. The results, including models of different polyno-
mial orders, are shown in Table 2.3. The coefficient of interest, β2, is sig-
nificantly negative across different specifications, which suggests that low
budget movies indeed face a larger drop in sentiment, and hence more ma-
nipulation. Thus Hypothesis 2 is supported. Following our earlier argu-
ment, we run the regression specified in Equation (2.2) again with the de-
pendent variable replaced by the proportion of highly positive tweets, and
the results are shown in Table A.2 in the appendix. We can see that the coef-
ficients of the variable post ∗lowBudget are significantly negative across dif-
ferent polynomial specifications. Therefore, we conclude that there is more
sentiment manipulation in low budget movies than high budget movies.
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Moreover, we check whether or not a movie is produced by a ma-
jor studio, and we argue that a major studio production is less likely to
engage in manipulative behavior because of a high manipulation cost re-
sulting from reputation concerns, whereas independently produced movies
have less reputation concerns and thus a lower manipulation cost.
Hypothesis 3 Major studio movies tend to have a smaller drop in Twitter sen-
timent than non-major studio movies.
The regression model is as follows:









β4,p · postjt · duration
p
jt + νj + εjt, (2.3)
where majorStudioj takes the value 1 if movie j is produced by a major
film studio. Similar to previous analyses, we also include different polyno-
mial orders for robustness check. The results of all model specifications are
shown in Table 2.4. The coefficient of interest, β2, is significantly positive
across different specifications. We see similar results when we replace the
dependent variable with the proportion of highly positive tweets, as shown
in Table A.3 in the appendix. Therefore, Hypothesis 3 is supported. This
result is consistent with Mayzlin et al. (2014) where they showed that ho-
tel chains are associated with less rating manipulation than independent
hotels because of reputation concerns.
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2.4.2 Effect of Competition on Sentiment Manipulation
To empirically examine how firm competition affects sentiment manipula-
tion, we construct a competition measure based on the following two di-
mensions: (1) timing competition and (2) thematic competition. Timing
competition between any given pair of movies is defined as the time in-
terval between these two movies’ release days. If two movies are released
around the same time, then they are likely to be competing with each other
directly. Therefore, a smaller interval between the release days corresponds
to a fiercer level of competition, and vice versa. Thematic competition is
characterized by how similar any given pair of movies are to each other.
We employ a machine learning technique, topic modeling, and use movie
keywords collected from IMDb as inputs to the topic model, to uncover the
underlying topic distributions of each movie. We then compute the cosine
similarity between a pair of movies’ relative topic distributions as our mea-
sure of thematic similarity between these two movies. Note that the range
of thematic similarity is between 0 and 1. The details of topic models, the
topics generated, and the operationalization of the similarity measures can
be found in the appendix. Once we calculate the time difference between
any pair of movies’ release days and the thematic similarity between that
pair of movies’ topics, we can construct our competition measure to be one
that, given a movie, counts the number of other movies that are released one
month within the focal movie, and with a thematic similarity compared to
the focal movie to be larger than 0.7. We denote this competition measure
as [±1month&sim > 0.7] and develop the following hypothesis:
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Hypothesis 4 Movies facing a higher level of competition will have a larger
drop in Twitter sentiment than those facing a lower level of competition.
To test this hypothesis, we specify the following regression model:









β4,p · postjt · duration
p
jt + β5 · colorj
+ β6 · runtimej + β7 ·majorStudioj + β8 ·numTweetsj
+ β9 · genrej + εjt. (2.4)
We can see that the coefficient of the post ∗ [±1month&sim > 0.7] variable is
significantly negative across models of different polynomial orders. Since
the post ∗ [±1month&sim > 0.7] variable is a measure of competition, this
result means that the more competition a movie faces, the more sentiment
drop after the movie release we observe in the data. This result is con-
sistent with our expectation that competition among movies will lead to
more sentiment manipulation. To see whether the results are robust to
different competition measures, we also consider changing the threshold
value of the thematic similarity to 0.75 (±1month&sim > 0.75), as well as
changing the time window to two months before and after the release day
(±2month&sim > 0.7), and the results show that more competition corre-
sponds to a larger drop in Twitter sentiment. Therefore, these findings are
robust to different competition measures. The results are shown in Table
A.11 and Table A.12 in the appendix.
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2.5 Endogeneity Concerns of Movie Release Shocks
2.5.1 Difference-in-Discontinuity Analysis
To further investigate the sentiment drop, we employ a relatively new em-
pirical methodology: difference-in-discontinuity design, to conduct more
empirical analyses. Essentially, the difference-in-discontinuity design is a
combination of difference-in-differences (DID) and regression discontinu-
ity design (RDD) (Grembi et al. 2016). Similar to DID, a requirement of
the difference-in-discontinuity design is to identify two similar platforms
where there is some institutional difference between the two platforms such
that one platform is more susceptible to some shocks while the other one
is not. Difference-in-discontinuity design is a cross-platform identifica-
tion strategy (Chevalier and Mayzlin 2006; Proserpio and Zervas 2014)
where institutional differences between two platforms are used to identify
the treatment effect. Proserpio and Zervas (2014) argued that the cross-
platform identification strategy has its unique strength in finding a proper
control group. For example, several matching procedures have been ap-
plied to identify appropriate control groups in empirical studies (e.g. Aral
et al. 2009). In a typical matching procedure, a treated unit is matched
with a control unit based on similar observable characteristics. In the cross-
platform identification strategy, the matched treated and control units are
not just similar with respect to some observable characteristics, but they are
often the same unit in different platforms. In our context, our goal is to find
two movie-related platforms where any given movie found on one platform
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is also discussed in the other platform. The advantage of comparing the
same movie across two different platforms is that the observable variables
of this movie will be identical in both platforms by definition, because we
are really only looking at a single movie. This is important because Im-
bens (2004) showed that stringent matching criteria can reduce concerns
about endogeneity-related biases. To acheive this, we augment our origi-
nal dataset with IMDb movie reviews in order to exploit the institutional
differences between these two platforms for our difference-in-discontinuity
analysis.17 We describe the institutional difference as follows: Twitter is a
less controlled platform where anyone can post tweets to express their opin-
ions on movies (Twitter has a very open API policy). While the popularity
of Twitter attracts advertisers to pay to increase their Twitter presence, ma-
licious individuals or even competitors can write simple programs to use
fake Twitter accounts to achieve the same level of advertising without Twit-
ter’s spam filter and verification mechanisms detecting them (Urbina 2013).
In contrast to Twitter, IMDb is a more strictly controlled platform:
it implements a stricter authentication steps for new user registration and
a user reputation system to prevent automated registrations and manip-
ulation activities. It also has strict rules on how to avoid gaming the sys-
tem.18 Therefore, compared with Twitter, the cost of manipulation in IMDb
17IMDb is a popular movie database with detailed cast and crew information. Users can
provide review and rating for movies. http://www.imdb.com/
18On IMDb, users can vote on movies as many times as they want but every vote will
overwrite the previous one; the movie rating displayed on a movie page is a weighted
average of all users’ votes instead of a simple average (various filters are applied to the raw
data in order to eliminate and reduce manipulation activities); unlike Twitter, it is difficult
to create and control a large number of IMDb accounts.
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is greatly increased. In summary, our difference-in-discontinuity approach
is a cross-platform identification strategy where we exploit the institutional
differences between Twitter and IMDb to identify manipulation.
We process IMDb review comments to obtain the sentiment scores
analogous to how we processed tweets. It is worth noting that the standard
DID design, such as the one used in Mayzlin et al. (2014), requires a strong
assumption of parallel trend between sentiment manipulation on Twitter
and on IMDb in a long time window, which may not be satisfied in our
setting. In the difference-in-discontinuity design, we do not require such
a strong assumption: we only need the parallel trend between sentiment
manipulation on Twitter and on IMDb around the discontinuity point (the
movie release day, a much shorter time window).
To implement the difference-in-discontinuity estimator, we define
the following quantities of differences:
dif f scorejt = twitter sentimentjt
−imdb sentimentjt,
dif f positive proportionjt = twitter positive proportionjt
−imdb positive proportionjt,
dif f negative proportionjt = twitter negative proportionjt
−imdb negative proportionjt,
where twitter sentimentjt is the mean sentiment score on Twitter for movie
j at time t; imdb sentimentjt is the mean sentiment score of IMDb com-
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ments for movie j at time t.
twitter positive proportionjt / imdb positive proportionjt are the pro-
portion of extremely positive tweets/comments on Twitter/IMDb for movie
j at time t, where extremely positive tweets/comments are defined as tweets
or comments that have their raw sentiment score ≥ 0.8.19
twitter negative proportionjt / imdb negative proportionjt are the
proportion of extremely negative tweets/comments on Twitter/IMDb for
movie j at time t, where extremely negative tweets/comments are defined
as tweets/comments that have their raw sentiment score ≤ 0.4. With these
definitions, we specify the following regression model:









β3,p · postjt · duration
p
jt + νj + εjt,
where the dependent variable is the mean sentiment score difference at time
t as defined above, postjt is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if time
t is after movie j’s release and 0 otherwise, and durationjt is the number of
days after movie j’s release, where a positive value means that day t is af-
ter the movie release, and vice versa. Note that we are interested in β1, the
coefficient of postjt. We also construct two other regressions in which the
dependent variables are the difference in the proportion of extremely pos-
itive comments at time t and the difference in the proportion of extremely
19Our results are robust using other score thresholds.
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negative comments at time t, respectively.
These regression results are shown in Table 2.6, Table 2.7, and Ta-
ble 2.8. We can see that the coefficients of post are significantly negative
in all three regressions and robust to different model specifications, which
means that there is a significant drop in the mean sentiment score differ-
ence, proportion of extremely positive Tweets/comments, and proportion
of extremely negative Tweets/comments, respectively. These findings fur-
ther strengthen the earlier regression discontinuity results on sentiment
manipulation.
In the literature, little is known about the relative prevalence of pos-
itive and negative manipulation. On the one hand, a negative review hurts
more than a positive review helps (Chevalier and Mayzlin 2006; Hu et al.
2011, 2012): if a negative tweet has a greater role in affecting consumer pur-
chase, other things being equal, a movie studio will have a greater incen-
tive to conduct negative manipulation than positive manipulation given the
manipulation budget. The reason is that the marginal benefit of conduct-
ing negative manipulation is higher than conducting positive manipulation.
However, on the other hand, the marginal cost of conducting negative ma-
nipulation is typically higher than conducting positive manipulation.20 As
20Usually, movie studios will hire a “public relation” company to conduct positive ma-
nipulation, but “because giving negative comments usually brings side effects and has
risks, few Internet public relations companies will take such orders. So in most cases,
film companies will use staff which they have themselves trained for generating neg-
ative comments about opponents.” Even if some public relation companies are willing
to conduct negative manipulation, they would be more cautious. To avoid problems,
they will often register new accounts from a foreign IP address. Training the internal
staffs or registering new accounts from a foreign IP address involves additional cost. See
http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/749267.shtml.
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a result, both the benefit and the cost of conducting negative manipulation
are higher than those of conducting positive manipulation. Therefore, both
directions are theoretically plausible, and it is an empirical question to ex-
amine whether negative manipulation is more likely to occur than positive
manipulation, and we specify the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 5 The drop in the proportion of extremely positive Tweets will be
larger than that in the proportion of extremely negative Tweets.
From the regressions in which the dependent variables are the difference in
the proportion of extremely positive Tweet/comments and the difference
in the proportion of extremely negative Tweet/comments, we can com-
pare the magnitude of positive manipulation with that of negative ma-
nipulation. We find that the drop in the proportion of extremely positive
Tweets/comments is much larger than the drop in the proportion of ex-
tremely negative Tweets/comments, which suggests that positive manipu-
lation is more prevalent than negative manipulation in general. Therefore,
Hypothesis 5 is supported.
Note that we combine two sources of variations, (i) before and af-
ter movie release; and (ii) the difference in sentiment score distribution
across Twitter and IMDb, to implement our difference-in-discontinuity de-
sign (Grembi et al. 2016). The intuition for our difference-in-discontinuity
is straightforward: the difference-in-discontinuity estimator focuses on the
discontinuity of the difference in sentiment score distribution across Twit-
ter and IMDb at the movie release time. If we use only the variation of the
difference in sentiment score distribution across Twitter and IMDb, the sen-
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timent score difference could be caused by the fact that the two platforms
consist of users with different characteristics. However, in our regressions,
we compare the sentiment score difference between Twitter and IMDb be-
fore and after the movie release. Even if Twitter users are systematically
different from IMDb users, our estimation will still be unbiased as long as
this systematic difference is time-invariant (i.e., the systematical difference
does not change after the movie release).
We also examine how positive and negative manipulation is moder-
ated by the intensity of competition. We specify the following regression
model to quantify the effect of competition:










β4,p · postjt · duration
p
jt + vj + εjt,
where dif f positive proportionjt is the difference in the proportion of ex-
tremely positive Tweets/comments, [±1month&sim > 0.7] is a measure of
competition which counts the number of other movies that are released one
month within the focal movie’s release day, and with a thematic similarity
greater than 0.7 compared with the focal movie. The regression model for
the difference in the proportion of extremely negative Tweets/comments is
specified similarly. The results of these regressions are shown in Table 2.9
and Table 2.10. We can see that, although movie studios facing a higher
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level of competition will conduct a higher level of both positive and neg-
ative sentiment manipulation, the magnitude is quite different. The effect
of competition intensity on negative manipulation is much stronger than
the effect on positive manipulation. Studying the role of positive and neg-
ative manipulation is not only theoretically important, it also has practical
implications. Our result should be of interest to platform designers or poli-
cymakers investigating sentiment manipulation issues. Recently, more and
more platforms are adopting anti-manipulation systems, such as Yelp’s re-
view filter. Potentially, a manipulation detection algorithm may work more
precisely if we know the major task is to detect positive or negative ma-
nipulation (positive and negative manipulation may have different writing
styles and other characteristics). Our results can inform platform design-
ers or policymakers in a given market conditions about the specific type of
sentiment manipulation they should pay close attention to (in general, pos-
itive manipulation is dominant, but negative manipulation becomes more
relevant in a more competitive market environment) and also help them
modify the detection algorithms in their tactical anti-manipulation systems
(Bichler et al. 2010; Ketter et al. 2012). From our previous results we know
that positive manipulation is more prevalent than negative manipulation in
general. However, as the level of competition increases, the level of negative
manipulation will increase more rapidly than the level of positive manip-
ulation. This finding helps us understand the mechanism behind positive
and negative manipulation, which has been overlooked in the prior litera-
ture.
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2.5.2 Quarterly Earnings Announcement
Besides the movie release shock we have used in our regression disconti-
nuity and difference-in-discontinuity analyses so far, we consider another
source of exogenous shock, movie studios’ quarterly earnings announce-
ments, to further strengthen our results on manipulation. The literature
in accounting and finance has shown that firms strategically disclose good
news and withhold bad news prior to earnings announcements because of a
range of incentives, including stock price boosting and the career concerns
of managers (e.g. Kothari et al. 2009). For instance, managers may infor-
mally disclose or leak good news using selective private channels prior to
quarterly earnings announcements. Extensive empirical evidence showed
that managers care about quarterly performance and benchmark beating
prior to quarterly earnings announcements (Graham et al. 2005), and they
have incentives to engage in real earnings management to meet quarterly
financial reporting benchmarks, such as earnings from the same quarter in
the previous year (Cohen et al. 2010). The accounting literature has demon-
strated that firms use various strategies to beat earnings benchmark prior
to earnings announcement, such as cutting advertising expenses, boosting
sales through accelerating their timing, and generating additional unsus-
tainable sales through price discounts or more lenient credit terms (Cohen
et al. 2010). Here we examine the possibility of a new strategy that has
been underexplored in the literature: firm could increase sales by conduct-
ing sentiment manipulation to boost stock price or meet financial reporting
benchmarks prior to quarterly earnings announcements.
40
In our specific context, movie studios can use sentiment manipula-
tion as a strategy of real earnings management to increase movie box of-
fice revenue, and therefore boost stock price or meet quarterly financial
reporting benchmarks. In the movie industry, major movie studios typi-
cally launch fewer than 20 movies per year, so the box office revenue of a
single movie can have a major effect on the studio’s stock price (Joshi and
Hanssens 2009). Chen et al. (2012) showed that third party movie reviews
have a significant impact on movie studios’ stock performance. Therefore,
movie studios have incentives to conduct sentiment manipulation prior to
earnings announcement as a form of disclosing good news just like a typ-
ical strategic firm behavior documented in the prior accounting literature
(Kothari et al. 2009). After earnings announcement, the manipulation in-
centives decrease dramatically.
It is worth noting that the date of quarterly earnings announcements
is more exogenous than the movie release date because the timing of quar-
terly earnings announcements is largely fixed by the law in advance and is
very unlikely to be affected by the performance of a single movie. In the case
of before/after movie release, we may worry that Twitter users might post
tweets in a different manner before and after movie release. However, it is
less of a concern in the case of before/after quarterly earnings announce-
ments: ordinary Twitter users are unlikely to behave differently before and
after quarterly earnings announcements of movie studios.
We use the following regression equation to examine the impact of
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earnings announcement on Twitter sentiment.








β3,p · postjt · duration
p
jt
+weekt + holidayt + νj + εjt,
where postjt is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if day t is on or after
the movie studio’s quarterly earnings announcement date, and 0 otherwise.
We focus on a windows of one month before/after quarterly earnings an-
nouncement. The estimation results are presented in Table 2.11. We can
see that there is a significant sentiment drop after quarterly earnings an-
nouncement, which suggests the existence of sentiment manipulation prior
to earnings announcement.
2.5.3 Exogenous Weather Shocks
In this section we describe another source of exogenous shock—namely,
severe weather conditions—to further alleviate concerns of potential con-
founding factors. Weather shocks are widely used as exogenous variations
in the literature (Angrist and Krueger 2001; Miguel et al. 2004; Moretti
2011; Qiu, Tang, and Whinston 2015). Moretti (2011) showed that severe
weather on movie release days can significantly reduce people’s willing-
ness to go out to watch movies. Based on negative severe weather shocks
on movie box office revenue, we conduct an additional analysis to examine
the impact of weather shocks on movie release days on the level of Twitter
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sentiment. Compared with our original movie release shocks, the weather
shocks on movie release days create a more exogenous variation. The intu-
ition of our identification is as follows: when the weather on a movie release
day is severe (cold, rain, or snow), the number of potential customers who
are interested in watching a movie is smaller (i.e. the user base that can be
affected by sentiment manipulation is smaller). Therefore, sentiment ma-
nipulation is less effective under severe weather shocks, and movie studios
would have less incentives to conduct manipulation. As a result, empiri-
cally, we should observe a smaller drop in the mean sentiment score when
the weather on the movie release day is more severe (because movie studios
are less likely to conduct manipulation just before the release).
Note that in our context, it is a challenge to construct U.S. nationally-
aggregated weather measures. Moretti (2011) used the weather conditions
in seven large cities to construct U.S. nationally-aggregated weather mea-
sures. We combine different data sources (the zip code level U.S. Cen-
sus data and the weather data from Weather Underground21 and construct
more precise nationally-aggregated weather measures. For each zip code
with movie theater establishments (based on the zip code level census data),
we match it to the closest weather station (based on the weather data from
Weather Underground). Then, for each weather station, we calculate the
percentage of movie theaters in that station among all theaters in the U.S.
We focus on minimum temperature, precipitation, snowfall, to character-
ize three severe weather events on movie release days: a cold day, a heavy
21http://www.wunderground.com/
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rainy day, and a heavy snow day, and construct three nationally-aggregated
weather measures as follows: (1) we define a movie release day to be a cold
day for a weather station if the minimum temperature on that day is below
0◦C (32◦F ); (2) define a movie release day to be a heavy rain day/a heavy
snow day for a zip code region if the precipitation rate is greater than 4 mm
per hour/4 cm per hour;22 (3) calculate the percentage of movie theaters in
the U.S. experiencing three severe weather events on that day (cold weather,
heavy rain, or heavy snow), respectively.
In order to account for seasonal and other time related factors, we
also control for weekly dummies and holiday dummies (Martin Luther King
Day, President’s Day, Veteran’s Day, Thanksgiving Day, Christmas Eve, Christ-
mas, New Year’s Eve, New Year’s Day, Halloween, St. Patrick’s Day in the
following regression equation:
sentimentjt = β1 · postjt + β2(postjt · coldj) + β3(postjt · rainj)









β6,p · postjt · duration
p
jt +weekt + holidayt + νj + εjt,
where coldj , rainj , and snowj are the percentage of movie theaters in the
U.S. experiencing a cold/rain/snow day on movie j’s release day, respec-
tively. weekt represents weekly time dummies, and holidayt represents hol-
iday dummies. The estimation results are presented in Table 2.12. We find
22http://www.metoffice.gov.uk/media/pdf/4/1/No. 03 - Water in the Atmosphere.pdf.
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that the coefficients β2, β3, and β4 are significantly positive, indicating a
smaller drop in the mean sentiment score when more theaters on the movie
release day experienced severe weather. These findings are consistent with
the expectation that movie studios might have less incentive to conduct ma-
nipulation under severe weather conditions, and they further suggest that
the sentiment drops likely come from sentiment manipulation.
2.5.4 Demand-Side Expectation
It is possible that the demand-side expectation—namely, the consumer’s ex-
pectation of the movie quality—may correlate with Twitter sentiment, and
the expectation can be easily influenced by movie trailers or other adver-
tising campaigns. Therefore, in addition to controlling for movies’ daily
advertising budget using a Nielsen data set, we include several demand-
side measures to further control for any differences in sentiment that might
have come from consumers’ expectation-realization gap. The first addi-
tional control variable is the Hollywood Stock Exchange (HSE) price. HSE
is a public prediction market such that people can trade on movies’ box
office revenues. The daily Hollywood Stock Exchange price acts as box of-
fice predictions from the consumer side, and it can reflect any potential
expectation-realization gap (Foutz and Jank 2010). For example, before
watching a movie, a user may think highly of the movie and buy shares
on that movie through Hollywood Stock Exchange. However, after watch-
ing the movie, she may realize that it is not as good as what she expected,
so she could sell her shares. The changes in the movie’s share price listed
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on HSE can thus reflect consumers’ expectation of the movie. The second
additional control is the daily Google Trends score of a movie,23 which also
captures the consumer expectation of the movie. Finally, we also control for
several other variables that may reflect or affect the expectation-realization
gap, such as the IMDb rating of the movie, weekly dummies, and holiday
dummies. The estimation results are robust and are presented in Table 2.13.
2.6 Robustness Checks
2.6.1 Intention, Pre-Consumption, and Promotional Tweets
One concern with using hashtags to identify all tweets related to a movie is
that some tweets are “pre-watch” tweets—namely, those that are posted be-
fore the user watched the movie—whereas others are “post-watch” tweets.
A potential issue with this setup is that pre-watch sentiment will be in-
fluenced largely by advertising and word of mouth effects, while the post-
watch sentiment will more accurately reflect the true perceived quality of
the movie. In the pre-release time period, almost all tweets reflect pre-
watch sentiment, but in the post-release time period, there will be a combi-
nation of pre-watch tweets and post-watch tweets. This difference between
the pre- and post-release time periods may bias our estimation.24 Never-
theless, we argue that our cross-platform difference-in-discontinuity analy-
sis can help mitigate this concern. This is because the distinction between
23https://www.google.com/trends/https://www.google.com/trends/
24We thank an anonymous reviewer for pointing out this issue.
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pre-release (mostly pre-watch) and post-release (combination of pre-watch
and post-watch) sentiment is present on both Twitter and IMDb. Using
the difference-in-discontinuity approach, the impact of the pre-release and
post-release distinction will be canceled out. Since we still observe signifi-
cant sentiment drop in our difference-in-discontinuity analysis, our results
suggest that, while the pre-release and post-release distinction might play
a role, the evidence of sentiment manipulation remains significant.
To further alleviate this concern, we use two different approaches to
control for the percentage of tweets posted by users who have not watched
the movie (pre-consumption tweets). The first approach is to split all tweets
into intention tweets and those that are not intention tweets. Intention
tweets are those whose authors clearly expressed their willingness to watch
the movie in the future, such as “I wanna see [movie name]!” Following Rui
et al. (2013), we used an intention lexicon to extract features from tweets
and then used a support vector machine to construct the intention classifier.
Then, we compute the percentage of intention tweets on a given day as an
approximate measure of the percentage of tweets posted by users who have
not watched the movie, and control for it in our regression. As shown in
Table 2.14, the sentiment drop result is robust. The other approach is sim-
ple and heuristic. For each tweet, we first count the number of verbs that
are present tense, and also the number of verbs that are past tense. If the
number of past tense verbs > the number of present tense verbs, we label
it as “After watching”; if the number of present tense verbs > the number
of past tense verbs, we label it as “Before watching”. Then, for each time
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period, we compute the percentage of pre-consumption tweets. The result
of this regression is shown in Table 2.15, and we still observe a significant
drop in sentiment on the movie release day.
Another concern with using hashtags to identify movie tweets is that some
of these tweets might be posted by movie studios or producers to promote
the movie. Such firm-side promotion/marketing efforts on Twitter might
bias our analysis. We argue that our difference-in-discontinuity approach
can to some extent alleviate this issue if we assume Twitter and IMDb users
to be equally exposed to the firm-side promotion and marketing efforts on
Twitter. If the assumption is valid, then the effect of firm-side promotion
will be canceled out when we compare the difference in sentiment drop
between Twitter and IMDb. To further alleviate the concern of the firm-
side promotion, we conduct two additional analyses as described below.
First, using the trackback permanent tweet link, we can differentiate
between the tweets posted by official Twitter accounts of movie studios and
individual accounts. Given the large amount of tweets, the proportion of
tweets posted by official movie studios is small. After we remove all tweets
posted by official Twitter accounts of movie studios, we still observe a sig-
nificant drop in tweet sentiment. The estimation results are robust and are
presented in Table 2.16.
Second, we include the number of ad tweets, Google trends score of
each movie, and the IMDb rating of each movie as control variables to con-
trol for movie studios’ marketing efforts. In Table 2.17, the variable num-
ber ad tweets is the number of tweets posted by the official Twitter accounts
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of movie studios, which can reflect the magnitude of positive influence. The
variable Google trends is the score of google trends for a particular movie,
and the variable IMDb rating is the user rating on IMDb for a given movie.
We can see that the coefficient of post is significantly negative across differ-
ent model specifications, which suggests that our result is robust.
2.6.2 Regression Results with Cluster Robust Variance
We conduct a robustness check where we take into account the potential
heteroskedasticity and clustering among observations, since failure to ad-
dress heteroskedasticity or clustering would lead to misleadingly small stan-
dard errors. Lee and Lemieux (2010) suggested that heteroskedasticity-
robust standard errors (White 1980) should be used instead of the usual
least squares standard errors. In addition, both Cameron et al. (2008)
and Cameron and Miller (2015) detailed a cluster-robust standard infer-
ence procedure to control for within-cluster correlation. The regression
results with cluster robust variance are shown in Table A.4. We can see
that, although the t-statistics are smaller than those appearing in Table 2.2,
the coefficient of the post variable is still significantly negative. Therefore,
controlling for potential within-cluster correlation, we still observe a signif-
icant drop in sentiment after the release day, which suggests the existence
of manipulation.
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2.6.3 Additional Movie Characteristics
We also conduct an additional regression analysis where we control for
movie specific characteristics such as the length of the movie, the genre of
the movie, whether the movie is a color movie or not, the number of tweets
associated with the movie, and whether or not the movie is a major studio
production. We construct an alternative regression model where we include
movie-specific characteristics in a pooled regression:








β3,p · postjt · duration
p
jt
+β4 · colorj + β5 · runtimej + β6 ·majorStudioj
+β7 ·numTweetsj + β8 · genrej + εjt, (2.5)
where colorj is 1 if movie j is a color movie, and 0 if the movie is in black
and white; runtimej is the length of movie j in minutes;majorStudioj is 1 if
movie j is produced by a major studio, as listed in Table A.5; numTweetsj is
the number of tweets associated with movie j during the ±60 day observa-
tion window; and genrej is a vector of dummy variables each corresponding
to a specific movie genre. Notice that this is not a fixed effect model since
we are now examining the effects of time-invariant movie characteristics
variables.
The results of this alternative regression model are shown in Table
2.18. We can see that, with the inclusion of movie characteristics variables
as covariates, the coefficient of the post variable is still significant. In other
words, the regression discontinuity near the release day is significant in this
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alternative regression specification. This is expected because the inclusion
of baseline covariates should not affect the estimated discontinuity (Lee and
Lemieux 2010).
2.6.4 Controlling for Movie Advertising Expenditure
Our illustrative example suggests that, in addition to any potential senti-
ment manipulation, movie studios might also behave differently prior to
and after movie releases. In fact, several marketing studies have docu-
mented an interesting phenomenon—that close to 90% of movie adver-
tising spending happens prior to movie release (Elberse and Anand 2007,
Chintagunta et al. 2010, Rennhoff and Wilbur 2011). We suspect that movie
sentiments and the observed discontinuity might also be affected by movie
studios’ advertising strategy. More specifically, the drop in movie sentiment
might have come from the drop in advertising spending. Therefore, we con-
duct two additional sets of regression analysis where we control for movie
studios’ daily advertising expenditure, as well as ads spending across differ-
ent advertising channels, both with movie fixed effects. The results, shown
in Table A.7 and Table A.8, indicate that the coefficients of the post variable
remain significantly negative after controlling for advertising expenditure.
These analyses suggest that the observed sentiment drops are not merely




In addition to the full sample analysis, we also identify important subsam-
ples and check whether we still observe significant sentiment drops within
these subsamples. More specifically, we generate subsamples of (1) low
budget movies–that is, movies with a production budget less than 3 mil-
lion US dollars, and (2) major studio movies. Then, we conduct regres-
sion analyses similar to those in the full sample case, and the results are
similar—the coefficients associated with the post variable are significantly
negative across different subsamples. The results, shown in Table A.6, and
detailed discussions can be found in the appendix.
2.6.6 Bandwidth Choice
The choice of bandwidth—that is, the length of the observation window for
each movie—can affect the regression results: the longer the bandwidth,
the more data will be available; the shorter the bandwidth, the more pre-
cise the estimates will be. Therefore, in addition to our initial choice of ±60
days, we also use ±30 and ±50 days as the observation window. Then, we
conduct regression analysis based on these different observation windows,
and the results are robust to different bandwidth choices—the coefficients
associated with the post variable remain significantly negative. The results,




There are several alternative explanations for the observed sentiment drop
on the release day. We discuss them in this section and explain why sen-
timent manipulation is the most plausible explanation. First of all, it is
possible that a sentiment drop is observed simply because movie goers did
not like the movie. While this could be the case for some movies, it does
not seem reasonable for consumers to consistently dislike movies they see.
In addition, this alternative explanation cannot explain why people con-
sistently dislike low budget movies, non-major studio movies, and movies
that face strong competition, more than other movies. Moreover, recall that
in our difference-in-discontinuity analysis, even if movie goers did not like
the movie, this effect would have been differenced out because the disap-
pointment should have affected both Twitter and IMDb users. The fact that
our difference-in-discontinuity analysis still shows a sentiment drop pro-
vides further evidence consistent with sentiment manipulation. Therefore,
we rule out this alternative explanation.
Another alternative explanation for the sentiment drop is the movie
studio’s budget constraint. Specifically, the reason low-budget movies ex-
hibit larger sentiment drop might be because they cannot afford to manip-
ulate as much as movies with higher budgets. In contrast, major studio
movies might be able to allocate more budget in manipulation. However,
recall that in our regression models, we have included a movie-specific fixed
effect, which controls all movie-specific, time-invariant variables, includ-
ing movie budgets. The coefficients of the post variable in these regression
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models are still significant. Therefore, budget constraint does not appear to
be a convincing explanation.
It is also possible that the pre-release sentiment is higher than post-
release sentiment because some eager fans tend to leave comments before
movie release, or, more generally, users who post tweets before movie re-
lease might be very different from users who leave tweets after movie re-
lease. However, the potential influence of the difference in user character-
istics (before and after movie release) on the sentiment drop cannot explain
why low-budget movies experience a larger sentiment drop than higher
budget movies, and why movies facing more competition exhibit a larger
sentiment drop than movies with less competition. Furthermore, the dif-
ference in user composition before and after movie release will be canceled
out in our difference-in-discontinuity analysis, yet we still observe signifi-
cant sentiment drops. Also recall that we use severe weather and earning
announcement as additional sources of exogenous shocks in our RD analy-
ses, and in those cases there is unlikely to be significant difference in user
composition before or after the shock. The fact that we observed signifi-
cant sentiment drops in these analyses suggests the existence of sentiment
manipulation.
In summary, although several alternative explanations exist regard-
ing why a sentiment drop after movie release is observed, sentiment manip-
ulation is the only one that could consistently explain all empirical results.




Platforms that adopt the review/recommendation business model, such as
Yelp, Expedia, and TripAdvisor, often provide contents for free, and rely
heavily on advertisements from sellers to sustain their business operations.
However, payments from producers are usually received in exchange of
certain forms of advertisements on the platform. Although the platforms
themselves should theoretically serve as impartial hosts that only aggregate
and organize the tremendous amount of mostly user generated informa-
tion, there is nonetheless a constant battle for them to balance the tradeoff
between their information credibility and the relationship with advertisers,
since consumers evaluate the platforms based on information accuracy and
their satisfaction with recommendations. There have been several instances
where certain suspicious reviews on Yelp stirred controversy in defining the
legal boundary between internet free-speech and outright defamation, and
in deciding whether a given comment is fraudulent or not (Loten 2014, Stre-
itfeld 2014). Researchers in the marketing and economics community have
also studied how structural differences in platform design between Expedia
and TripAdvisor result in significant differences in the rating distributions
in the hotel industry (Mayzlin et al. 2014), and how a business’ decision
to commit review fraud on Yelp corresponds to reputation concerns and
competitions (Luca and Zervas 2015).
Not only are review platforms plagued with manipulation, social me-
dia also suffer from the pervasiveness of fraudulent information and strate-
gic behaviors. For example, it has been revealed that Facebook has a black
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market issue by which user engagements in the form of “likes” can be pur-
chased, known as Facebook Fraud (Leonard 2014). Twitter’s advertising
and sentiment aggregation efficacy is affected by the prevalence of spam
tweets and robotic programs (Coy 2013). Although the popularity of Twit-
ter attracts advertisers to pay to increase their Twitter presence, malicious
individuals or even competitors could write simple programs to achieve
the same level of advertising, which would sabotage legitimate advertising
campaigns and contaminate sentiments. From the advertising firm’s per-
spective, engaging in illegitimate activities such as deploying spam bots
and leaving opinion spam messages may very well turn out to be benefi-
cial for its business operation. The reason for this is that firms strive to
increase their influence over consumers. Traditional ads serve as a medium
for raising product awareness and, subsequently, affecting consumer’s pur-
chasing behaviors. Advertising on Twitter essentially follows this principle
of raising awareness and encouraging purchases. Users are generally able to
recognize the firm’s intention to advertise, and tend to adjust downward the
potentially biased and promotional messages. In contrast, spamming is an-
other, albeit illegitimate and somewhat morally questionable, strategy for
raising awareness and inducing purchases, as has been widely deployed in
the form of e-mail spam. Moreover, sophisticated spammers often assume
multiple aliases as a camouflage, which makes it even more difficult for
users to recognize these messages’ spamming intent, and our empirical re-
sults show that the observed Twitter sentiment exhibits patterns consistent
with sentiment manipulation. These are questions for opinion platforms
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to consider, and should also alert the consumers so they can reevaluate the
degree to which they could rely on social media information for recommen-
dation and decision making.
2.8 Conclusion
In the present study, we conducted a series of empirical analyses to exam-
ine the existence of sentiment manipulation. Using movie tweets data, our
RDD results uncovered unusual patterns in Twitter sentiment near movie
release days, including larger sentiment drop for low-budget movies, non-
major studio movies, and movies facing a higher level of competition. These
results prompted us to suspect the existence of sentiment manipulation. We
further validated our results through a cross-platform identification strat-
egy, where we used a difference-in-discontinuity approach to compare Twit-
ter tweets and IMDb comments. Our difference-in-discontinuity results
were consistent with the RDD results, and we further found that the mag-
nitude of positive manipulation is larger than that of negative manipula-
tion, but the magnitude of negative manipulation increases with the rise in
competition level. Additional analyses using earnings announcement and
severe weather conditions as sources of exogenous shocks, as well as con-
trolling for demand-side expectations through Hollywood Stock Exchange
and Google Trends all suggested that the sentiment drop is likely a result
of strategic sentiment manipulation.
The current research is not without limitations: we were unable to
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directly identify tweets or comments that were manufactured by strategic
parties. Therefore, the exact magnitude of positive and negative manipu-
lation remains an open question. In addition, since we only studied movie
data, the extent to which sentiment manipulation is used in other indus-
tries is still unclear. Despite these limitations, we believe this research con-
tributes to the literature by uncovering sentiment anomaly through a RDD
and difference-in-discontinuity approach, as well as constructing a movie
competition measure through topic modeling. We believe that online plat-
forms and opinion forums must address the issue of manipulation through
better system designs and enhanced verification to ensure the reliability of
reviews, comments, and sentiment analysis.
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Table 2.3: RD Estimates of the Effect of Movie Release on Twitter Sentiment












































































Observations 52,829 52,829 52,829 52,829
AIC -84834.44 -84868.95 -84879.36 -84879.76
BIC -84807.82 -84824.58 -84817.24 -84817.64
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Table 2.4: RD Estimates of the Effect of Movie Release on Twitter Sentiment
with Different Studio Types (t-statistics in brackets, *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05,











































































Observations 52,829 52,829 52,829 52,829
AIC -84836.51 -84871.43 -84881.89 -84882.27
BIC -84809.89 -84827.05 -84819.77 -84820.15
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Table 2.5: The Effect of Competition on Sentiment Manipulation, where
competition is measured as the number of movies released 1 month within
the focal movie and with thematic similarity > 0.7 (Robust t-statistics in













































































Observations 48,139 48,139 48,139
AIC -68106.3 -68170.4 -68224.78
BIC -67869.19 -67915.73 -67952.54
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Table 2.6: Difference-in-Discontinuity Estimates of the Effect of Movie
Release on Twitter Sentiment: Mean Sentiment Score Difference (Robust

























































Table 2.7: Difference-in-Discontinuity Estimates of the Effect of Movie
Release on Twitter Sentiment: Difference in Proportion of Extremely
Positive Tweets/Comments (Robust t-statistics in brackets, *** p < 0.01, **

























































Table 2.8: Difference-in-Discontinuity Estimates of the Effect of Movie
Release on Twitter Sentiment: Difference in Proportion of Extremely
Negative Tweets/Comments (Robust t-statistics in brackets, *** p < 0.01, **

























































Table 2.9: Difference-in-Discontinuity Estimates of the Effect of Compe-
tition: Difference in Proportion of Extremely Positive Tweets/Comments



























































post ∗ duration3 1.55e-10
[0.656]
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Table 2.10: Difference-in-Discontinuity Estimates of the Effect of Compe-
tition: Difference in Proportion of Extremely Negative Tweets/Comments



























































post ∗ duration3 1.34e-10
[0.662]
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Table 2.11: RD Estimates of the Effect of Quarterly Earnings Announce-
ment on Twitter Sentiment (Robust t-statistics in brackets, *** p < 0.01, **


























































YES YES YES YES
Holiday
Dummies
YES YES YES YES
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Table 2.12: RD Estimates of the Effect of Movie Release on Twitter Sen-
timent: Exogenous Weather Shocks (Robust t-statistics in brackets, ***


















































































YES YES YES YES
Holiday
Dummies
YES YES YES YES
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Table 2.13: RD Estimates of the Effect of Movie Release on Twitter
Sentiment: Control for Demand-Side Expectations (Robust t-statistics in





















































































YES YES YES YES
Holiday
Dummies
YES YES YES YES
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Table 2.14: RD Estimates of the Effect of Movie Release on Twitter Senti-
ment: Control for the Percentage of Intention Tweets (Robust t-statistics in




























































Table 2.15: RD Estimates of the Effect of Movie Release on Twitter Sen-
timent: Control for the Percentage of Pre-Consumption Tweets (Robust





























































Table 2.16: RD Estimates of the Effect of Movie Release on Twitter Senti-
ment of Individual Accounts (Robust t-statistics in brackets, *** p < 0.01, **


























































Table 2.17: RD Estimates of the Effect of Movie Release on Twitter Sen-
timent: Control for the Influence of Marketing Efforts of Movie Studios














































































Table 2.18: Robustness Checks of RD Estimates: Including Other Covari-










































































Observations 51,829 51,829 51,829
AIC -72105.71 -72123.48 -72121.15
BIC -71875.47 -71875.52 -71855.48
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Chapter 3
Word-of-Mouth in Social Media
Advertising
3.1 Introduction
Social media platforms have become a prominent advertising channel for
firms to reach out to their customers.123 A unique feature of social me-
dia platforms such as Facebook is the information about users’ social graph
which allows the platform to target users and spread content using their
social connections. Firms can organically spread content for their brand
or products on these platforms based on the user interconnections. How-





3Social media ad spending is expected to reach $23.68 billion and represents 13.9% of
total digital ad spending.
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ingly pushing ads as a mechanism to show content to users.4 As a result,
firms have started promoting content using ads on these platforms to cre-
ate awareness about their brand and to enable installs or purchases of their
products or mobile applications. Among others, Facebook has been the
most successful social media platform that allows firms to conduct adver-
tising campaigns. In fact, with more than 1.49 billion monthly active users,
Facebook’s advertising revenue is 65.5% of the total social media advertis-
ing.5 While paid advertising on social media platforms is gaining promi-
nence, the effectiveness of this form of advertising is largely unstudied. In
this study we address this gap by studying the effectiveness of word-of-
mouth (WOM) signals and social endorsement on the click and conversion
performance of ads in the form of app installs on Facebook.
Facebook ads display the popularity, or WOM6 information in terms
of the number of users who have endorsed the ad through “likes”. Face-
book also utilizes user social graph information for advertising by target-
ing users based on actions taken by their social connections in response to
the ad. Further, Facebook also displays other users’ actions to the targeted
users. For example, Facebook ads contain social endorsement information
on the targeted user’s friends who have “liked” the ad. The objective of
displaying these types of signals is to draw more user attention by showing





6In this chapter we use WOM and popularity interchangeably.
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ad performance in terms of actual product installs or purchases. Thus, it
is important to know if the ad’s popularity and social endorsement infor-
mation has any effect on the targeted users for actual purchases or installs.
Additionally, the install or purchase decision is a multi-step process where
users first click on an ad and go to the product or the app source and then
make the purchase or install decision. These separate steps correspond to
different consumer stages of decision making (De Bruyn and Lilien 2008).
Therefore, it is also useful to know whether and how users use these signals
at different steps to make their decisions.
Previous research has shown the efficacy of observational learning
(e.g., Banerjee 1992, Bikhchandani et al. 1992) and WOM signals to spread
content and enable purchases (e.g., Godes and Mayzlin 2004, Chevalier and
Mayzlin 2006, Liu 2006, Dellarocas et al. 2007, Gu et al. 2012, Lu et al.
2013). One possibility is that WOM signals such as “likes” would have a
similar effect and increase the user propensity to respond to the ad and
make purchases.7 Some recent studies do suggest that word-of-mouth sig-
nals such as “likes” on Facebook (Li and Wu 2014) or “favorites” (Dewan et
al. 2015) may also be effective in influencing the purchase decision. How-
ever, these studies rely on the WOM signals generated by users through
organic content. Thus, it is not clear if ads will carry the same effect.
Another possibility is that, as WOM and social endorsement signals
are included in ads, consumers may link these signals to advertiser’s manip-
ulative intent and show negative reactance (Brehm 1966, 1989; Clee and
7While a Facebook “like” suggests that a user “likes” the content or the product, “likes”
differ from the traditional word-of-mouth signals as there is no negative valence.
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Wicklund 1980, White et al. 2008). Further, social endorsement may be
perceived as intrusive as the platform is targeting users based on friends’
actions (Goldfarb and Tucker 2011) and may raise privacy concerns (Tucker
2014). This may further evoke a negative response to social ads. Thus, the
actual effect of popularity and social endorsement signals in the social ads
on actual product purchases or installs is not obvious and needs further
investigation.
In order to examine the effectiveness of WOM and social endorse-
ment in social ads, our study evaluates the following questions: (1) Does the
popularity information displayed alongside ads influence targeted users’
decision to click an ad? (2) Does the popularity information play a role in
targeted users’ decision to install an application after clicking the ad? (3)
How does the presence of social endorsement influence users’ decision to
click an ad or to install an application after clicking the ad?
We answer these questions using the data generated from a random-
ized field experiment on Facebook in collaboration with a mobile app com-
pany which advertises on Facebook.8 This collaboration allowed us to ex-
amine the effectiveness of WOM and social endorsement signals as part of
the mobile app company’s ongoing efforts to increase the installs for their
application through promotions on Facebook. Specifically, we assume the
role of marketing managers and test a mobile app install ad campaign on
Facebook for a five-week period targeting sixteen different user groups with
varying levels of WOM and social endorsement signals. We use the standard
8This company distributes a shopping app which connects users to different vendors.
We cannot reveal the name of the company due to the non-disclosure agreement.
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interface provided by the Facebook platform to advertisers to target users
and draw inference from the aggregate performance data typically received
by advertisers as part of their ad campaigns.
One of the challenges in determining the effect of ad characteristics
on the advertiser performance on Facebook is the selection bias introduced
by Facebook: the users to whom the ad is shown are not randomly sampled
(Lee et al. 2014). More specifically, Facebook uses a proprietary algorithm
which allows it to selectively display ads to users that are more (less) likely
to respond. This sampling bias makes it difficult to identify the effect of ad
characteristics on the response rates. To address this selection issue, we use
a random bidding procedure which ensures that our ads in each group are
randomly targeted to users of different quality—defined as their likelihood
to respond, so the resulting sample more closely resembles the population
of that target group. We collect hourly aggregate performance data for each
ad in terms of the number of impressions, ad clicks, and the final app in-
stalls; these data were collected every hour through the Facebook Market-
ing API during our 5-week ad campaign. We use a logit specification for
representing clicking and install decisions and estimate our models while
accounting for correlation across these decisions.
We find that, across different model specifications, overall “likes” as-
sociated with Facebook ads are ineffective in leading to clicks and have a
negative effect on installs. This result is in stark contrast to extant studies
which have shown a positive effect of such WOM signals on user response
on social media platforms (Liu 2006, Chen et al. 2011, Li and Wu 2014, De-
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wan et al. 2015). One potential explanation is that in our research context
“likes” are associated with the ad; consequently, the user might perceive the
“likes” as endorsing the ad itself rather than endorsing the product being
advertised. This might lead the users to perceive “likes” as another form of
advertising strategy and therefore not respond to them.
We also find that the presence of social endorsement has a negative
effect on users’ clicking decision. A potential explanation is that social en-
dorsement may be perceived as intrusive as users are being targeted using
their friends. However, conditional on clicking, social endorsement from
several friends helps to reduce the negative effect of overall “likes”. In
other words, this means that when a user finds out several of her social
connections have endorsed the app, she will be more willing to install the
application compared to the case when no social endorsement information
is displayed, provided that she has clicked the ad. This positive effect of so-
cial endorsement only after clicking suggests that users are not drawn to the
ad using “likes” along with social endorsement. However, users who end up
clicking the ad are likely to consider “likes” along with social endorsement
to make the install decision. This suggests that WOM in the presence of
social endorsement is not generating interest among consumers but is more
likely to be used as a quality signal by the interested consumers to make the
install decision.
Our research makes several contributions. We contribute to the ex-
isting literature on the social media WOM by showing how it works in the
context of advertising. While previous studies show that WOM for organic
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content is effective for improving product sales, our results suggest that the
same may not apply to promoted content. To the best of our knowledge,
ours is the first study that demonstrates the role of social endorsement on
ads for enabling app installs. Second, we provide insight into the underly-
ing consumer behavior associated with the response to ad popularity and
social endorsement information included in social ads. Previous research
has suggested that WOM signals increase sales performance due to increase
in the consumer valuation (Liu 2006, Chen et al. 2011) without determining
the source of this increase in valuation. Our research adds to this work by
demonstrating the role of WOM signals in different stages of consumer deci-
sion making in the context of ads. We show that social media WOM through
ads is not increasing users’ interest in the product but is more likely to serve
as a signal of quality for the product for interested users provided that the
ads also include social endorsement.
Our research also informs the Facebook platform on the efficacy of
WOM and social endorsement signals to promote content and enable pur-
chases. Specifically, our results show that popularity or social endorsement
without popularity is inadequate to get consumer traffic and can have a
negative effect on the install performance. Thus, the platform is better off
not showing these signals on ads targeted to get new users. From a prac-
titioner’s perspective, our results suggest that advertisers should discount
such metrics in the evaluation of their ad performance. Finally, our study
provides advertisers with an approach to independently conduct experi-
mentation on Facebook and test the consumer response to ad attributes
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while accounting for the selection bias introduced by the Facebook algo-
rithm.9
3.2 Literature Review and Theory
Our research is related to the literature on promotions using word-of-mouth
(WOM) and social networks.
3.2.1 Promotions using Word-of-Mouth (WOM)
Various advertising strategies enabled by the Facebook platform are related
to core economics and marketing concepts such as observational learning
(OL) and word-of-mouth (WOM). Studies in observational learning (OL)
suggest that individuals use information they learn from observing pur-
chasing decisions made by earlier individuals to make their own purchas-
ing decisions (e.g., Banerjee 1992, Bikhchandani et al. 1992). WOM signals
differ from OL signals as they provide collective user opinion or prefer-
ences of the product or service rather than displaying the actual purchase
decision. WOM literature shows that an individual’s decision is affected by
the opinions and preferences of other consumers (e.g., Godes and Mayzlin
2004, Chevalier and Mayzlin 2006, Liu 2006, Dellarocas et al. 2007, Gu et
al. 2012, Lu et al. 2013). Such WOM can improve consideration (Gupta and
9The only other way to prevent such selection bias is to randomly tar-
get users with ads independent of the algorithm, which is only feasible for
Facebook’s own research team. Facebook has close to 2 million advertisers.
https://www.facebook.com/business/news/two-million-advertisers While Facebook re-
searchers routinely conduct experiments on Facebook, they are unlikely to conduct ex-
periments for individual advertisers.
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Harris 2010). Additionally, WOM increases product valuation (Chevalier
and Mayzlin 2006, Chen et al. 2011) and leads to higher sales performance
of the product.
Social media platforms such as Facebook also show WOM signals for
the content propagating on the platform using the notion of “likes”. A Face-
book “like” is a user’s endorsement of the content and/or the product as-
sociated with the content. However, it is possible for users to “like” the ad
without having to install or purchase the product. As a result, “likes” might
be interpreted as a weaker WOM signal. Nevertheless, recent studies pro-
vide evidence that “likes” are indeed effective in improving the consumer
response for organic content. For example, Li and Wu (2014) study the
effect of Facebook “likes” in the context of a daily-deal website and show
that “likes” increase the product sales. Similarly, Dewan et al. (2015) study
the effect of “favorite” in an online music community, where “favorite” in
their setting functions similarly as “like” on Facebook. They find that the
number of favorites has a positive effect on the music consumption.
Facebook ads also display popularity information in the form of num-
ber of “likes” an ad has received along with other ad attributes. One pos-
sibility is that “likes” shown on ads can be seen as WOM signals. In that
case “likes” would increase the user’s propensity to click the ads and make
purchases or installs. Alternatively, the user might perceive the “likes” as
endorsing the ad itself rather than endorsing the product being advertised.
This might lead the user to perceive “likes” as another form of advertis-
ing strategy and link it to advertiser’s manipulative intent (Campbell 1995)
83
and therefore induce users’ reactance behaviors toward the ad (e.g., Brehm
1966, 1989; Clee and Wicklund 1980, White et al. 2008).
3.2.2 Promotions using Social Networks
Facebook also targets content to users using their social graph informa-
tion. This includes showing content to users whose friends have already
endorsed the content using a “like” and also displaying this endorsement
apart from the overall popularity or “likes” for the content. Such targeting
of users and display of social cues or social endorsement using the social
graph can be beneficial in two ways. First, users in a social network ex-
hibit homophily i.e., friends possess similar characteristics and preferences
(McPherson et al. 2001). Thus, due to similarity in preferences, a user is
more likely to adopt a product if one or more friends have “liked” the prod-
uct. Further, friend connections operate through trust (Coleman 1990). As
a result, WOM from friends is more trustworthy as compared to regular
WOM (Rogers 1995). Thus, the display of “likes” by friends may have a
stronger influence on users to adopt as compared to overall “likes”. Many
researchers have found such online social influence to play a role in the
adoption of products. These include adoption of YouTube videos (Susarla
et al. 2010, Yoganarasimhan 2012), social networking site (Katona et al.
2011, Bakshy et al. 2012), applications (Aral and Walker 2011) and paid
subscriptions (Bapna and Umyarov 2015). Additionally, an increase in the
number of friends’ “likes” further increases the propensity of adoption. For
example, Centola and Macy (2007) show that individuals are more likely to
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adopt actions previously taken by their peers when multiple social signals
are present. Additionally, Dewan et al. (2015) find that these signals act
as substitutes and users prefer to respond to WOM from friends instead of
WOM from others. In that case, one can expect users are more likely to
respond to friends’ “likes” than overall “likes”.
It is possible that such social targeting and social endorsement can
be effective for increasing product sales or app installs through ads. Some
studies on Facebook (Tucker 2012, Bakshy et al. 2012) show the effective-
ness of social endorsement information on ads to generate more “likes”.
Tucker (2012) uses a Facebook ad campaign dataset of a charity organiza-
tion to show that social ads are more effective than regular ads in generating
clicks and “likes”. She finds that while social influence plays some role, the
contribution is primarily due to the ability of ads to target individuals with
similar preferences. Bakshy et al. (2012) find that an increase in the number
of social cues leads to higher click performance as well as higher endorse-
ment rate of ads on Facebook. However, they restrict their analysis to ads
which are always socially targeted and do not consider the relative perfor-
mance of social ads compared with regular ads. Additionally, both of these
studies use ads to create content awareness, and users are not required to
make product purchase or app install decisions which are cognitively more
costly. Aral and Walker (2011) evaluate the effect of viral product design on
social contagion in app installations. However, in their setup information
about the app is spread organically and not through an ad. Further, they do
not consider the effect of WOM signals such as “likes” on the propensity to
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install apps.
It is also possible that social endorsement may increase the salience of
the advertiser’s manipulative intent. This may activate persuasion knowl-
edge which can be used to view ads negatively (Campbell and Kirmani
2000). Reactance is greatest when the information used is more unique
(White et al. 2008, Tucker 2014). Social endorsement information is unique
to the user as it is an endorsement from the user’s friends. Thus, social en-
dorsement may evoke higher reactance. Such reactance can be due to pri-
vacy concerns (Tucker 2014). In that case, higher attention to social ads may
raise concerns such as privacy, which may diminish the performance of ads.
For example, Goldfarb and Tucker (2011) show that while contextual tar-
geting usually increases ad performance, it can lead to lower performance
if such ads are made more visible to the users using videos, pop-ups, or
large displays. They attribute this to the sense of intrusiveness that arises
when targeted ads are highly visible. We expect that a socially targeted ad
results in better targeting as users share similar preferences as their friends
who have endorsed the ad due to homophily (McPherson et al. 2001). As a
result, when it is placed in the newsfeed, higher attention can elicit a sense
of intrusiveness and may negatively impact the performance of the ad. We
summarize the relevant theories and the predictions that emerge from these
theories in Table 3.1.
Thus, the previous literature suggests that WOM can improve installs
or purchases. Similarly, social endorsement can have a positive effect on the
adoption of products. However, the effectiveness of these mechanisms on
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the performance of sponsored content or ads is not known and is the focus
of this study.
3.3 Experimental Design and Data Description
3.3.1 Experiment Objective
The objective of our experiment is to determine the effect of popularity, or
“likes”, and social endorsement information on the click and install perfor-
mance of ads on Facebook. In order to achieve this we collaborated with
a technology company that provides a free mobile shopping app on the
Google Android platform. This collaboration allowed us to run advertising
campaigns on the company’s behalf to promote its app using Facebook’s ad-
vertising platform. We conduct a field experiment on Facebook where we
randomly target users using these ads and evaluate how users are affected
by “likes” for the ad and how they are influenced by endorsement of the ad
from social connections. More specifically, we explore how the number of
“likes” and social endorsement affect the user’s decision to click on the ad
and subsequently install the app.
Our approach of using an app to determine the effect of WOM signals
is similar to Aral and Walker (2011) where they use an app to determine
the effect of viral product design to create social contagion using active and
passive viral features. However, there are several differences between our
setups. First, they use an app hosted on the Facebook platform for their ex-
periment where the application provider has access to the app users’ social
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networks. This allows them to recruit and target users for the experiment
and track app installs at an individual level. However, apps or products
that are consumed outside the Facebook platform do not have access to in-
dividual Facebook users. Second, they rely on organic propagation of the
messages whereas our objective is to test the effectiveness of ads with vary-
ing “likes” and social endorsement in generating user response. Since an ad
is posted by Facebook and not by an individual user; an advertiser cannot
directly target individual users or monitor performance at an individual
level but has to rely on Facebook’s advertising platform.10 Note that this
restriction would apply even for advertising campaigns of an app running
on the Facebook platform.11 As a result, we do not explicitly recruit users
but rely on the regular advertising setup used by Facebook to target users
and measure the performance at an aggregate level in each time period.
3.3.2 Advertising on Facebook and Mobile Install Ads
Facebook allows advertisers to run advertising campaigns on its network in
order to reach consumers. These ads can be used to promote a page, a prod-
uct, or an app. For a particular ad creative, advertisers can use different
targeting options such as gender, age, and preferences. It is possible that
ads from different advertisers are competing for user attention, and Face-
10See https://www.facebook.com/business/help/318580098318734 for a step-by-step
guide on examining ad campaign performance. Notice the campaign performance met-
rics are displayed at the aggregate level.
11An app on Facebook platform can only access networks associated with its own users.
However, if the targeting is done by the Facebook platform, then the app cannot determine
which users were targeted.
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book uses an auction to prioritize these ads. In these auctions advertisers
submit bids for their ads, and Facebook uses these bids and the expected
performance of ads to rank and prioritize these ads.12 The expected per-
formance reflects the underlying quality of an ad to generate user response.
An advertiser can increase its ad exposure to Facebook users by submitting
higher bids. These would result in more ad impressions, clicks, and installs
or purchases. The Facebook platform allows the advertisers to submit their
bids through its interface or through API calls. Facebook also allows ad-
vertisers to access their aggregate performance information such as impres-
sions, clicks, “likes”, etc., for each ad in each period through its interface as
well as through its API.
Facebook provides an ad format specifically for promoting mobile
apps, as shown in Figure 3.1. These ads are displayed to users in their
Facebook newsfeed when they are using a mobile device.
Facebook users can comment, “like”, and share the ad with their
friends; they can also click on the ad, which will take them to the app’s
install page on the appropriate platform such as iTunes or Google play, and
there users can decide if they want to install the app. The app platform
shares install information with Facebook, so installs on the app platform
can be linked back to the users clicking the ad.14 Notice that at the time
12https://www.facebook.com/business/help/163066663757985
13It shows the ad text, ad picture, any available social endorsement information, i.e.
friends who have “liked” this app, as well as the number of “likes” this ad received. If a
user clicks on the ad, s/he will be redirected to the download page, as shown in Figure 3.2,
where s/he can install the app.




Figure 3.1: A sample mobile install ad on Facebook13
of our experiment mobile install ads will only display the total number of
Facebook users who have “liked” the ads, but not numbers of clicks or in-
stalls. In addition, if a user’s friend has “liked” the ad, then Facebook will
also display relevant social endorsement information, i.e., the name of the
friend who has “liked” the ad, as shown in Figure 3.1.
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3.3.3 User Targeting
As mentioned earlier, Facebook’s advertising platform allows advertisers to
explicitly target users of a given set of characteristics. Using this feature, we
generate a mobile app install ad and show this ad to a total of 16 groups,
each consisting of users with a specific set of characteristics. Specifically,
these 2 x 2 x 2 x 2 experimental groups are based on the following user
characteristics: (1) friends of fans, (2) age, (3) gender, and (4) experience in
mobile technology. We explain the importance of each characteristic in the
following discussion.
Firstly, Facebook allows advertisers to target users who have friends
that have “liked” the Facebook page of the company providing the app and,
as a consequence, are followers or fans of the company. Such fans are likely
to be interested in the app provided by the company. In that case, by virtue
of homophily, target users who are friends of fans are also likely to be more
interested in the app as compared to other users. We refer to this group of
users as the “FF” group. This allows us to distinguish between users based
on their inherent interest in the app and allows us to explain the poten-
tial driver of the effect of social endorsement as explained in the results
section. User response to the social media content depends on the demo-
graphic characteristics of users (Lee et al. 2014). Thus, it is possible that
the response to WOM signals such as “likes” and social endorsement may
be biased due to a particular demographic group. In order to ensure that
different demographic groups have an even representation in our sample,
we create identical ad copies which are targeted to different demographic
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groups. We consider two age groups (18-25 or 26-34)15 and gender (male or
female) as they might also affect how users react to WOM signals and social
endorsement.
Finally, Facebook is able to determine whether a user just recently
started using smartphones or tablets, and we use this information to divide
users into either the experienced or the inexperienced group. This charac-
teristic is important because studies suggest that inexperienced users are
more likely to be influenced by others than experienced users (e.g. Bettman
and Park 1980). Additionally, experience plays a role in technology adop-
tion (Venkatesh et al. 2003). In order to control for the response bias based
on the experience of users, we create ad copies separately for experienced
and inexperienced groups.
In summary, each of the 16 groups consists of users that are (FF/not
FF), age group (18-25/26-34), (male/female), and (experienced/ inexperi-
enced) in mobile technology. A summary of all sixteen target groups is
shown in Table 3.2. For example, group 1 in our experiment consists of
users that are FF, in the age group 18-25, male, and are inexperienced in
mobile technology.
Since the product we are advertising is a mobile app designed for
the Google Android platform, we restrict all target users to be Android-
based mobile device users with an Android 4.0 or newer operating system
installed to make sure their devices are up-to-date and the app can run
correctly. We further restrict our target users to those that are interested in
15The mobile app company specifically targets these age groups as these age groups are
likely to install the shopping app.
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online shopping to make sure they will potentially be interested in our app,
since the app we advertise in this experiment is a shopping app.
3.3.4 Random Bidding
It is well known that the assignment of ad to users is not random—Facebook
reportedly uses some proprietary algorithm to determine the display of ads
(Lee et al. 2014) and target users depending on their propensity to respond.
This nonrandom assignment is likely to create a selection bias where any re-
sponse to “likes” would be correlated with the order of user quality targeted
by Facebook, which is unobservable to the researcher and the advertiser. To
address this issue, we create a random bidding system which allows us to
generate a random bid for each of the sixteen ad groups every hour. As de-
scribed earlier, advertisers need to submit a bid which specifies how much
he or she is willing to pay for each impression, i.e. each time the ad is shown.
Facebook then uses this bid information and the expected quality of the ad
to determine its score and targets the user accordingly. Thus, the ad with
the best score gets the highest quality users. Our random bidding system
considers a wide range of bids from $1- 1016 so that we can make sure that
our ads get a wide range of scores and are evenly targeting users of all qual-
ity levels. Figure 3.3 shows how the targeting can vary across users with
or without randomized bids. Facebook’s default targeting allows access to
only users with a certain propensity to respond based on the score of the
16Upper limit of our bids is 3 to 5 times the bid suggested by Facebook to ensure we do
not miss on the high quality users.
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ad. However, randomized bidding can allow access to users with varying
propensity to respond.17
3.3.5 “Likes” and Social Endorsement
We rely on the variation in “likes” and social endorsement across users to
determine the effect of these variables on the user response to click and
install. An advertiser or a researcher cannot directly manipulate this in-
formation on ads as it is controlled by the Facebook platform. Thus, we
rely on the actions of the target users to generate these signals and show
ads with these signals to target users in subsequent periods. As our ads are
randomly shown to different users, some users choose to “like” the ads as
they click and install the app. Facebook aggregates these “likes” across all
target groups18 and displays the ad along with “likes” to subsequent users
who are targeted. As the number of “likes” increases over time, users tar-
geted at different points in time will see different number of “likes”. This
variation in “likes” represents multiple different treatments in our exper-
iment, and we rely on the variation in treatments to identify the effect of
each additional “like” on the ad effectiveness.
Among users who are randomly targeted, there is a subset of users
with one or more friends who have “liked” the ad. These users also see the
17We rely on the publicly known information provided by the Facebook platform to
devise our randomization approach. This is based on the assumption that Facebook as a
platform is not engaging in any strategic behavior and is actually following the publicly
revealed ranking mechanism.
18We use a single post which is targeted to sixteen different groups separately using
different ads. Facebook provides separate performance data for each ad. However, “likes”
are associated with the post and are aggregated across all ads.
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social endorsement information on the ad. Note that not all users qualify to
be targeted with social endorsement. Only those users whose friends have
already “liked” the ad can be targeted with social endorsement informa-
tion. This design is similar to the average treatment effect on the treated
used by previous research (Aral and Walker 2011). However, in our setup
users who do not see the treatment of social endorsement are also not likely
to receive social endorsement as none of their friends have liked the ad.
Thus, we have two separate pools of users within each target group, one
which is eligible to receive social endorsement and the other which is not
eligible. Figure 3.4 shows the targeting of users with and without social
endorsement, i.e., one or more friends who have “liked” the ad. While our
random bidding procedure allows us to randomly pick users from these two
different pools of users, friend of users who have “liked” the ad may have
a higher propensity to respond to the ad. As a consequence, any effect of
social endorsement may be driven by this propensity or homophily and not
necessarily due to social influence. We also conduct additional analysis to
determine the possible mechanism and explain it in our results section.
Additionally, in each period “likes” seen by the target users are based
on the “likes” generated by users in all previous periods. Within each group
in each period, the ad placement is driven by bids and expected perfor-
mance of the ad. In that case, user selection for ad placement and the result-
ing “likes” generated could be correlated. Note that “likes” are not likely
to be correlated across groups as bids are randomized separately for each
group and user selection is independent across groups. In that case, cumu-
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lative “likes” are less likely to be correlated with unobservable user quality
in each group. However, in order to address any potential endogeneity con-
cern, we use an appropriate instrument as described in the model section.
3.3.6 Data Collection
We interact with the Facebook Advertising Platform through Facebook Mar-
keting API, which enables us to create customized target groups and ac-
cess ad performance statistics in a programmatic manner. A python script
was written to automate the following tasks: (1) submit a randomly gener-
ated new bid every hour, (2) extract impressions, clicks, “likes”, and installs
statistics on an hourly basis. Notice that Facebook only provides cumulative
statistics, and all statistics are anonymous, aggregated at the target group
level. Therefore, every hour we extract the cumulative number of social and
non-social impressions, social and non-social clicks, “likes”, and installs.
We then take first difference to determine the hourly performance for each
of the sixteen target groups, where social impressions are defined as im-
pressions shown with social endorsement information, and social clicks are
defined as clicks that result from social impressions. Note that Facebook
does not provide advertisers with social install information, so we cannot
directly observe the number of installs that are results of social impressions
and social clicks. We use a likelihood approach to attribute the cumulative
installs to social and non-social clicks as described in the model section.
Also note that Facebook does not provide advertisers with the magnitude
of social signals associated with social impressions or social clicks. In other
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words, advertisers can only know that some social endorsement informa-
tion is displayed, which means at least one of the user’s friends has “liked”
the ad, but they do not know exactly how many of the user’s friends have
“liked” the ad. We use an appropriate proxy for friends’ “likes” as described
in the model section.
We ran the advertising campaign over the 5-week period from April
2015 to June 2015. During this period our experimental ad was shown a
total of 710,445 times, resulting in 4052 clicks, 799 “likes”, and 206 in-
stalls across all sixteen target groups. The low click-through rate, 0.57%, is
comparable to those reported in other studies (Tucker 2012, Tucker 2014).
Sample observations are shown in Table 3.3. Each observation in the col-
lected data is a group-hour observation. Notice that in our campaign, all
sixteen groups saw an identical mobile install ad, and they were also see-
ing the same number of cumulative “likes” that have been given to the ad.
Summary statistics of the hourly data are shown in Table 3.4.
3.4 Research Model
The app install process through Facebook ads consists of two steps. In the
first step users are shown the mobile app install ad (Figure 3.1), and they
decide whether to click on it or not. For users clicking on the ad, they enter
the second step in which they learn more about the app through the ad
and then decide whether to install it (Figure 3.2). These steps represent
different stages of consumer decision making. De Bruyn and Lilien (2008)
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suggest a three-stage model to characterize users’ decision making process:
awareness, interest, and final outcome. In the awareness stage consumers
become aware of the alternative. If users are interested, they take further
action to get more information. In the final stage, users take an observable
action such as purchase of a good or service. In our research context, users
are already aware of the application as they see the ad in the newsfeed. The
clicking step represents the interest stage: upon seeing the ad, the user then
decides whether to click on the ad based on his or her interest level. The
install step reflects the final outcome. We model these two stages to study
how the number of “likes” and social endorsement on ads affect users’ ad
clicking and app installing decisions.
3.4.1 Decision Context 1: Click Rate
When a user is shown an ad, her decision to click can be influenced by
“likes” and social endorsement. Facebook does not provide advertisers with
the magnitude of social signals associated with social impressions or so-
cial clicks. In other words, advertisers can only know that some social en-
dorsement information is displayed, which means at least one of the user’s
friends has “liked” the ad, but they do not know exactly how many of the
user’s friends have “liked” the ad. We use a dummy variable to capture the
effect of social endorsement. Further, as the overall “likes” increase, the
number of “likes” from friends can also be expected to increase and can in-
fluence the user decision to click. We proxy the effect of this increase in the
number of friends’ “likes” using an interaction between “likes” and social
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endorsement. In our setup, in any period we know the number of users
who are shown the ad. We also know the user response to the ad in terms
of clicks. Thus we can represent the outcome as a click probability. This is
similar to the setup of search engine auctions and we adopt the modeling
approach used in the related literature (Ghose and Yang 2009, Agarwal et
al. 2011, Rutz and Trusov 2011) to capture the click performance. Specif-
ically, we assume an i.i.d. extreme value distribution of the error term for
individual choices and use a logit model to represent the click probability
for an individual belonging to group g at time t as follows:
ΛClickgt =
exp(UClickgt )
1 + exp(UClickgt )
, (3.1)
where UClickgt is the latent utility of clicking the ad for group g at time t and
can be expressed as follows:
UClickgt =β0 + β1 ·
t−1∑
j=1




+ βγ ·γg + βδ · δt + βh · ht + βw ·wt + ε
β
gt, (3.2)
where social is the dummy representing whether or not this individual is
shown some social endorsement information, i.e., whether the impression
is a social impression,
∑t−1
j=1 likej is the cumulative “likes” up to time t − 1;
social ·
∑t−1
j=1 likej captures the interaction effect; γg is a vector of user char-
acteristics dummies associated with group g, including age, gender, expe-
rience, and FF membership; δt is a vector of day of week dummies; ht is a
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vector of time of day dummies where we separate a day into four 6-hour
periods; wt is a vector of week dummies which controls for any potential
time trend; εβgt represents the idiosyncratic error term which is common for
all individuals within group g.
Since in our data set we observe the number of social/non-social im-
pressions and the corresponding social/non-social clicks per group-hour,


























3.4.2 Decision Context 2: App Install Rate
Users who end up clicking the ad may choose to install the app. Further,
this decision to install can also depend on the “likes” and social endorse-
ment information displayed with the ad. We represent this install deci-
sion using a similar approach as the clicking decision. Specifically, we use
the following logit model to capture the install performance conditional on
clicking, or the install rate, of a group g at time t:
ΛInstallgt =
exp(U Installgt )
1 + exp(U Installgt )
, (3.4)
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where U Installgt is the latent utility of installing the app for group g at time t
and can be expressed as follows:
U Installgt =θ0 +θ1 ·
t−1∑
j=1




+θγ ·γg +θδ · δt +θh · ht +θw ·wt + εθgt. (3.5)
However, since Facebook does not provide advertisers with the number of
social/non-social installs, we are not able to trace installs back to social/non-
social clicks. Instead, we use the empirical frequency of social and non-
social clicks among all clicks to account for the effect of social endorsement























)#Installsgt · (1−ΛInstallgt )(#Clicksgt−#Installsgt)} .
(3.7)
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)#Installsgt · (1−ΛInstallgt )(#Clicksgt−#Installsgt)} . (3.8)
3.4.3 Endogeneity of “Likes”
Our strategy is to implement a random bidding system to minimize the is-
sue of sample selection bias resulting from Facebook’s nonrandom ad-user
assignment, as documented in the experimental design section. Further,
we rely on the users to generate “likes” for our ad. However, Facebook
determines the ad placement for all competing ads based on their bids and
expected performance. Thus, it is possible that Facebook may prioritize cer-
tain ads competing for the same set of users and the user selection for the
focal ad is influenced by this prioritization. For example, if two competing
ads have the same distribution of random bids then the ad with higher ex-
pected performance is more likely to get higher quality users. Since users’
quality influences their decisions to respond to the ad, it is possible that the
cumulative “likes” generated may be correlated with the unobservable user
quality which is also influencing their click and install decisions. However,
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in each period the random draw of bid allows us to pick different users for
each of our sixteen target groups. Further, bids are independent across dif-
ferent target groups, suggesting that the quality of the selected users is less
likely to be correlated across groups. As cumulative “likes” are generated
by these different users, it is less likely that these cumulative “likes” gener-
ated in a prior period will be correlated with the user quality in a particular
target group in the current period. To further alleviate any remaining en-
dogeneity concern, we adopt an instrumental variable approach where we
use the randomly generated bids to instrument for “likes”. This is because
these random bids directly affect “likes” and are uncorrelated with any un-
observed variables in the clicking and install steps that might also affect
“likes”. Specifically, when examining the effect of signals on users’ click
and install decisions, we used the number of fitted “likes” instead of using
the actual number of “likes”, where fitted “likes” are generated using the
following expression:
likegt = α0 +α1 · bidgt +αγ ·γg +αδ · δt +αh · ht +αw ·wt + εαgt, (3.9)
where bidgt represents the randomly generated bid for group g in period t,
γg is a vector of group demographic dummies, δt is a vector of day of week
dummies, ht is a vector of time of day dummies, and wt is a vector of week
dummies. We then generate cumulative fitted “likes” based on group-hour
level fitted “likes”. Specifically, the cumulative fitted “likes” up to time t−1
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Finally, as “likes” are endogenous, the unobservable time varying attributes
for the equations representing consumer decisions to click and install will
be correlated with error terms for the equation representing “likes”. As
such, we use the following distribution to account for any correlation be-












3.4.4 Identification and Estimation
Effect of “Likes”
We rely on the variation in cumulative “likes” across users to determine
the effect of “likes” on the click and install performance. We use the 2SLS
approach to correct for the endogeneity bias associated with “likes”. We
first estimate the “likes” in each period for each ad group using bids and
use the estimated cumulative value of “likes” in the previous periods to
estimate the parameters of the click and install equations. Identification
comes from the fact that fitted “likes” are completely determined by the
exogenous bids. “Likes”, in turn, influence the user’s clicking and install
decisions.
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Effect of Social Endorsement
The effect of social endorsement can be established by comparing the per-
formance of users receiving ads with social endorsement with that of the
users who are shown the ad without such endorsement. As described ear-
lier, our random bidding procedure allows us to show ads to randomly se-
lected users in each period from the two pools of users within each target
group, i.e., one receiving the ad with social endorsement and the other with-
out social endorsement. This randomization ensures that the selected users
represent the population of the target group with each pool. This helps us
to establish the relative performance of each pool within each target group.
Note that while the selection of users from the two pools is random,
the classification of users in these two pools is not random as the Facebook
interface does not allow advertisers’ to randomly enable social endorsement
only for selected users. If a user whose friends have already “liked” the ad
is shown the ad, she will always receive the social endorsement informa-
tion (treatment). Similarly, non-treated users, i.e., users not receiving social
endorsement, do not have any friends who have “liked” the ad. This is dif-
ferent from the approach adopted by previous studies (for example, Aral
and Walker 2014) where only peers of adopters are randomly classified into
treatment and control groups. As a consequence, the effect of social en-
dorsement may be driven by this propensity or homophily of the subgroup
receiving social endorsement to respond to the ad and not necessarily due
to social influence. In order to overcome this limitation, we also conduct a
separate analysis for only the “FF” group. Users in this group are friends
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of fans of the company’s Facebook fan page and are likely to share similar
propensity or interest in the app provided by the company by virtue of ho-
mophily. In that case, any effect of social endorsement within this group is
more likely to be driven by social influence.
An additional challenge with the identification of the effect of so-
cial endorsement is that the Facebook platform does not separately pro-
vide information about the installs resulting from ads shown with social
endorsement. As described earlier, we rely on the empirical frequency of
social clicks to capture the effect of social endorsement on the overall install
probability (Equation 3.6). A critical requirement for identifying the effect
of social endorsement is that there is variation in the proportions of social
installs across different time periods within each target group. Specifically,
in Equation 3.6 the proportion of social clicks should vary across observa-
tions in order to identify the effect of social endorsement. In our data, this
proportion varies randomly and helps us to identify the effect of social en-
dorsement.
Effect of Social Endorsement x “Likes”
Identification for this interaction effect comes from the fact that “likes” are
varying across users in each pool: one receiving social endorsement and one
not receiving social endorsement. Further, we use cumulative estimated
“likes” to overcome any endogeneity bias caused by the selection of the
users.
The above set of simultaneous equations represents a triangular sys-
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tem and has been addressed by authors in classical econometrics (Lahiri
and Schmidt 1978, Hausman 1975, Greene 1999) and Bayesian economet-
rics (Zellner 1962). Hausman (1975) and Lahiri and Schmidt (1978) have
shown that the parameter estimates for a triangular system can be fully
identified using GLS. Zellner (1962) has addressed triangular systems from
a Bayesian point of view. Triangular systems have been estimated using
the classical approach (Elberse and Eliashberg 2003, Godes and Mayzlin
2004) and more recently in sponsored search using the Bayesian approach
(Ghose and Yang 2009, Yang and Ghose 2010, Agarwal et al. 2011, Rutz
and Trusov, 2011, Rutz et al., 2012). We estimate our main model using a
Bayesian approach, applying Markov Chain Monte Carlo sampling due to
the non-linear characteristics of our model (Rossi and Allenby 2005). The
priors and conditional posteriors of this model are discussed in Appendix B.
We run the MCMC simulation for 80,000 draws, discarding the first 40,000
as burn-in. We also performed an F-test in the first stage for our instrument.
The F-test value was well over 10, suggesting our instrument is not weak.
We report our main results for click rate and install rate models in Table
3.5. We also estimate a model without the interaction term (Tables 3.8 and
3.9). However, the model fitness is poor compared to our main model with




The estimation results for the click rate model are shown in Table 3.5. We
can see that the coefficient associated with cumulative “likes” is not statis-
tically significant for the click decision. This suggests that Facebook “likes”
do not increase users’ tendency to click on the ad. If “likes” are treated as
WOM signals, then one would expect “likes” to improve product consider-
ation (Gupta and Harris 2010) and increase valuation of product (Chevalier
and Mayzlin 2006, Chen et al. 2011). In that case we would expect “likes”
to increase the clicking performance. However, we do not find any such ef-
fect. A possible explanation for this surprising result is that these Facebook
“likes” are displayed along with the ad itself, which might prompt users to
perceive them as part of the firm’s advertising strategy. This would induce
users’ reactance behavior, which would lead them to disregard the signal
(Brehm 1966, 1989; Clee and Wicklund 1980, White et al. 2008).
An alternative explanation can be that users receiving ads with higher
number of “likes” are poor quality users due to the selection bias induced
by the Facebook platform where it targets best possible users first. How-
ever, our random selection of users should prevent such selection bias to
a large extent. Additionally, we controlled for the time trend using time
dummies. This suggests that the outcome is not likely due to any systematic
time trend associated with the user quality. It is also possible that Facebook
could be targeting the wrong set of users which in turn may itself impact
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the response to “likes”. However, as we target only those users who have
interest in shopping, this is not likely to be the case.
The coefficient for “Social” is negative and significant (Table 3.5).
This suggests that the mere presence of social endorsement information
actually decreases users’ propensity to click the ad. Additionally, the co-
efficient for the interaction terms between social and “likes” is not signif-
icant. Thus, the click performance of ads does not improve even if more
friends have endorsed the ad. This result is also contrary to our expectation
since users are more likely to have similar tastes with their friends, i.e. ho-
mophily (McPherson et al. 2001). In addition, endorsement from friends
should further influence users to respond to the ad (Rogers 1995). How-
ever, we are actually seeing the opposite effect in our analysis. A plausible
explanation is that the display of social endorsement information may be
seen as intrusive. As social endorsement information is unique to the user,
it may evoke higher reactance (White et al. 2008) and may raise privacy
concerns (Tucker 2014). This may result in a lower click propensity for ads
with social endorsement information.
Our results for the impact of social endorsement on the click per-
formance are different from those obtained by Bakshy et al. (2012) and
Tucker (2012). Both of these studies use ads to create content awareness,
and users are not required to make product purchase or app install deci-
sions which needs additional processing. Increase in processing can lead to
negative reactance (Campbell 1995). Task incongruence has also been asso-
ciated with negative reactance (Edwards et al. 2002). In our context users
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may be expecting to read newsfeed from friends and not actually evaluate
mobile install ads. This mismatch between user activity and the ad can lead
to negative response. Further, these studies use ad formats where the ads
appear on the right hand side and not in the newsfeed.19 However, install
ads are always shown in mobile newsfeed. Previous research has shown
that personalized ads that are more visible are more likely to be perceived
as intrusive (Goldfarb and Tucker 2011). Thus, it is possible that newsfeed
ads with social endorsement may be perceived as intrusive as compared to
the regular newsfeed ads as social ads are more personalized due to the
inclusion of social endorsement information. Also, note that Bakshy et al.
(2012) do not compare the performance of social ads with non-social ads.
On the other hand, while Tucker (2012) does compared the performance of
a social ad with a non-social ad, she uses a Facebook ad campaign dataset
of a charity organization and the results could be driven by the altruistic
setup.
The coefficient for FF is negative and significant (Table 3.5). This
suggests that users belonging to the FF group are less likely to click the ad
as compared to other users. Users in the FF group are likely to be familiar
with the app company as they are friends of fans of the app company’s
Facebook page. Due to homophily, these users should be expected to have
higher fit for the ad as compared to the regular users. The lower response
of these users provides further evidence of possible negative reactance to





the ad as they may perceive the display of ad as a manipulative intent on
the part of the Facebook platform.
3.5.2 Install Rate
The estimation results for the install rate model are shown in Table 3.5. Cu-
mulative “likes” have a negative impact on the propensity of users to install
the app as the coefficient associated with cumulative “likes” is negative and
significant. This, along with the results for click rate, suggests that, unlike
the observation made for the WOM signals (Liu 2006, Chen et al. 2011, De-
wan et al. 2015) in the context of product purchases, pure Facebook “likes”
appearing on Facebook ads do not help the users to install the app. The neg-
ative effect of “likes” on the install rate can again be attributed to negative
reactance. Users who have already clicked the ad and are considering the
install decision need higher processing effort to make the install decision.
Higher processing can lead consumers to think about what the advertiser is
trying to do in the ad and lead to negative reactance (Campbell 1995).
The coefficient for “Social” is negative and significant (Table 3.5).
This suggests that the presence of social endorsement information actually
decreases users’ propensity to install the app even after clicking the ad. In
contrast, the coefficient of the interaction term, Social ·
∑t−1
j=1
̂likej , is positive
and significant. A positive interaction effect may suggest that “likes” and
social endorsement are complements. However, Dewan et al. (2015) find
that these different signals act as substitutes and WOM signals from friends
dominate overall WOM signals. In that case the positive effect of the inter-
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action term, Social ·
∑t−1
j=1
̂likej , is more likely to be driven by the intensity of
friends’ “likes”. This suggests that users who have clicked the ad are more
likely to install the app when the ad is socially endorsed by a large number
of friends. As explained later, our results for the FF-subsample also suggest
that the positive interaction is likely to be driven by friends’ “likes”.
The initial negative response to social endorsement can be potentially
due to the perception of intrusiveness which may play a role even among
interested users. Among the users who do end up clicking ads, the ones
seeing the social endorsement may still be wary of the advertiser’s intent
and may have a lower propensity to install due to negative reactance. How-
ever, with the increase in “likes” and potentially friends’ “likes”, it is pos-
sible that the perceived value of the application increases (Chevalier and
Mayzlin 2006, Chen et al. 2011). Reactance is low for personalized con-
tent when the perceived value of the content is high for users (White et al.
2008). Thus, users receiving ads with potentially high number of “likes”
from friends may show a lower reactance as the perceived value is high for
these users due to multiple “likes” from friends. Note that we do not ob-
serve this effect for clicks but only for installs conditional on clicking. Users
who have clicked the ad are more interested users and are likely to have a
high perceived value of the application due to multiple friends’ “likes” as
compared to all users.
Our results point to the role of WOM signals in generating user re-
sponse in different stages of their decision process. Specifically, our results
show that WOM signals such as “likes” with social endorsement are not
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likely to draw users to the ad but are more likely to serve as a signal of
quality for interested users, i.e., users who have clicked the ad. Some of the
extant research (Godes and Mayzlin 2005, Liu 2006, Dellarocas et al. 2007,
Gu et al. 2012, Lu et al. 2013) has linked WOM to performance without
explaining the underlying driver for this outcome. Chevalier and Mayzlin
(2006) and Chen et al. (2011) suggest that WOM increases the perceived
valuation of products. However, it is not clear at which of the awareness,
interest, or final outcome stage is the source of this relationship. Our results
show that it plays a role only in the final outcome in the context of ads.
The coefficient for FF is negative and significant. This again points to
the possibility of negative reactance as these users are expected to be more
familiar with the app as they are friends of fans of the app company’s Face-
book page. Thus, even if they receive the ad without any social endorse-
ment, they may still perceive it as manipulative and intrusive and may be
less likely to install the app even after clicking the ad as compared to other
users clicking the ad.
3.5.3 “Likes”
Table 3.6 provides the estimates for the parameters from Equation (3.9). In
these results, higher bids lead to a higher number of “likes”. This is reason-
able because the bid is the primary input used by Facebook to determine
the ad placement, and higher values of bids should result in ad impressions
to high quality users. These users, in turn, are more likely to “like” the ad.
Finally, Table 3.7 shows the covariance between unobservables for
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Click Rate, Install Rate, and “likes” from Equation (3.11). The covariance
between the unobservables for Click Rate and Install Rate is statistically
significant. This indicates that the unknown factors influencing consumer
clicks also influence subsequent install behavior. The covariance between
the unobservables for Install Rate and “likes” is also statistically significant.
This suggests that the unobservables influencing “likes” are also influenc-
ing the install rate.
3.5.4 Homophily or Social Influence?
In our setup, only those users whose friends have already “liked” the ad can
be targeted with social endorsement information. However, a user whose
friend has “liked” the ad may inherently have a higher propensity to re-
spond to the ad. Thus, any effect of social endorsement may just represent
the effect of homophily. On the contrary, our results suggest that social
endorsement has a negative effect on both click and install rates. Thus,
our result suggests that users are responding to the social endorsement and
not because they have similar characteristics. Additionally, user response
to social endorsement conditional on clicking depends on the number of
“likes”. As a high number of “likes” is a proxy for high number of “likes”
from friends, it suggests that the intensity of social signals does play a role
in influencing the user decision. This provides some evidence that the effect
of social endorsement is not entirely due to homophily but social influence
could also be playing a role.
In order to investigate this further, we estimate our models only using
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the “FF” subsample, where we only target users that are friends of existing
product “fans” and thus likely to see social endorsement information. The
reason this subsample analysis can provide more information is because, by
definition, the FF groups consist of product fans’ friends, and homophily
would suggest that these people might have similar tastes. By restricting
our focus to these FF groups we can minimize potential homophily effects
in our analysis. The FF-subsample results are shown in column (2) of Tables
3.8 and 3.9. We can see that the subsample result is qualitatively similar to
the full sample result, with “likes” alone being insignificant for clicking and
negative for the install decision, “Social” being negative for both install and
clicking decisions, and Social ·
∑t−1
j=1
̂likej being positive for users’ install
decision. This suggests that at least some portion of the observed main
results is due to social influence. Also note that the negative effect of “likes”
on the install decision further confirms that these WOM signals are possibly
inducing the negative reactance among interested users. As users in the FF-
subsample are already aware of the app from their friends who are fans of
the app company, one possibility is that a higher number of “likes” may be
considered an additional validation of the quality of apps. However, our
results show that is not the case. This also suggests that “likes” and social
endorsement do not act as complements similar to the observation made by




likely to be driven by the number of friends’ “likes”.
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3.5.5 Robustness of Results
In this section we outline several steps we have taken to evaluate the ro-
bustness of our results.
Holdout Sample Analysis
As one test of robustness, we have attempted to verify the prediction ac-
curacy of our results using a holdout sample. To do this, we consider data
from the first 3 weeks as the estimation sample and data from the remain-
ing two weeks as the holdout sample. We use mean absolute error (MAE)
for daily Click Rate and Install Rate values at the aggregate level. The error
values are reported in Table 3.10 and show that the model prediction accu-
racy is similar for both the estimation and holdout samples. This suggests
that our model estimates are robust.
Model without Endogeneity Correction for “Likes”
We estimate our model without considering the endogeneity of “likes”. Specif-
ically, we estimated the click and install models using the actual cumula-
tive “likes”. The corresponding click and install results are shown in Tables
3.8 and 3.9 respectively and are qualitatively similar to our main results.
“Likes” do not help the click rate or the install rate. Social endorsement has
a negative impact on click rate as well as install rate. However, in the pres-
ence of a high number of “likes”, social endorsement has a positive effect
on the install rate.
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Fixed Effect Model
We also use a fixed effects approach to control for the unobservable user
group attributes. More specifically, we use the group dummies instead of
group characteristics as controls in our main models. The corresponding
click and install results are shown in Tables 3.8 and 3.9 respectively and
are qualitatively similar to our main results. “Likes” do not help the click
rate or the install rate. Social endorsement has a negative impact on click
rate as well as install rate. However, the presence of social endorsement
information attenuates the negative effect of “likes” on installs.
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Table 3.1: Impact on WOM and Social Endorsement on Ad Performance
Positive
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(McPherson et al. 2001)
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of such ads in newsfeed
might be perceived as
intrusive by the con-
sumers (Tucker 2014)
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Figure 3.2: A sample mobile app page on Google Play
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Table 3.2: Summary of 16 Target Groups
Group Gender Age FF? Experienced?
1 M 18-25 Yes Yes
2 M 18-25 Yes No
3 M 18-25 No Yes
4 M 18-25 No No
5 M 26-34 Yes Yes
6 M 26-34 Yes No
7 M 26-34 No Yes
8 M 26-34 No No
9 F 18-25 Yes Yes
10 F 18-25 Yes No
11 F 18-25 No Yes
12 F 18-25 No No
13 F 26-34 Yes Yes
14 F 26-34 Yes No
15 F 26-34 No Yes
16 F 26-34 No No
All sixteen groups target Android-based mobile device users who
expressed interest in shopping.

















405788 35.7208 126.7053 0 4584
Non-Social Im-
pressions
304657 26.8184 107.4740 0 4338
Social Clicks 2020 0.1778 0.6091 0 14
Non-Social
Clicks
2032 0.1789 0.6300 0 15
Installs 206 0.0181 0.1424 0 3
Likes 799 0.0703 0.5496 0 24
Bids — 569.3396 262.3448 100 1000
121
Figure 3.3: Comparison of Facebook’s default targeting and our random
bidding targeting
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Figure 3.4: Users targeted in the experiment
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Table 3.5: Empirical Results














































Standard errors in parentheses: ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1
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Standard errors in parentheses: ***p < 0.01,
**p < 0.05, *p < 0.1

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 3.10: Prediction Accuracy for Estimation and Holdout Samples
Click Rate (MAE) Install Rate (MAE)
Estimation Sample 0.01 0.078
Holdout Sample 0.011 0.085
3.6 Discussion and Conclusion
Social media platforms such as Facebook can use WOM signals such as
“likes” and endorsement by friends, or social endorsement, to influence
user actions. These platforms also allow the firms to leverage these signals
through social ads to spread their content and induce installs or purchases.
However, the effectiveness of these signals in ads is not established. In this
research we investigate the impact of WOM signals and social endorsement
on the click and install performance of ads.
We conduct a randomized field experiment on Facebook to under-
stand the effect of WOM and social endorsement information on the perfor-
mance of ads. More specifically, we run a mobile app install ad campaign on
Facebook to sixteen different targeted groups and capture the performance
of ads in terms of impressions, clicks, “likes”, and installs. We randomly
target users by using random bids for our ad in the Facebook ad auction.
We find that the WOM generated from “likes” alone has no positive impact
on the user’s decision to click and has a negative impact on the install deci-
sion. This can be attributed to the target users’ reactance which stems from
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Table 3.11: Model Fits
Models Marginal Density
Main Model -27541
Main Model without Social*Likes -27723
Model with Fixed Effects -27621
their tendency to associate the WOM with the ad as opposed to associating
the WOM with the product itself—the WOM here would likely be perceived
as an advertising strategy. We also find that social endorsement has a neg-
ative impact on the click and install performance. However, conditional on
the ad being clicked, the negative effect of WOM on the install performance
can be attenuated by the display of social endorsement. Since the interac-
tion of WOM and social endorsement proxies for the WOM from friends,
this finding implies that WOM from friends can reduce the negative effect
of “likes”.
These results are important for several reasons. Our results inform
the design of ads on Facebook. Social media platforms such as Facebook are
trying to monetize the ability of the embedded social graph to spread con-
tent and influence users to take actions such as installs and purchases using
ads. Our results show that the use of WOM signals such as “likes” and social
endorsement is not effective in generating response for install ads. In that
case, the platform should determine alternative ways to utilize the social
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graph to elicit user response for such ads. For example, instead of showing
such signals on the ad, the platform can work with the app platforms to
show these signals when the interested users are making the install deci-
sion. Our results do show that social endorsement by several friends helps
to reduce the negative effect of “likes”. Thus, showing such signals on the
install page can be a useful way to dis-associate the signals from ads and
not generate reactance. Additionally, the platform could use such signals
on ads to promote usage among users who have already installed the app.
It is possible that such users may be less likely to show negative reactance
to WOM signals on the ad as they have already installed the app. Facebook
already had a mechanism in place to promote app usage.20
From a practitioner’s perspective, our research provides insights into
the efficacy of WOM and social endorsement information in social media
ads. Marketing and academic studies have established the value of WOM
and social endorsement in enabling product sales. However, our results
question the efficacy of these signals in the context of ads. Our results sug-
gest that marketing managers should ignore the “likes” generated by the
ads as these do not translate into sales and may even hurt sales, and the
presence of social endorsement information only reduces this negative ef-
fect and is not sufficient to overcome the negative effect. Thus, managers
should not misinterpret these signals while evaluating the performance of
ads. This is especially relevant for advertisers who cannot realize product
sales directly through the Facebook interface and have to rely on interpret-
20https://developers.facebook.com/docs/app-ads/formats/engagement-ads
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ing intermediate signals such as “clicks” or “likes” to infer the performance
of their ads.
Our proposed experimental framework can also serve as a guideline
for marketing managers in conducting social media advertising campaigns.
Specifically, our approach enables marketing managers to identify core user
groups from interacting with the Facebook platform and allows managers
to assess the effectiveness of their Facebook advertising campaigns. We note
that all required information described in our framework can be accessed
by marketing managers, so marketing managers can follow our framework
to conduct their own analysis. Using our methodology we are able to show
whether or not the display of social endorsement is an appropriate strat-
egy for their specific marketing campaign, as well as exploring how differ-
ent user demographic groups react to social endorsement. As the Facebook
platform reaches a wide audience, this can be a mechanism used by firms to
learn about their target audience instead of conducting marketing survey or
relying on external information sources such as Nielsen. For example, our
approach can be combined with techniques such as multi-arm bandit op-
timization (Scott 2010) to quickly learn the characteristics of the relevant
target audience for the firm from a large number of possible choices.
As with any empirical analysis our study has several limitations. While
our results explain consumer behaviors at an aggregate level, the aggregate
nature of our data limits our ability to account for the actions of individ-
ual consumers. This calls for future research using click stream data to
empirically evaluate the behavior of different types of consumers in these
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environments. Our research does not consider the effect of ad content on
the performance of social ads. While our study controls for the role of ad
content, future research should consider the role of ad content and how it
interplays with WOM and social endorsement. Since our research relies on
a real life app and needs experimentation with the marketing campaign, we
have managed to use only a single app in our setup. Future research should
also validate the results for other apps. While our results can be applied to
experience goods such as mobile apps, future research should also investi-
gate the effect on search goods where it is possible to infer the quality using
sources other than WOM signals. Finally, future research should also con-




Is Best Answer Really The Best
Answer?
4.1 Introduction
Knowledge is an important asset for individuals and organizations alike.
The need for knowledge is fundamental to one’s career perspective and
many other facets of life; organizations rely on knowledge to maintain suc-
cessful operation and stay competitive (e.g., Nonaka 1991, Nonaka 1994).
Information systems have been a key enabler to individual and organiza-
tion’s knowledge management process; therefore, the issues of knowledge
contribution, knowledge exchange, and knowledge sharing have also been
a major focus of research in the information systems community (e.g., Alavi
and Leidner 2001, Grover and Davenport 2001, Sambamurthy and Subra-
mani 2005). In recent years, the proliferation of electronic networks of prac-
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tice (ENP) have received attention from academics (e.g., Wasko and Faraj
2005), and a stream of research dedicated to the study of ENPs has studied
a variety of issues related to different aspects of knowledge management.
ENPs are defined as self-organizing networks where a potentially
geographically dispersed group of users exchanges knowledge through a
computer-mediated communication system; these users often share some
common practice or interests, and user participation is voluntary (Brown
and Duguid 2001, Wasko and Faraj 2005). A type of ENP is community-
based question answering sites (CQA) on which anyone can post questions
or provide answers to other questions. Popular CQAs such as Quora and
StackExchange.com are convenient platforms for users to exchange knowl-
edge with others.
Since the majority of ENPs and CQAs are open platforms, anyone can
contribute to the knowledge exchange process, and, as a consequence, the
quality of the user-generated content varies and can be vastly heterogeneous
(Wasko and Faraj 2005). Quality level indicators can help CQA users locate
high quality content more easily; meanwhile, the use of these indicators
themselves can significantly affect the usefulness and effectiveness of the
CQAs (Poston and Speier 2005, Meservy et al. 2014). Therefore, the choice
of a good quality measure is crucial for CQAs to be effective.
Theoretically speaking, any user associated with a CQA platform can
provide his/her own quality assessment of a given answer: (1) question
asker-based measure: the original question asker can evaluate proposed an-
swers; (2) reader/audience-based measure: some platforms implement a
134
content quality assessment mechanism which allows all users to rate CQA
content through voting or assigning numerical ratings (Poston and Speier
2005); (3) answerer-based measure: another way to assess content quality
is to allow answer providers to place bets on their own answers based on
how confident they are in their own answer quality (Savage 1971, Fang et
al. 2007); (4) platform-based measure: the CQA platform can designate
a group of moderators to evaluate answer quality for all answers. How-
ever, since the number of answers on CQAs can be very large, it is generally
infeasible to implement a platform-based measure. In addition, it is not
clear how one would implement a betting mechanism on CQAs to allow
for answerer-based quality evaluation without a complete redesign of the
platform. As a result, the most popular quality measures on CQAs are the
question asker-based best answer and the audience-based most popular an-
swer.
Since an answer on CQA platforms is written to address issues raised
in the associated question posted by some question asker, the original ques-
tion asker would seem to be the most qualified judge of the answer quality.
In fact, popular CQA platforms seem to follow this rationale—for a given
question, StackExchange, one of the most popular CQA platforms today,
displays the question-asker-chosen “best answer” first, followed by all other
answers ordered by the number of votes they each receive. This arrange-
ment is intuitively appealing because the question askers themselves should
know best whether their questions have been satisfactorily answered. More-
over, there have been studies in economics where people exhibit some types
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of “herding” behavior, where people choose to follow earlier people’s de-
cisions rather than relying on their own judgment (e.g. Banerjee 1992,
Bikhchandani et al. 1992). This can easily happen in a voting setting where
users vote sequentially and are able to see previous people’s votes. There-
fore, the answers that end up gathering the most votes can just be a result
of the crowd’s herding behavior instead of individual users’ independent
and well thought out decisions. This consequently reaffirms that it would
seem most appropriate to use the question asker’s choice of best answer as
the primary quality measure.
However, the concept of quality itself is subjective, and choosing
the best answer is fundamentally a question asker’s judgment and deci-
sion making task. Research in psychology, behavior economics, behavior
finance, and other related areas has shown that people are not always fully
rational and are susceptible to numerous cognitive biases. For example,
the classic paper by Tversky and Kahneman (1974) listed common heuris-
tics people tend to employ in making judgments under uncertainty and
discussed the resulting systematic and predictable biases; Rabin (1998) dis-
cussed areas where findings in psychology can inform the studies of eco-
nomics; Barberis and Thaler (2003) offered a comprehensive overview of
how psychology affects investors’ behaviors; in the information systems lit-
erature, Poston and Speier (2005) studied the anchoring and adjustment
heuristics and the resulting biased judgment in content search tasks in
knowledge management systems. Inspired by these studies, in the current
paper we identify a new type of bias prevalent in CQA platforms, which we
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coined the politeness bias, and study how this bias affects question asker’s
answer quality evaluation. The finding of our study has profound theoret-
ical and practical implications and will improve our understanding of the
effect of cognitive biases on CQAs and knowledge exchange platforms in
general.
Our study draws upon the social psychology and linguistics litera-
ture and analyzes linguistic features of answers on CQA. We examine how
certain linguistic features could reflect the politeness level of a given an-
swer; we then examine how these features might be correlated with exist-
ing quality measures. More specifically, we focus on the use of context-free
linguistic features such as function words—words that are used to meet cer-
tain syntactic rules but do not themselves carry meanings—and study how
it relates to users’ quality assessment of the answer. In fact, in our analy-
sis, we discard any content words, or keywords, and only retain function
words, such as pronouns and articles, for our linguistic analysis, which is
distinctly different from a conventional text analysis approach where only
content words and keywords were used to analyze texts. Psycholinguistic
studies suggest that the analysis of linguistic features such as the occur-
rence of function words is valuable because individuals’ otherwise unob-
servable attributes could be reflected in their writing style and word usage
(e.g., Pennebaker et al. 2003, Chung and Pennebaker 2007, Tausczik and
Pennebaker 2010, Ludwig et al. 2014). For example, the percentage of first-
person singular and first-person plural pronouns contained in a piece of
writing might reflect the social status of the speaker or writer. Since social
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status might be correlated with one’s expertise level, we expect that the use
of words might also be correlated with the quality of the writing. As an-
other example, Pennebaker (2011) suggested that the use of articles—“a”,
“an”, “the”—is related to concrete nouns and concrete ideas, which might
be positively correlated with content quality.
In addition, studies have shown that the knowledge transfer pro-
cess depends crucially on communication (e.g., Ko et al. 2005). On CQAs,
since the content quality is evaluated by community members, it is reason-
able to expect that the way answer providers communicate through lan-
guage will affect how their answers are perceived and evaluated by read-
ers. Politeness theory, a concept widely studied by linguistics and commu-
nication researchers, describes how speakers and addressees communicate
with each other to retain politeness while achieving their respective com-
munication goals (e.g., Goffman 1955, Holtgraves 1986, Brown and Levin-
son 1987, Goldsmith and MacGeorge 2000, Morand 1996, Morand 2000).
On CQAs, users who provide answers address issues raised in questions
and convey ideas through textual responses, and politeness theory explains
what type of answers are more likely to preserve the “face” (Goffman 1955,
Brown and Levinson 1987) of addressees—that is, question askers—and
will thus be received more favorably than answers that are more threat-
ening to the addressee’s face. Everything else equal, answers that preserve
the addressee’s face will likely be evaluated as high quality answers by the
addressee. According to the politeness theory, the use of second-person
pronouns—“you”—can help improve the clarity of a given text, but it can
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also make the text seem less polite. Since quality assessment is subjective,
we expect the use of second-person pronouns to also affect how people eval-
uate answers on CQA platforms.
We develop a series of hypotheses based on psycholinguistic and po-
liteness theories and empirically test these hypotheses in a data set ob-
tained from StackExchange.com, a collection of community-based question
answering sites with StackOverflow being its largest child forum. Stack-
Exchange is an ideal platform for our analysis because (1) StackExchange
sites contain a large number of textual content contributed by community
users, and (2) StackExchange implements two mechanisms—best answer
decision and community votes—to reflect content quality, which allow us
to examine the relationship between linguistic features and different mea-
sures of content quality. We first specify a random coefficient logit model
to examine the relationship between linguistic features and the first mea-
sure of quality—whether or not a given answer will be chosen as the best
answer. For the second measure of quality—the number of votes a given an-
swer receives—we specify a question-specific fixed-effect negative binomial
model to test our hypotheses. We also specify a panel fixed-effect model to
examine the changes in linguistic features as one develops his or her repu-
tation on the platform.
Our empirical results suggest that, through examining context-free
linguistic features such as pronoun usage, percentage of articles contained
in the text, length of the text, and number of words with more than six
letters, a politeness bias indeed exists and strongly influences the question
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asker’s choice of best answer. Specifically, different communication strate-
gies might appeal to different audiences: while a more indirect and face-
preserving approach might be less face threatening and thus more appre-
ciated by the question asker due to its politeness, more direct and thus
clearer answers might be more beneficial to the general audience. This im-
plies that the design of answer display rules in current CQA platforms, if
relying too much on the question asker’s own answer assessment, might
be inadvertently sacrificing quality for politeness, which would negatively
impact the community’s collective knowledge building process. As a con-
sequence, even though question askers seem to be the most qualified in-
dividuals to determine whether the answers have successfully addressed
their questions, the CQA platform should reconsider to what extent ques-
tion askers’ choices of best answers should be used in determining the qual-
ity level of answers so as to improve the effectiveness of the platform as a
whole. More generally, through the identification and a better understand-
ing of the politeness bias, we hope to raise both researchers’ and practition-
ers’ awareness in studying how this new form of cognitive bias could affect
people’s decision making process.
Our research contributes to the study of knowledge exchange in ENPs
and CQAs, as well as the study of cognitive bias in the context of quality as-
sessment. In addition, our research is related to the topic of strategic com-
munication studied extensively in the economics literature. For example,
signaling games (e.g., Spence 1973) study situations where a sender, whose
type is unknown to the receiver, sends a message to a receiver, and the re-
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ceiver subsequently chooses an action, which affects the payoffs of both the
sender and the receiver. Our psycholinguistic approach can add another
layer of information to existing economics models where the receiver can
now imperfectly infer the type of the sender through analyzing the func-
tion words contained in the sender’s message. We believe this new direction
of research should be of interest to the knowledge management research
community in the study of IT-enabled knowledge exchange, as well as the
economics of IS community in the study of strategic communication.
4.2 Literature Review
4.2.1 IT-enabled Knowledge Exchange and CQAs
The ability to manage knowledge effectively is crucial to an organization’s
success (Nonaka 1994). Several IT-based systems such as knowledge man-
agement systems (KMS) have been designed to enable the creation, storage,
transfer, and application of knowledge (Alavi and Leidner 2001). A detailed
review of KMS and how they enable the knowledge management processes
can be found in Alavi and Leidner (2001). Grover and Davenport (2001)
described a process framework for the study of knowledge management.
Electronic network of practice (ENP) is a popular types of KMS. Dis-
tinct from traditional KMS, ENPs are self-organizing, and participation is
voluntary. They allow users of similar professional practice or interests
to exchange knowledge online, and these users do not necessarily need
to have any offline connection or relationship with each other. Similarly,
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community-based question answering sites (CQA) provide an ideal medium
for the voluntary communication and knowledge creation among users with
similar interests, often in the form of question-answer pairs. Several studies
in the information systems literature have looked at the user’s contribution
and sharing behaviors (e.g., Wasko and Faraj 2005), the platform’s social
structure and characteristics (Wasko et al. 2009), and the user’s evalua-
tion and adoption of knowledge (Meservy et al. 2014). More recently, Beck
et al. (2014) studied enterprise social media-enabled ENP using a multi-
level model of knowledge exchange. Broadly speaking, the process of post-
ing questions in expectation of receiving useful answers is also likened to
the concept of crowdsourcing (Tausczik and Pennebaker 2011, Huang et al.
2014).
4.2.2 Content Quality Assessment
Both ENPs and CQAs allow for open participation and voluntary knowl-
edge contribution, often without a centralized screening process. A con-
sequence of this is that there might be a plethora of interesting content,
but the quality level can be vastly heterogeneous. As a result, knowledge
seekers often have to rely on their own judgment to evaluate content and
filter useful information based on quality (Meservy et al. 2014). Since users
do not need to provide any proof of their capabilities or other credentials,
it is difficult to assess a given user’s expertise level other than relying on
some types of reputation scores the platform generates for each user, often
based on his/her past activities. Besides reputation scores, most CQAs also
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provide some types of content quality measure to help knowledge seekers
evaluate the quality of the content. Poston and Speier (2005) studied how
content ratings affect users’ search, evaluation processes, and their decision
performance. A number of computer science researchers have studied the
problem of content quality prediction through social structure, user repu-
tation, and texts, among other observable features (e.g., Adamic et al. 2008,
Harper et al. 2008, Liu et al. 2008, Shah and Pomerantz 2010, Tian et al.
2013).
As mentioned in the introduction, two most popular quality mea-
sures used in CQAs are (1) best answer and (2) most popular answer. The
main difference between these two quality measures is that an accepted an-
swer is determined solely by the question asker, whereas answer popularity
is determined collectively by community members. To make this distinc-
tion clear, we refer to question asker validation as question asker acceptance
and refer to answer popularity as general audience reception. Notice that
both quality measures are generated by users and are inherently subjective.
In fact, mismatches between the true content quality and the given rating
are common (e.g., Poston and Speier 2005). In this paper, we study how
different quality measures would provide different estimates for the same




Knowledge exchange is inherently a communication process. Factors such
as the source credibility and both the sender and recipient’s communica-
tion competence all affect the effectiveness of knowledge transfer (Ko et al.
2005). The use of language to a large degree determines how effective the
communication would be. Several information systems researchers have
studied computer-mediated communication (CMC), such as those happen-
ing on ENPs and CQAs, through textual and linguistic analysis (e.g., Ab-
basi and Chen 2008, Ludwig et al. 2014). In fact, the study of language
and communication has been a major research area in social psychology,
and more specifically, psycholinguistics. One goal psychologists hope to
achieve is to be able to go beyond the understanding of semantics—that is,
the contextual meaning of words and sentences—and explore in depth the
psychological processes that speakers or writers go through at the time of
speaking or writing. Several psycholinguistic studies have shown that some
of these underlying psychological processes can be revealed by studying in-
dividuals’ writing style (Pennebaker et al. 2003, Chung and Pennebaker
2007, Tausczik and Pennebaker 2010, Kacewicz et al. 2013). Among the
most informative style indicators is the speaker or writer’s use of function
words—words that are used to fulfill a language’s syntactic requirements,
but the existence of themselves alone do not carry semantic purposes. Func-
tion words, or sometimes referred to as closed-class words, include pro-
nouns, articles, conjunctions, prepositions, and auxiliary verbs. While there
are only relatively few function words in a language—around 400 of them
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in English compared with the average native English speaker’s vocabulary
of 100,000 words (Chung and Pennebaker 2007), they account for roughly
50% of words used in a person’s daily speech (Rochon et al. 2000, Chung
and Pennebaker 2007).
The reason function word analysis can be informative of one’s social
and psychological processes has to do with how our brains process them
differently from content words—words that serve semantic purposes and
retain semantic properties independent of context. Friederici et al. (2000)
showed through a functional magnetic resonance imaging study (fMRI)
that the parts of brain activated when processing function words differ
from those activated when processing content words, and some of these
parts are highly related to both human language and social behaviors. (See
Diaz and McCarthy 2009 for a list of brain and neuropsychological studies
on the different brain activities related to processing function and content
words.) This suggests that the use of function words and the use of content
words might be from fundamentally different biological and neurological
processes and are to certain extent orthogonal to each other.
Even more fascinating is the fact that, while people tend not to pay
much attention to function words despite their prevalence in verbal and
written communications, the use of them can actually reflect people’s un-
derlying psychological processes. Chung and Pennebaker (2007) summa-
rized findings that relate the use of function words to social status, atten-
tion, negative affective states, and deception, among other types of health
and psychological traits. Ludwig et al. (2014) studied the linguistic style
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matching (LSM) behavior among online community users by examining
their use of function words.
4.2.4 Politeness Theory
Since an important function of language is its ability to facilitate commu-
nication, besides psycholinguistic processes, one’s choice of words is also
closely dependent on the specific communication goals he or she is trying
to achieve. Brown and Levinson (1987), among a stream of sociolinguistic
and communication research, proposed the politeness theory to explain how
individuals choose appropriate words during a conversation to satisfy each
other’s face wants, where (1) a positive face refers to an individual’s desire to
have his or her identity approved by others, and (2) a negative face refers to
the desire to have one’s autonomy respected and actions unimpeded (Brown
and Levinson 1987, Goldsmith and MacGeorge 2000).
Actions that might threaten one’s face wants are referred to as face-
threatening acts (FTAs). For example, during a communication process, the
speaker’s negative evaluation, insults, and criticism of the addressee are
FTAs that threaten the addressee’s positive face because they might be per-
ceived as a disapproval of the addressee’s current effort; the speaker’s sug-
gestions, recommendations, and advice for the addressee can be perceived
as FTAs that pose threats to the addressee’s negative face because these sug-
gestions might impose constraints on the addressee’s future behavior (Wil-
son et al. 1998). Notice that not all FTAs are equally face threatening—
Brown and Levinson (1987) suggested that the degree of threats are mod-
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erated by the (1) power/status difference and (2) social distance between
the speaker and the addressee, as well as (3) cultural specific ranking of
impositions. For instance, the less power the speaker has compared with
the addressee, the more threatening the FTA would be to the addressee—
an employee’s giving advice to his or her supervisor is likely to be more
face threatening to the supervisor than one’s giving advice to a friend. The
study of face can be traced back to Erving Goffman’s study on face-work
(Goffman 1955). More recently, several politeness theory studies have been
done in the domain of organizational studies (e.g., Morand 1996, Morand
2000). For example, Morand and Ocker (2003) studied the implication of
politeness theory in the context of computer-mediated communication.
Harper et al. (2008) studied strategies which question askers on
question answering sites can use in order to receive higher quality answers,
such as providing higher payment to elicit answer provision on for-fee plat-
forms and using rhetorical strategies such as showing gratitude. They found
that the use of “thank you” contained in questions received differing appre-
ciation levels with regard to different forum culture. Similarly, Burke and
Kraut (2008) found that the level of politeness associated with questions can
positively or negatively elicit the number of answers responding to those
questions, depending on the forum-specific group norms. Both studies rely
on experts to manually evaluate the politeness level of the questions, and
therefore the data sets they used for analysis are considerably smaller than
ours. Danescu-Niculescu-Mizil et al. (2013) recruited Amazon Mechanical
Turks (AMT) to manually annotate messages and use the annotation results
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to train a politeness classifier. Using the trained classifier to analyze much
larger data sets, they found that users’ requests (questions) become less po-
lite as their reputation increases.
It is worth noting that the aforementioned politeness studies focus
primarily on the politeness level associated with questions, while we aim to
study how the politeness level of answers would affect the answer quality
level perception. More closely related to our research objective, Trees et al.
(2009) studied how face-threat mitigation strategies used by teachers can
increase students’ judgments about the quality and usefulness of teachers’
instruction. However, being polite might come at a cost: Brummernhenrich
and Jucks (2013) studied how the politeness strategies used by tutors in ed-
ucational instructions can hinder effective tutoring and negatively affect the
student’s learning process. In this paper we address this question by com-
paring the politeness level associated with answers and how different users,
i.e., question asker or general audience, evaluate the quality of answers.
4.3 Hypothesis Development
As we have seen in previous sections, effective assessment of content qual-
ity is critical for CQAs. Besides measures such as reputation score, question
asker validation of an answer, and overall answer popularity, psycholin-
guistic theory suggests that certain linguistic features might also be use-
ful in assessing the quality of an answer. For example, the relative use of
first-person plural pronouns—“we”, “us”, “our”—and first-person singular
148
pronouns—“I”, “me”, “my”, “mine”—can reflect the relative status of two
people in an interaction (Chung and Pennebaker 2007). Specifically, the
person who uses more first-person plural pronouns tends to be of higher
status. Intuitively speaking, this might be because higher status people tend
to be more collectively oriented (Kacewicz et al. 2014) and might be more
comfortable including others in a statement. In addition, Dino et al. (2008)
found that the differing patterns of pronoun usage between high-status and
low-status individuals are also observed in online message boards. Since
one’s status is to certain extent positively associated with his or her exper-
tise, we expect the user’s usage of pronouns to reflect the quality of his or
her contributed content. This association is consistent with the relationship
between reputation and content quality found in Tausczik and Pennebaker
(2011), where they included the degree of authoritativeness expressed in
the writing in the measurement of users’ online reputation. We first ex-
amine whether this relationship between status and first-person pronoun
use exists on CQAs. Notice that the number of self-referencing pronouns
needed in an answer is very likely going to depend on the specific question
being answered. For example, questions that seek other people’s personal
experience would naturally receive answers that contain a large number of
self-referencing pronouns. Therefore, we expect that, controlling for the
number of self-referencing pronouns, one’s use of first-person plural will
increase as one’s reputation increases, while the use of first-person singular
decreases. Stated formally,
Hypothesis 1 (First-Person Pronoun Use) Controlling for the percentage of
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self-referencing pronouns, the higher one’s reputation is, the larger the relative
proportion of first-person plurals to first-person singulars this person would use.
We then examine whether the use of first-person plural pronouns,
which we have hypothesized to increase as one builds reputation, could re-
flect the quality of one’s contributed content. Notice that empirically this
relationship is not straightforward. While higher reputation might be pos-
itively correlated with higher expertise and hence higher content quality,
individuals’ actual choices of words can be inherently heterogeneous and
highly context-dependent. Therefore, a direct empirical comparison of first-
person pronoun usages between answers might not necessarily reflect their
relative quality level. We develop the following hypothesis to test this rela-
tionship:
Hypothesis 2A (First-Person Pronoun and Question Asker’s Acceptance)
Controlling for the percentage of self-referencing pronouns, the larger the relative
proportion of first-person plurals to first-person singulars the answer contains,
the more positive the question asker acceptance will be.
Hypothesis 2B (First-Person Pronoun and General Audience’s Reception)
Controlling for the percentage of self-referencing pronouns, the larger the relative
proportion of first-person plurals to first-person singulars the answer contains,
the more positive the general audience reception will be.
Our third hypothesis concerns the subjective nature of quality mea-
sures used on CQAs. Recall that CQA users ask questions and provide an-
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swers, which can be categorized as advice-seeking and advice-giving be-
haviors. According to the politeness theory, advice-giving is perceived by
addressees—that is, the question askers—as FTAs that threaten the nega-
tive face, and different word use and different ways of describing an an-
swer could result in different degrees of threats. FTAs that pose higher
level of threats are more likely to be perceived as impolite and are thus less
likely to be accepted by the addressee. Brown and Levinson (1987) summa-
rized some common strategies to communicate negative face-threatening
FTAs while also preserving politeness in advice-giving situations: (1) re-
placing the second-person pronoun—“you”—by the impersonal pronoun
pronoun—“one”, or (2) avoiding using “you” altogether—known as pro-
noun avoidance (Brown and Levinson 1987). These strategies are known as
redressing—instead of making one’s point directly and posing face threats
to the addressee, the speaker or writer can use these strategies to lower the
perceived face threat so as to increase the likelihood that the answer will be
accepted. The disadvantage of using redressing strategies is that, while ap-
pearing more polite, FTAs delivered with redressing strategies can be less
direct which could make the answer seem less clear. To summarize, in an
advice-giving situation, a direct response can achieve a high level of clarity
but will also pose a high level of face threat; a response using the redressing
strategy will decrease the level of face threat but will be less clear. There-
fore, we expect an answer’s perceived quality level to be affected both by
the level of face threat and the level of clarity.
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Operationally, we use the proportion of second-person pronouns to
first-person singular and plural pronouns as a measure of an answer’s face
threatening intensity. This is because second-person pronouns are per-
ceived as rude and impolite (Murphy 1988), and the avoidance of second-
person pronouns is a redressing strategy documented by Brown and Levin-
son (1987). Therefore, we expect the proportion of second-person pronouns
to first-person pronouns present in an answer to reflect the level of the face
threatening intensity. In a CQA setting, since the question asker is the di-
rect recipient of the answer provided by the answer provider, we expect the
question asker to experience the most face threat from the answer. There-
fore, we hypothesize that the higher an answer’s face threatening intensity
is, the less likely it will be chosen as the best answer by the question asker.
Formally speaking,
Hypothesis 3A (FTA on Question Asker) Controlling for the percentage of
all personal references/pronouns, the larger the relative proportion of second-
person pronouns to first-person pronouns the answer contains, the more negative
the question asker’s acceptance will be.
In contrast, since the general audience is not the direct recipient of
the answer, we expect the face threatening level to the general audience to
be minimal. Meanwhile, the general audience might be able to benefit from
the clarity brought forth by the more direct answer. Therefore, we expect
that a direct answer, while posing a high level of face threats, will provide
a high level of clarity and will thus be more appreciated by the general
audience. Formally,
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Hypothesis 3B (FTA on General Audience) Controlling for the percentage of
all personal references/pronouns, the larger the relative proportion of second-
person pronouns to first-person pronouns the answer contains, the more positive
the general audience reception will be.
In addition, the politeness theory suggests that the degree of face
threat is moderated by the power difference between the speaker and the
addressee. The higher the speaker’s status, the lower the perceived face
threat would be. In our case, if the answer provider’s reputation level is
much higher than that of the question asker, then the perceived face threat
coming from the use of second-person pronouns might be smaller. In con-
trast, since second-person pronouns are much less face-threatening to the
general audience, we do not expect the answer provider’s reputation to
moderate the effect of second-person pronouns. Formally speaking,
Hypothesis 4A (Power Distance, FTA, and Question Asker’s Acceptance)
The higher the answer provider’s reputation score is, the weaker the negative ef-
fect of second-person pronouns on the question asker’s best answer choice would
be.
Hypothesis 4B (Power Distance, FTA, and General Audience’s Reception)
The effect of second-person pronouns on the general audience reception is not
moderated by the answer provider’s reputation score.
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4.4 Data Collection and Measure Development
4.4.1 Stack Exchange
We obtain a rich dataset from StackExchange, a popular community-based
question answering platform. StackExchange is a network of more than 140
diverse question answering sites, each focusing on a specific topic ranging
from computer programming and mathematics to philosophy and physi-
cal fitness. Users on StackExchange sites can post questions, and others
can provide answers to these posted questions. The question asker can then
choose among different answers the one that he or she thinks best addresses
the question and mark it as the best answer; this best answer will be dis-
played before all other answers. Similar to other CQAs, StackExchange con-
tents are all generated and moderated by users. More specifically, any user
can upvote any post, question or answer, if he or she thinks the post is of
high quality; similarly, the user can downvote any posts if he or she thinks
the post quality is low. For a given question, StackExchange sites order the
corresponding answers by first displaying the best answer determined by
the question asker and then displaying the other answers according to the
number of votes these answers received. StackExchange sites also maintain
a reputation system where users can accumulate reputation points based on
the number of posts they have generated, the number of votes their posts
have received to date, and their other activities on the site.
All historical StackExchange contents, including all posts, votes, and
user public information, are distributed under the Creative Commons BY-
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Table 4.1: Summary Statistics
Summary Statistics of StackExchange Sites
Site # Questions # Answers # Answers by Native Speakers
Academia 5,500 14,605 4,626
Askubuntu 125,894 213,303 48,501
Codereview 16,469 30,317 11,988
Mathematica 15,109 28,463 10,181
Philosophy 2,925 7,605 2,268
Serverfault 166,345 329,162 155,325
Stats 29,006 47,755 17,868
Tex 61,732 99,204 23,241
Total 407,800 770,414 273,998
SA 3.0 license, and the sites prepare and regularly release data dump for
public downloads. We downloaded a subset of 8 StackExchange sites from
the data dump released in September 2014 for our empirical analysis. These
8 sites cover diverse topics and are representatives of the overall StackEx-
change community. An overview of these sites is shown in Table 4.1. The
downloaded dataset for each site includes post, vote, and user information;
the post information contains post type (question or answer), post author,
post title, post body in raw text format, post date, and number of votes
received, for each post on a given site; the vote information contains vote
date, vote type (upvote, downvote, etc.), and the corresponding post being
voted; the user information contains user name, age, location, a list of all
questions and answers posted by this user, and his or her reputation score
as of September 2014, etc.
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4.4.2 Linguistic Features
For any given post, we analyze the post content’s linguistic features using
the Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count (LIWC), a computerized text analy-
sis package (Pennebaker et al. 2007). LIWC is a state-of-the-art psycholin-
guistic package used to analyze linguistic features of texts by calculating
percentages of words that belong to different word categories, and each of
these categories reflects different language and psycholinguistic dimensions
of a written text. These categories include linguistic processes, such as func-
tion words usage and verb tenses; affective processes such as positive words
and negative words; cognitive processes such as tentative, inclusive, and ex-
clusive words, among many other word categories. Rigorous studies were
conducted during the building of the LIWC dictionaries to ensure the reli-
ability of these generated word categories. Of particular interests are cate-
gories corresponding to function words and pronouns as we are interested
in exploring the relationships between pronoun use and content quality.
Notice that many of the StackExchange sites are related to computer
programming and many posts contain mathematical derivations or code
snippets. We carefully remove these math segments and code snippets and
only retain verbal descriptions and explanations of these snippets for our
linguistic analysis. This is because mathematical derivations and code snip-
pets follow mathematical and programming syntax and are less informative
in reflecting users’ linguistic styles.
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4.4.3 Answer Quality Measurement
Generally speaking, answers receiving a large number of upvotes are not
necessarily chosen as best answers, although in many cases best answers are
also upvoted the most. While best answers are often the most upvoted an-
swers, these two measures might potentially reflect different quality dimen-
sions. Notice that whether or not an answer will be chosen as the best an-
swer is determined solely by the associated question asker. In other words,
an answer will be chosen as the best answer as long as the question asker is
satisfied with the answer. This would likely happen if the answer is able to
solve the specific question posted. We define the choice of best answer as
reflecting the question asker’s acceptance. In contrast, any user, including
the question asker, can cast votes on answers that they deem of high qual-
ity. Since a user can only vote once for a given answer, an answer will only
accumulate a large number of votes if it is able to satisfy many users. We
define answers with many upvotes as reflecting the general audience’s re-
ception in the sense that they are able to gain support from a large number
of community members perhaps because they are able to provide responses
general enough to be appreciated by users facing similar but potentially
slightly different issues.
4.4.4 Reputation Score Reconstruction
The StackExchange data dump does not include the time series data of user
reputation scores; instead, it only provides a snapshot of all users’ repu-
tation scores extracted in September 2014. Since we would like to obtain
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user’s reputation score at the time of posting questions or answers, it is crit-
ical that we reconstruct this measure from the information available to us.
We use StackExchange’s rules of gaining and losing reputation points to re-
construct, for each post, the corresponding post user’s reputation score at
the time of posting by counting the number of questions asked, the number
of answers provided, the number of votes received, the number of answers
being chosen as best answers, as well as other measures that would affect
the user’s reputation score, for all posts in all 8 StackExchange sites.1 We
extend the original dataset by including this retrospective reputation score
information for each post.
4.4.5 Vote Reconstruction
Similar to reputation score, the StackExchange data dump does not include
any time series data on the number of votes a given post receives up to a
specified time. This information is important for our analysis because, as
described in the answer quality measurement section, we want to treat the
answer popularity/general audience reception as a quality measure to ex-
plore the relationship between quality and linguistic features. However,
due to the design of StackExchange sites, answers that are chosen as best
answers will appear first on the webpage, immediately below the associ-
ated questions. As a consequence, the webpage’s answer placement might
make it easier for users to see and vote on best answers than on other an-
swers. This display rule might further complicate the relationship between
1http://stackoverflow.com/help/whats-reputation
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best answer choice—question asker acceptance—and the number of votes
received—general audience reception. To alleviate this concern, for each
post, we recompile the votes information and recount the number of votes
received immediately before the best answer is chosen for the correspond-
ing question. Through this approach we are able to measure the popularity
of answers prior to the website’s exogenous answer placement, which only
takes place when the best answer is chosen.
4.4.6 Native Speaker Identification
Psycholinguistic research suggests that the use of function words is chal-
lenging for non-native speakers to master (Chung and Pennebaker 2007).
Since our goal is to examine how linguistic features, and function word us-
age in particular, correspond to content quality, we choose to only consider
textual data written by English native speakers to ensure our results are not
contaminated by other aspects of language proficiency. We use a heuris-
tic approach to determine whether a given user is likely a native English
speaker: the user information section of the StackExchange dataset contains
a location field where users can provide their location information in their
public user profile. We use this information as a proxy of their country of
origin and language preference and identify users from Australia, Canada,
Ireland, New Zealand, United Kingdom, and United States to be included
in our empirical analysis because users from these countries are more likely
to be native English speakers.
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4.5 Empirical Analysis
We construct a series of empirical models to test our hypotheses using the
StackExchange dataset. Recall that our goal is to explore the relationship
between linguistic features and content quality. As described in the data
section, for each post in the data set, we obtain detailed information includ-
ing post type, post text, post user information, and voting information. Our
dataset allows us to use two related but distinct quality evaluation meth-
ods to assess the quality of each post: for each answer post we know (1)
whether or not it is chosen as a best answer and (2) the number of votes it
has received before the question asker chooses the best answer. Since by
definition only answer posts are qualified to be chosen as best answers, we
restrict our attention to only answer posts in our empirical analysis. We
first discuss the relationship between linguistic features and content qual-
ity using question asker acceptance—whether a given answer is chosen as a
best answer—as the quality measure.
4.5.1 Question Asker Acceptance Model
Recall that, for a given question, the question asker would choose from all
candidate answers the one that he or she thinks best addresses the ques-
tion. Therefore, the best answer decision is a multinomial choice problem.
Also notice that, since questions are potentially very different from each
other, it is highly likely that their corresponding answers will also be very
different from each other, while exhibiting some level of similarity among
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answers that address the same question. We construct a random coefficient
logit model, also known as the mixed logit model, to accommodate both
the multinomial choice nature of best answer decisions and the potential
similarity among affiliated answers. Formally, assume that answer a, which
addresses question q, provides the question asker with utility Uqa, defined
as





+ βq2 · ỸOUqa + βq3 · W̃Eqa + βq4 · SHEHEqa
+ βq5 ·THEYqa + βq6 · IPRONqa + βq7 ·ARTICLEqa + βq8 · SIXLTRqa










+ βq12 ·ANSWERVOTEqa + εqa, (4.1)
where variables SHEHE, THEY, IPRON, ARTICLE, and SIXLTR are per-
centages of third-person singular pronouns, third-person plural pronouns,
impersonal pronouns, articles, and words consisting of more than six let-
ters that are present in answer a, respectively; variable (YOU&WE&I) is the
sum of second-person, first-person plural, and first-person singular pro-
nouns, measured in percentages; variable ỸOU is defined as the propor-
tion of second-person pronoun with respect to (YOU&WE&I), and variable
W̃E is defined as the proportion of first-person plurals with respect to all
first-person pronouns. In other words, ỸOU = YOU/ (YOU&WE&I), and
W̃E = WE/ (WE&I); ε is an unobserved random term that is distributed ac-
cording to a Type I extreme-value distribution.
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The reason we include a composite term, (YOU&WE&I), as an inde-
pendent variable is that, as described in our hypothesis development, we
need to control for the inherent need for answers to use personal pronouns,
which might be dependent on the specific question being asked. Once we
control for the need for first- and second-person pronouns, we use the pro-
portion of first-person plurals with respect to all first-person pronouns to
compare the relative use of first-person plural to first-person singular us-
age, which is the goal of hypothesis H2A. Similarly, we use the proportion
of second-person pronouns with respect to all first- and second-person pro-
nouns to compare the relative use of second-person pronoun to first-person
pronoun usage, which corresponds to hypothesis H3A.
Words belonging to each of these linguistic categories are based on
the LIWC 2007 dictionaries. In addition, we also include WORDCOUNT,
the number of words in a given answer, log(ANSWERERSCORE), the log-
transformed reputation score of the answer provider at the time of posting




, as well as ANSWERVOTE, the
number of votes (upvotes – downvotes) the answer receives before the ques-





, corresponds to hypotheses H4A and H4B.
The advantage of using a random coefficient logit model is the fol-
lowing: through the random coefficient setup, each question is allowed to
value each linguistic feature differently, which means that different ques-
tion askers can have different preferences. More specifically, we assume
that the coefficients βq1, βq2, . . . , βq12 in Equation (4.1) are question-specific
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and normally distributed. The question asker is assumed to be utility-
maximizing in the sense that he or she would pick the answer that gives
him or her the highest utility to be the best answer—that is, for question
q, BestAnswerq = argmaxaUqa. Let Pqa denote the probability that answer
a associated with question q is chosen as the best answer. Since we do not
observe the question asker’s preference, we need to integrate over the dis-
tribution of all possible preferences the question asker could have. Then,






f (β | θ)dβ, (4.2)
where Xqa is a vector of answer a’s linguistic features appeared in Equation
(4.1), A(q) is the number of answers that are associated with question q,
β = (βq1, · · · ,βq12), f (β | θ) is the density function of β, which represents the
question asker’s preference, and θ is a vector of parameters associated with
the density function f .
4.5.2 General Audience Reception Model
We construct a different regression model to explore the relationship be-
tween linguistic features and general audience reception. Notice that the
acceptance of an answer is measured by the number of votes (upvotes –
downvotes) this answer receives up to the time when the best answer is
chosen for the corresponding question. Since the dependent variable here
is a count variable taking only integer values, we specify a negative bino-
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mial count model where the dependent variable is the number of votes up
to when the best answer is chosen, and independent variables include lin-
guistic features as well as the answer provider’s reputation score at the time
of posting the answer. Notice that, similar to the case of question asker ac-
ceptance, it is likely that answers corresponding to different questions will
differ significantly from each other, and therefore there might exist some
type of clustering among answers addressing the same question. Therefore,
we specify a panel fixed-effect negative binomial model to address this is-
sue. The likelihood of this model is as follows (Hausman et al. 1984).
Pr
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where yqa is the number of votes given to answer a which is associated with
question q, and yqa follows a negative binomial distribution with the fol-






















Γ (·) is the Gamma function; µq is a question-specific fixed effect; φq is an-
other question-specific fixed effect; γqa is parameterized as follows:
γqa = exp
(
β0 + β1 · (YOU&WE&I)qa + β2 · ỸOUqa + β3 · W̃Eqa + β4 · SHEHEqa
+ β5 ·THEYqa + β6 · IPRONqa + β7 ·ARTICLEqa + β8 · SIXLTRqa
+ β9 ·WORDCOUNTqa + β10 · log(ANSWERERSCORE)qa




where variables corresponding to linguistic features are defined similarly as
in the question asker acceptance model; ANSWERERSCORE is the answer
provider’s reputation score at the time of posting the answer; BESTANSWER
is a dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if the answer is picked as











γqa · exp(2 ·µq)
φ2q
, (4.9)
where both µq and φq reflect question-specific fixed effects (Hausman et al.
1984, Greene 2007).
Notice that another option is to use a fixed-effect Poisson specifica-
tion to model the number of votes each answer receives. However, Poisson
regression model imposes the restriction that the conditional variance be
equal to the conditional mean, known as the Poisson variance assumption
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(Wooldridge 2010), which might be overly restrictive. Our data exhibits
overdispersion, which refers to the phenomenon that the conditional vari-
ance is greater than the conditional mean. Therefore, we believe the use of
fixed-effect negative binomial model is more appropriate for our empirical
analysis.
4.6 Model Estimation and Results
4.6.1 Reputation Score and Linguistic Features
We first examine whether users’ use of words would change as they accu-
mulate reputation points over time. The increase of reputation points on
StackExchange sites may come from asking questions, providing answers,
or voting. A higher reputation level can reflect the user’s active participa-
tion on the platform, as well as their expanded knowledge in the subject
matter. Therefore, reputation points can be interpreted as a measure of sta-
tus and expertise. Recall that psycholinguistic theories suggest an individ-
ual’s status might influence the way one uses words. More specifically, high
status users might tend to use more first-person plural pronouns than first-
person singular pronouns as hypothesized in H1. To test this, we construct
a panel model with a user fixed-effect where we regress the proportion of
first-person plurals among all first-person pronouns on a user’s reputation
points and control variables including other context-free linguistic features.
Notice that in this analysis we only consider users who have contributed an-
swers and only examine the linguistic features contained in these answers.
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The results are shown in Column (2) of Table 4.2. We can see that an in-
crease in the answer user’s reputation score is correlated with a higher pro-
portion of first-person plural pronouns. This result is consistent with the
psycholinguistic theory which states that an individual’s higher status will
correspond to more use of first-person plural pronouns. Therefore, H1 is
supported.
Table 4.2: Changes in Linguistic Features vs Reputation Points
(1) (2) (3) (4)
DV ARTICLE W̃E ỸOU Word Count
log answeruserscoretodate 0.0009∗∗∗ 0.00465∗∗∗ 0.0154∗∗∗ 2.494∗∗∗
(7.58e-05) (0.000646) (0.000657) (0.286)
YOU&WE&I -0.234∗∗∗ 0.164∗∗∗ 1.498∗∗∗ -705.6∗∗∗
(0.00256) (0.0225) (.0225) (9.736)
ỸOU -0.0035∗∗∗ -0.0757∗∗∗ — 90.24∗∗∗
(0.000316) (0.000268) — (1.163)
W̃E 0.00153∗∗∗ — -0.0787∗∗∗ 43.55∗∗∗
(0.000322) — (0.00279) (1.206)
SHEHE -0.251∗∗∗ -0.428∗∗∗ -2.306∗∗∗ 474.9∗∗∗
(0.0226) (0.193) (0.196) (85.20)
THEY -0.448∗∗∗ -0.428∗∗ -2.306∗∗∗ 474.9∗∗∗
(0.00849) (0.0731) (0.0745) (32.28)
IPRON -0.212∗∗∗ -0.130∗∗∗ -0.571∗∗∗ -77.71∗∗∗
(0.00279) (0.0243) (0.0247) (10.74)
ARTICLE — 0.111∗∗∗ -0.265∗∗∗ -10.56
— (0.0233) (0.0238) (10.32)
(Continued on next page)
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Table 4.2 – continued from previous page
(1) (2) (3) (4)
DV ARTICLE W̃E ỸOU Word Count
SIXLTR -0.0598∗∗∗ 0.118∗∗∗ -0.414∗∗∗ -7.044
(0.00142) (0.0122) (0.0123) (5.373)
Word Count -7.45e-07 0.000223∗∗∗ 0.000480∗∗∗ —
(7.28e-07) (6.17e-06) (6.18e-06) —
Constant 0.121∗∗∗ 0.0519∗∗∗ 0.388∗∗∗ 110.1∗∗∗
(0.00071) (0.00666) (0.00671) (2.92)
User Fixed-Effect YES YES YES YES
Observations 145,952 145,952 145,952 145,952
R-squared 0.117 0.016 0.089 0.087
Number of Users 12,828 12,828 12,828 12,828
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
For completeness, we also regress the proportion of second-person
pronouns with respect to first-person pronouns, i.e., ỸOU, the proportion
of articles, and the total number of words, all on the user’s reputation score
and control variables. These results are shown in columns(3), (1), and (4)
in Table 4.2. These results show that, as one develops his or her reputation,
the proportion of second-person pronouns increases. Recall that the use
of second-person pronouns tends to make answers clearer while posing a
higher level of face threats to the question asker. Therefore, our result sug-
gests that as one attains higher reputation level, he or she would focus more
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on the clarity rather than the politeness of his or her answer. Also, as repu-
tation score increases, users would use more articles, which reflect concrete
ideas and a categorical thinking style. Finally, we observe that users tend to
write longer answers as their reputation scores increase. This could reflect
an increase in users’ knowledge and expertise in the subject matter, which
in turn enables them to provide more detailed answers.
4.6.2 Question Asker Acceptance
In this section we briefly describe our estimation procedures and the results
of hypothesis tests associated with the question asker acceptance model.
As described in the previous section, we specify a random coefficient logit
model to study the relationship between linguistic features and content
quality, where the quality is measured by whether or not an answer is cho-
sen as the best answer. Recall that Equation (4.2) is the probability of a
given answer being chosen. Let yqa be the indicator which takes the value 1
if answer a, which addresses question q, is chosen as the best answer, and 0










f (β | θ)dβ. (4.10)
Since the integral in Equation (4.10) does not have a closed form solution,
we can approximate it through simulation (Train 2009). Specifically, for
question q and a given θ, draw β from f (β | θ) a total of R times and mark
them as β1,β2, . . .βR. Then we can use these draws to approximate the like-
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Our goal is to estimate the parameters, θ, of the density function f (β | θ).
Recall that θ is normally distributed. Assume θ ∼ N(µ,σ2). The mean,
µ, and variance, σ2, of θ can be estimated through maximizing the joint
























The maximum simulated likelihood estimator (MSLE) maximizes Equation
(4.12). Note that during the model estimation, (1) questions that contain
only one answer as well as (2) questions that did not have a corresponding
best answer chosen will be dropped. This is because answers corresponding
to these questions do not have within cluster variations in their outcome
variable and are thus uninformative to the model estimation.
The random coefficient logit estimation results using 50 halton draws
for each observation (question) to construct the simulated likelihood are
shown in Table 4.3. Notice that in the random coefficient logit model we
assume question-specific coefficients to be normally distributed across ob-
servations. Therefore, the reported results include the estimated coefficient
mean of each independent variable, shown in column (1), as well as the es-
timated mean of standard deviation of each independent variable, shown in
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column (3). The standard errors of both the means and standard deviations
are reported in columns (2) and (4), respectively. We begin by analyzing
the relationship between pronouns and question asker acceptance. These
estimates show that, allowing the effect to be heterogeneous across ques-
tions and controlling for the overall use of first-person pronouns, i.e. “we”
and “I”, the relationship between the use of first-person plurals in an an-
swer and the likelihood that this answer will be chosen as the best answer
is positive but insignificant. Therefore, hypothesis H2A is not supported. A
possible explanation for this insignificant result is that there are only very
few occurrences of “we” used in answers on StackExchange forums. In fact,
W̃E is zero for more than 80% of answers. Therefore, the lack of “we” in the
data might have prevented us from seeing the effect of first-person plurals.
Moving to the analysis of second-person pronouns, controlling for
the overall use of first- and second-personal pronouns, the more second-
person pronouns used in an answer, the less likely it will be chosen as the
best answer, and therefore hypothesis H3A is supported. This result is con-
sistent with the politeness theory, which predicts that answers that pose
higher threats to the addressee’s face are considered less polite, which might
negatively affect their chances of being accepted by the question asker. Re-
call the politeness theory also theorizes that factors such as power difference
and social distance will moderate the perceived face threats. Our model
explicitly include the answer provider’s reputation score in the analysis,
and the difference between answer providers’ reputation scores reflects the
difference in the question asker–answer provider power difference across
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different answer providers. Furthermore, since CQAs do not usually imple-
ment social structures such as friendships and users often use pseudonyms,
we argue that the effect of social distance is not likely to play a significant
role in our analysis. In sum, our result supports hypothesis H3A, which
suggests that the politeness of an answer plays an important role in whether
or not this answer will be accepted by the question asker.
In addition, from the random coefficient logit estimation results, as
shown in Table 4.3, we also see that the coefficient associated with the term
ỸOU * log(ANSWERERSCORE) is significantly positive. This means that,
controlling for the use of second-person pronouns, the higher the answer
provider’s reputation, the weaker the second-person pronoun’s negative ef-
fect on question asker acceptance is. In other words, while second-person
pronouns are perceived by question asker as face threatening and are thus
negatively correlated with question asker acceptance, this negative effect
can be alleviated as long as the answer provider’s reputation is high. There-
fore, hypothesis H4A is supported.
Besides pronoun usage and its relationship with content quality, we
also examine three other context-free linguistic features and their relation-
ships to question asker acceptance. Pennebaker (2011) described a cate-
gorical thinking style as one that places more focus on objects, things, and
categories. His findings suggest that several categorical thinking-related
linguistic features, including the use of articles—“a”, “an”, “the”—and the
use of “big words”—words that are longer than six letters, are correlated
with learning outcome and academic performance. Our random-coefficient
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logit results suggest that both features are positively correlated with an an-
swer being chosen as the best answer. In addition, the length of an answer,
measured in the number of words an answer contains, is positively related
with the likelihood that this answer will be accepted by the question asker.
It is worth noting that the reputation score of the answer provider
is negatively correlated with the question asker’s acceptance decision. In-
terestingly, if we consider the terms log(ANSWERERSCORE) and ỸOU *
log(ANSWERERSCORE) together, we can see that, for someone with a high
enough reputation score, the higher ỸOU is, the more likely it would be
picked as the best answer; otherwise, for people with lower reputation, the
higher ỸOU is, the less likely it would be picked as the best answer. In con-
trast, if ỸOU is high enough, then the higher the answer user’s reputation,
the more likely it would be picked as the best answer; otherwise, the higher
the answer user’s reputation, the less likely it will be picked as the best an-
swer. These results suggest that, for high reputation answer providers, the
negative impact coming from the face-threatening second-person pronouns
can be countered by their high reputation: the question asker will find the
impoliteness to be less of a concern or even as a signal of authority, and he
or she will therefore appreciate the clarity brought forth by the answer.
We rerun the random coefficient logit model using 200 draws to see
if the results are robust to the number of draws we use to compute the
simulated likelihood, and the results, shown in Table 4.4, are qualitatively
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similar to the results using 50 draws.
Table 4.3: Random Coefficient Logit Result–50 Draws
DV isBestAnswer
Mean Standard Deviation











YOU&WE&I -2.576∗∗∗ (0.989) 3.635 (5.294)
ỸOU -2.196∗∗∗ (0.2413) 1.138∗∗ (0.550)
W̃E 0.103 (0.084) 0.113 (0.390)
SHEHE -6.846 (7.910) 2.763 (25.379)
THEY -6.091∗∗∗ (2.217) 1.298 (7.473)
IPRON 0.206 (0.810) 8.981∗∗ (3.760)
ARTICLE 2.101∗∗∗ (0.773) 1.209 (3.331)
SIXLTR 1.692∗∗∗ (0.390) 0.671 (2.056)
ANSWERVOTE 1.120∗∗∗ (0.056) 0.762∗∗∗ (0.047)
log(ANSWERERSCORE) -0.137∗∗ (0.019) 0.015 (0.049)
ỸOU*log(ANSWERERSCORE) 0.244∗∗ (0.034) 0.117∗∗ (0.046)
Word Count 0.006∗∗∗ (0.0004) 0.005∗∗∗ (0.0008)
N 24,553 24,553 24,553 24,553
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 4.4: Random Coefficient Logit Result–200 Draws
DV isBestAnswer
Mean Standard Deviation











YOU&WE&I -2.732∗∗ (1.087) 6.121 (6.933)
ỸOU -2.370∗∗∗ (0.273) 1.551∗∗∗ (0.555)
W̃E 0.105 (0.090) 0.033 (0.453)
SHEHE -6.993 (8.339) 1.028 (27.015)
THEY -6.683∗∗∗ (2.417) 5.667 (10.863)
IPRON 0.136 (0.882) 10.816∗∗∗ (3.939)
ARTICLE 2.305∗∗∗ (0.835) 2.115 (3.576)
SIXLTR 1.801∗∗∗ (0.428) 1.893 (2.483)
ANSWERVOTE 1.215∗∗∗ (0.075) 0.834∗∗∗ (0.058)
log(ANSWERERSCORE) -0.148∗∗∗ (0.022) 0.078 (0.087)
ỸOU*log(ANSWERERSCORE) 0.263∗∗∗ (0.038) 0.123 (0.086)
Word Count 0.007∗∗∗ (0.0005) 0.006∗∗∗ (0.001)
N 24,553 24,553 24,553 24,553
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Overall, these findings suggest that linguistic features and the po-
liteness level of the answer seem to be closely related to question asker’s
answer acceptance decision. We emphasize that these results do not them-
selves reflect causal relationships. Rather, we argue that answers which are
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perceived by question askers to be of highest quality consistently contain
certain linguistic features in terms of their pronoun usage, as well as their
perceived politeness.
Having established main correlations, we shift our attention to ex-
ploring whether or not any potential heterogeneity across StackExchange
sites might affect the analysis. Roughly speaking, StackExchange sites can
be categorized into one of the following two categories: (1) those featuring
closed-ended questions and answers and (2) those featuring open-ended
questions and answers. For example, a typical question posted to the “Tex”
forum usually consists of a precise statement of the issue faced, and the
corresponding answer is usually a precise, objective solution addressing the
issue at hand. We refer to this type of sites as closed-ended sites. In con-
trast, questions posted to the “Academia” forum are more likely to be open-
ended, such as those seeking career advice, research ideas, among others,
and the answers are more likely to be subjective. We refer to these sites as
open-ended. Therefore, we label “Askubuntu”, “Codereview”, “Mathemat-
ica”, “Tex”, “Stats”, and “Serverfault” as closed-ended sites, and we label
“Academia” and “Philosophy” as open-ended sites. To explore the possibil-
ity that answers posted to different types of sites might be evaluated differ-
ently, we include in our random coefficient logit model interaction effects
between pronouns and site type, and the results are shown in Table 4.5.
We can see that the direction and magnitude of linguistic features remain
largely unchanged from earlier results, and the interactions between open-
ended forums and pronouns are insignificant. Therefore, there does not
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seem to be any significant differences across different types of sites.
Finally, we point out that the number of votes an answer receives
prior to the time the best answer is determined is positively correlated with
this answer being chosen as the best answer, and this correlation remains
significant after controlling for site type. In summary, hypotheses H3A and
H4A were supported, while H2A was not.
Table 4.5: Random Coefficient Logit with Interactions–50 Draws
DV isBestAnswer
Mean Standard Deviation











YOU&WE&I -2.677∗∗∗ (0.970) 5.668 (5.204)
(YOU&WE&I)*OpenEnded -17.610∗ (9.584) 15.247 (34.207)
ỸOU -2.072∗∗∗ (0.231) 1.523∗∗∗ (0.399)
ỸOU*OpenEnded 1.005 (0.786) 3.338 (2.510)
W̃E 0.096 (0.082) 0.076 (0.421)
W̃E*OpenEnded -0.108 (0.700) 1.096 (1.615)
SHEHE -5.046 (8.091) 17.440 (23.303)
THEY -6.092∗∗∗ (2.147) 0.862 (8.248)
IPRON 0.436 (0.764) 3.372 (5.158)
ARTICLE 2.036∗∗∗ (0.751) 1.428 (2.519)
SIXLTR 1.580∗∗∗ (0.376) 1.652 (1.436)
(Continued on next page)
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Table 4.5 – continued from previous page
Mean Standard Deviation











ANSWERVOTE 1.051∗∗∗ (0.050) 0.685∗∗∗ (0.043)
log(ANSWERERSCORE) -0.130∗∗∗ (0.019) 0.023 (0.043)
ỸOU*log(ANSWERERSCORE) 0.231∗∗∗ (0.032) 0.014 (0.050)
Word Count 0.006∗∗∗ (0.0003) 0.004∗∗∗ (0.0007)
N 24,553 24,553 24,553 24,553
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
4.6.3 General Audience Reception
We next turn to exploring the relationship between linguistic features and
general audience reception, measured by the number of votes an answer re-
ceived. The fixed-effect negative binomial model we specified is estimated
through a maximum likelihood approach (Hausman et al. 1984). Notice
that the outcome variable—in our case, the number of votes each answer
receives—needs to be nonnegative. Therefore, we discard answers that re-
ceive more downvotes than upvotes, which corresponds to less than 1%
among all answers, and only use answers with nonnegative votes for our
analysis. The estimation results are shown in column (1) in Table 4.6. No-
tice the number of observations is larger in the general audience reception
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analysis than in the question asker acceptance analysis. This is because in
the case of general audience reception we are able to use all answers for the
analysis, while in the case of question asker acceptance we had to remove
answers whose corresponding question asker has not chosen a best answer.
We can see that the sign of the coefficient estimate associated with W̃E is
positive but insignificant. This means that, controlling for the overall use
of first-person pronouns, i.e. “we” and “I”, we do not observe any signif-
icant relationship between first-person plurals used in an answer and the
number of votes this answer would receive. Therefore, hypothesis H2B is
not supported. We suspect this insignificant result might have come from
the fact that “we” was rarely used. Recall that our fixed-effect specification
controls for any question-specific answer characteristics, and therefore our
analysis reflects the likelihood of an answer receiving more votes than its
competing answers.
Next, controlling for the overall use of first- and second-person pro-
nouns, the more second-person pronouns used in an answer, the more votes
this answer will receive, and therefore hypothesis H3B is supported. This
result is consistent with the politeness theory, which predicts that, while an-
swers containing more second-person pronouns might pose higher threats
to the addressee’s face and are considered less polite, the perceived face
threat of the general audience should be minimal since the general audience
is not the direct recipient of the answer. In addition, more second-person
pronoun use and more direct answers tend to be clearer, and therefore the
combination of the lower face threat facing general audience and the im-
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provement in clarity explains why more use of second-person pronouns is
correlated with a higher number of votes an answer will receive. In ad-
dition, the coefficient associated with ỸOU*log(ANSWERERSCORE) is in-
significant, which is consistent with hypothesis H4B. This result is expected
because second-person pronouns only pose minimal face threats to the gen-
eral audience, and hence the answer provider’s reputation level would not
have made any significant difference.
Similar to the question asker acceptance model, our general audi-
ence reception model explicitly controls for the answer provider’s reputa-
tion score, and the difference between answer providers’ reputation scores
should reflect the difference in the question asker–answer provider power
difference across different answer providers. In sum, the combination of
psycholinguistic and politeness theory is able to explain the empirical re-
sults of the general audience reception analysis.
We then analyze other linguistic features and their correlations with
general audience reception, and we can see that the use of articles and long
words are both positively correlated with general audience reception, simi-
lar to the results from the question asker acceptance model. Also notice that
the coefficient of wordcount is positive, which means the longer an answer
is, the more votes it will receive. Finally, our result shows that, unlike in the
case of question asker acceptance, the answer provider’s reputation score is
positively correlated with the number of votes his or her answer receives.
We can also see from the coefficient associated with BESTANSWER that an-
swers accepted by question askers tend to receive more votes. This might
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be because StackExchange displays answers first by displaying the accepted
answer then order the rest of the answers by the number of votes they re-
ceived. Therefore, besides the possibility that answers accepted by question
askers might be of high quality, this display arrangement might also con-
tribute to the correlation. Our next model specification explores whether
a StackExchange site is open- or closed-ended will lead to any change in
results. These results are shown in column (2) in Table 4.6. We can see
that, while the direction and magnitude of main linguistic features remain
largely unchanged from column (1), open ended sites exhibit slightly differ-
ent correlations between pronoun usage and general audience reception. To
summarize, our general audience reception results are consistent with both
psycholinguistic and politeness theories, and the specific type of StackEx-
change sites moderate the effect of pronoun usage on general audience re-
ception.
In summary, hypotheses H1, H3A, H3B, H4A, and H4B are sup-
ported.
Table 4.6: Fixed-Effect Negative Binomial Results
DV # Votes Received
(1) (2)




(Continued on next page)
181
Table 4.6 – continued from previous page
(1) (2)
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Table 4.6 – continued from previous page
(1) (2)
No Interactions With Interactions
Word Count 0.0004∗∗∗ 0.0004∗∗∗
(3.59e-05) (3.59e-05)
Question Fixed Effect YES YES
Number of Answers 45,285 45,285
Number of Questions 18,306 18,306
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
4.7 Conclusion
Content quality assessment for ENPs and CQAs is an important research
topic in the IS literature. Since content provision on ENPs and CQAs is
voluntary and open to anyone, the quality level is highly heterogeneous.
A suitable quality assessment method can help users locate high quality
content, but the choice of such method is difficult in itself because quality
assessment is by nature a subjective task, and different assessment methods
might get diverging results.
We considered using both the question asker’s acceptance and the
general audience reception as our quality measures, modelled by a random
coefficient logit model and a fixed-effect negative binomial model, respec-
tively. Our results using two different quality measures showed that the
relative usage of second-person pronouns to first-person pronouns exhibits
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different correlations with respect to the perceived answer quality: a high
percentage of second-person pronouns is correlated with a decrease in the
likelihood of question asker acceptance, while the same feature is corre-
lated with an increase in general audience reception, measured in votes. In
addition, we showed that, as users build their reputation on the platform,
they tend to use more second-person pronouns and more first-person plu-
rals; their answers also tend to be longer and contain more complicated
words. Moreover, while the use of first-person plural pronouns increases
compared to that of first-person singular pronouns, this relative proportion
of first-person plural to singular pronouns is not correlated with the quality
measures we examined. Importantly, we found that the politeness level of
an answer is correlated with both the question asker acceptance and general
audience reception in opposite directions.
We are able to explain these results using psycholinguistic theories
and the concept of face threatening acts from the politeness theory. More
specifically, since the use of words, and function words in particular, can be
reflective of one’s unobservable social and psychological processes, by an-
alyzing the answer provider’s word usage expressed in an answer, one can
examine to what degree the writing can reveal the writer’s status, think-
ing style, as well as the expertise level, which is usually unobservable on
CQA platforms. Therefore, in addition to the reputation score of the an-
swer provider, one can use linguistic features to estimate the quality of an
answer. Moreover, our empirical results inspired by the politeness theory
are fruitful. Since CQAs are by nature advice-seeking and advice-giving
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platforms and hence more relevant to the negative face according to the
politeness theory, we hypothesized that the use of second-person pronouns
would be correlated with quality evaluation in distinct ways, depending on
the specific quality evaluation method used. One important implication
of this finding is that content quality assessment appears to be sensitive
to the particular evaluation measure being used, and the subjective nature
of quality assessment suggests that the politeness expressed in a message
might be exerting significant influence on the quality evaluation, which we
called the politeness bias. Whether or not the politeness of an answer should
affect the quality of an answer is debatable and is up to the CQA to de-
cide. If the goal of CQAs is to facilitate knowledge creation, then the “ob-
jective” quality of an answer would seem to be much more important than
the politeness of the answer, although how we define an “objective” quality
measure is a completely independent research question. In sum, through
the identification of the politeness bias we discussed how it affects users’ an-
swer quality evaluation and, as a consequence, the overall effectiveness of
knowledge exchange on CQA platforms.
This study integrates insights from psycholinguistic theories, the po-
liteness theory, as well as the knowledge exchange literature and ENP, and




The first theoretical implication of our study is that the degree of politeness
expressed in a text plays an important role in quality assessment. More
specifically, since CQA is essentially an advice-seeking and advice-giving
platform, the majority of exchange happening on CQA is face threatening
(Brown and Levinson 1987), and the politeness theory suggests that the
question asker is susceptible to face threats contained in an answer. Our
study shows that this susceptibility to face threats significantly impacts
question asker’s evaluation of answer quality: answers that exhibit a lower
level of face threats are perceived by question askers as better answers than
other answers. In contrast, the general audience would perceive a minimal
level of face threats from the same answer than the question asker because
they are not the direct recipient of the answer. Their quality assessment
focuses mainly on the clarity of the answer. Since the use of second-person
pronouns can be more face threatening but at the same time more direct
and clearer, the general audience exhibits a liking toward answers that use
more second-person pronouns. The theoretical implication of this is pro-
found: although the politeness/face threatening level of an answer should
not be directly related to its actual quality level, the agents evaluating its
quality can be significantly affected by it and hence provide different qual-
ity assessments. This politeness bias provides an explanation of why differ-
ent quality assessment methods would provide diverging assessments and
also suggests the importance of using multiple assessment methods to get a
comprehensive evaluation of content quality.
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The subjective nature of quality evaluation, as reflected in our re-
sults, suggests that ENP and CQA researchers should carefully examine if
any quality-independent factors—such as the politeness level—might be
present in their research contexts which could confound the quality as-
sessment process. Similarly, a CQA’s choice of quality assessment methods
should be carefully considered to facilitate effective knowledge exchange.
The implication of our identification and characterization of the po-
liteness bias is profound. Several social science disciplines such as eco-
nomics and finance have started to incorporate psychology theories and
findings into their core theory building process to better reflect human
behaviors (e.g., Rabin 1998, Barberis and Thaler 2003). Politeness bias
can play an important role in interpersonal communication processes, and
hence computer-mediated communications such as those taking place on
ENPs and CQAs might all be influenced by it. Researchers are encouraged
to explore more into the extent to which the politeness bias affects commu-
nication as well as the knowledge exchange process.
From a strategic point of view, our results might inspire users on
CQAs to deliberately choose the wording of their answers in order to cater
to both the question asker and the general audience so that they can obtain
question asker acceptance as well as positive general audience reception.
This can be studied in a game-theoretic framework and is related to the
issue of strategic communication studied extensively in the economics lit-
erature.
In addition, our context-free linguistic analysis, especially that of
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function words, can offer insights to the quality of textual contents. This
approach is drastically different from conventional text analysis such as
sentiment analysis and topic models, in which only content words or key
words were used as inputs, and function words were considered stopping
words and thus dropped. In contrast, our approach focuses solely on func-
tion words and studies their relationships with quality assessment. The
study of function words has its roots in psycholinguistic theories, and this
paper shows its strength in CQA quality assessment. We believe that our
context-free linguistic analysis framework can be used beyond CQA and
knowledge exchange studies. For example, researchers can consider using
a combination of a content words-focused approach and a function word
analysis in the study of textual data for a more in-depth understanding of
texts.
The study of context-free linguistic features and their application to
CQA quality assessment is a relatively new research area. Although knowl-
edge exchange, ENPs, and CQAs have been studied extensively in the IS lit-
erature, the combination of psycholinguistic theories, the politeness theory,
and the knowledge exchange process is unique in the literature and pro-
vides numerous opportunities for future research. According to Whinston
and Geng (2004), we believe our paper explores an exciting gray area of IS
research where diverse disciplines such as IS, psychology, communication,
and economics are integrated to provide an interdisciplinary understand-
ing of the IT artifact. We encourage IS researchers to pursue research in
this direction, and we believe more innovative projects along this research
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direction will be beneficial to the advancement of the IS field.
4.7.2 Managerial Implication
Our empirical investigation offers several implications to practitioners. First
of all, our results show that quality assessment methods are subjective and
can be affected by quality-independent factors such as the politeness bias.
Therefore, in designing a new CQA for an organization or for public use,
the design engineer needs to carefully choose quality assessment methods
that can most effectively help users locate high quality content. They need
to consider the specific user demographics for which the CQA is designed
and evaluate the degree to which factors such as face threats would affect
this specific user base. In addition, the CQA can remind its users of the
importance of an accurate quality assessment and also emphasize that the
accuracy of answers is the most important among all factors that might play
a role in the evaluation. This way, a more objective content quality evalua-
tion can be obtained.
In addition, how different quality assessment methods are displayed
on the CQA can affect the way users interact with the platform. For exam-
ple, on StackExchange forums, for a given question, the answer chosen by
the question asker as best is displayed on top of all other answers, regardless
of the number of votes the answers received. Although the question asker
himself or herself may be the most qualified person to evaluate the answer
quality based on how effective the answers addressed his or her question,
his or her choice of best answer can be significantly affected by the polite-
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ness level of the answers. Therefore, the platform has to assess whether
or not there are more effective ways to order the answers than the current
order of display to help users locate high quality answers more efficiently.
The easier it is for users to locate high quality content, the more valuable
the CQA would be to users. Since CQAs such as StackExchange have be-
come increasingly popular and are expected to become a major player in the
technology and education scene,2 it is imperative that CQAs understand the
politeness bias and its consequence to ensure effective knowledge exchange
and successful commercialization. In addition, a careful design of quality
assessment methods can be highly beneficial to the growth of these plat-
forms.
Finally, CQAs should consider using a context-free linguistic feature
analysis to study user contributed content. Psycholinguistic theories sug-
gest that users of different status tend to use function words differently.
Therefore, a function word analysis might be useful in helping CQAs iden-
tify capable or influential individuals without the need to acquire personal
information, which is often missing in CQAs and ENPs.
4.7.3 Limitation and Future Research
Our research is not without limitations. First and foremost, the current
research does not directly establish any causality. Instead, we show the ex-
2A New York Times article lists StackExchange as one of the 50 companies that could
be the next start-up unicorns, which will most likely reach a $1 billion valuation. See
the following article for details: http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2015/08/23/here-are-the-
companies-that-may-be-the-next-50-start-up-unicorns
190
istence of strong correlation between politeness bias and the answer quality
evaluation and analyze the theoretical roots of the correlations using psy-
cholinguistic theory and politeness theory. Thus, the underlying causality
is indirectly inferred rather than directly tested. We encourage future re-
search to explore the politeness bias more directly, preferably through ex-
periments. Second, in the current study we focused on the politeness anal-
ysis of the question asker/addressee’s negative face. In reality, the answer
provider/writer would also be facing certain degrees of face threats, which
would need to be examined in future studies.
That said, we believe our econometric analysis based on psycholin-
guistic and politeness theories in the context of CQAs is a first step toward
understanding the roles context-free linguistic features and politeness bias
play in reflecting and influencing the perceived content quality. Our pro-
posed approach of linguistic analysis can be extended to other problem
domains where content quality evaluation is important, such as job hir-
ing, college admission, and internal employee reviews, among many oth-
ers. Our results suggest that a close examination of people’s writing can
be informative of their ability and can be used as quality indicators, and
knowledge exchange platforms can also benefit from using our proposed




Appendix for Chapter 2
Additional Empirical Robustness Checks
A.1 Using Proportion of Extreme Positive Tweets
as Dependent Variable
As mentioned in the main text, a measure of positive sentiment manipula-
tion used in Mayzlin et al. (2014) is the proportion of highly positive mes-
sages among all messages. We follow their approach in this section and use
the proportion of highly positive movie tweets as the dependent variable,
where highly positive tweets are defined as those with a raw sentiment score
greater than or equal to 0.8 . We then run the same set of regressions as in
Chapter 2.4. The results are shown in Table A.1, Table A.2, and Table A.3.
We can see that the same results hold with the alternative dependent vari-
able: (1) the proportion of highly positive tweets decreases after the movie
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Table A.1: RD Estimates of the Effect of Movie Release on the Proportion
of Extreme Positive Tweets (t-statistics in brackets, *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05,
* p < 0.1; extreme positive tweets are defined as tweets that have their raw











































Observations 52,829 52,829 52,829
AIC -17814.39 -17950.12 -17969.29
BIC -17796.63 -17914.60 -17916.01
release; (2) low budget movies exhibit a larger drop after movie release in
the proportion of highly positive tweets than high budget movies; (3) major
studio movies exhibit a smaller drop after movie release in the proportion
of highly positive tweets than non-major studio movies.
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A.2 Regression Discontinuity Design Results with
Cluster Robust Variance
As discussed in Section 2.6.2, we run our regressions with cluster robust
variances, and the results are shown in Table A.4.
A.3 Regression Discontinuity Design: Subsam-
ple Analysis
The main results based on the full data set, as shown in Table 2.2, suggest
that the movie sentiment does experience a release shock on the release
day. Here we identify several important subsamples and check if the results
remain significant within the subsamples. Column (1) and (2) in Table A.6
correspond to the subsample of movies with a production budget less than
3 million US dollars. Comparing these columns with Column (2) and (3) in
Table 2.2, we can see the results based on the low budget subsample remain
qualitatively similar to the full sample coefficients, with the magnitude of
the coefficients larger than that of the full sample. This is consistent with
Hypothesis 2, which states that low budget movies tend to have a larger
drop in Twitter sentiment than high budget movies.
Column (3) and (4) in Table A.6 correspond to the subsample of
movies that are produced by any of the major studios listed in Table A.5.
Comparing these columns with Column (2) and (3) in Table 2.2, we can see
that the results are also qualitatively similar to the full sample, with the
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magnitude of the coefficients smaller than that of the full sample. This is
consistent with Hypothesis 3, which states that major studio movies tend to
have a smaller drop in Twitter sentiment than non-major studio movies.
A.4 Regression Results controlling for Advertis-
ing Expenditure
Since Twitter sentiment might be influenced by movie studios’ advertising
campaigns, we acquired detailed daily movie advertising expenditure data
from Nielsen for additional analysis. Our advertising expenditure data set
consists of movies’ advertising spending across different advertising chan-
nels including (1) Business-to-Business, (2) Cable TV, (3) Local Magazine,
(4) Local Newspaper, (5) National Internet, (6) National Sunday Supple-
ment, (7) Network Radio, (8) Network TV, (9) Outdoor Ads, (10) Spanish
Cable TV, (11) Spanish Network TV, (12) Spot Radio, (13) Spot TV, and (14)
Syndicated TV. We were able to match our Twitter sentiment data with the
Nielsen advertising data for 40 movies. In the first set of regression analy-
sis we include movies’ daily total ads expenditure as a control variable with
movie fixed effects. The results are shown in Table A.7. We can see that
the coefficients associated with the post variable remain significantly neg-
ative across different polynomial specifications, after controlling for daily
ads expenditure. In the second set of regression analysis we include daily
ads expenditure in the aforementioned 14 advertising channels as separate
control variables with movie fixed effects, and the results are similar, as
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shown in Table A.8. These results suggest that the sentiment drop we ob-
serve on the release day remains significant after controlling for movies’
advertising expenditure. Therefore, we argue that the sentiment drop is
unlikely a result of movies’ advertising campaigns.
A.5 Regression Results with Various Bandwidth
Choices
To explore the sensitivity of the results to the length of the observation win-
dow, we run the regression specified in Equation (2.1) with different obser-
vation windows. The advantage of using a longer observation window is
that longer observation windows yield more precise estimates as more ob-
servations are available to be used to estimate the regression coefficients.
However, the linear specification in our regression equation is less likely to
be a good approximation with a longer observation window, which can bias
the estimate of the treatment effect, if the underlying conditional expecta-
tion is not linear. This is because a linear specification can only provide a
close approximation over a limited range of values (Lee and Lemieux 2010).
Recall that our full sample analysis uses data starting 60 days prior
to movie release up to 60 days after the release (±60 days). Therefore, we
use ±30 days and ±50 days as the observation window, both of which are
shorter than the original observation window, in order to obtain better ap-
proximations. The results are shown in Table A.9. Comparing these results
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with Table 2.2, we can see the results are robust to different choices of obser-
vation windows, with the longest observation window exhibiting the largest
effects.
A.6 Using Topic Modeling to Measure Thematic
Competition
A.6.1 Generative Model and Statistical Procedure
We define thematic competition as the closeness in theme between any
given pair of movies. The intuition for this dimension is that, the more fa-
miliar a movie is to consumers, the more efforts these movie studios would
have to exert in order to convince consumers to go see something that is less
likely to be original or unconventional. A crude measurement of thematic
competition is the genre a given movie belongs to. However, genre alone is
unlikely to capture the degree of novelty a movie possesses. Therefore, we
use a statistical technique broadly referred to as topic modeling to quantify
the thematic originality of any given movie.
A type of topic model, the Latent Dirichlet Allocation (LDA), is a
Bayesian statistical and information retrieval technique. The input of the
topic model is a set of documents, and for the purpose of this project, we
use the keyword information on the individual movie’s IMDb entry for the
analysis. Each movie typically contains several keywords that relate to
its story line. The output of LDA is a list of K topics, where each topic
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is a distribution over all words appearing in any keyword document. In
other words, topics differ from each other in the weights given to individual
words contained in all keyword documents. Intuitively speaking, keyword
documents that share similar words are likely to be from similar topics gen-
erated from the LDA model, and therefore an originality measure of a given
movie can be constructed by checking the uniqueness of words contained
in the corresponding keyword document. The variables in our LDA model
are:
• K : number of topics
• D: number of keyword documents
• N : number of words contained in a keyword document. Different
across documents.
• βk: the k-th topic. Topics are distributions over all words that appear
in any keyword documents.
• η: parameter for a Dirichlet distribution from which the topics are
drawn.
• θd : topic proportion for keyword document d.
• α: parameter for another Dirichlet distribution from which the topic
proportions θ′ds are drawn from.
• Zd,n : topic assignment for word n in keyword document d. Zd,n is
drawn from θd .
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• Wd,n : word n in keyword document d drawn from the assigned topic
Zd,n.
The generative procedure of each movie’s keyword document is described
as follows.
1. Specify the number of topics, K .
2. For each specified topic, draw a distribution over all words appearing
in any keyword document, from a Dirichlet distribution.
3. For each keyword document,
(a) draw a distribution over all K topics from a Dirichlet distribu-
tion. This distribution determines the proportion of topics that
each word appearing in a given keyword document is drawn based
on.
(b) for each word in a given keyword document, draw a topic assign-
ment from the distribution specified in (a).
(c) for each word, draw a word from the assigned topic determined
in (b).
Notice that the only observed variables here are the keyword documents
and the words contained in them. All other variables, including the list of
topics and all topic assignments are latent. The output of LDA is a posterior
topic distribution over all K topics for each keyword document.
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The posterior distribution implied by LDA can be written as
P(θ1,·,D , Z1,·,D;1,··· ,N , ,β1,··· ,K , |W1,··· ,D;1,···N , α, η), (A.1)
and posterior inferences for LDA models are usually conducted via mean-
field variational inference which approximates intractable distributions with
simpler distributions. The resulting posterior topic distributions of key-
word documents can be compared through some document-similarity mea-
sure, which can then be used to construct a measure of thematic similarity.
A detailed description of topic models can be found in Blei and Lafferty
(2009).
A.6.2 Thematic Similarity and Competition Measure
As mentioned in the previous section, the input of the LDA model is the
keyword documents we extract from IMDb, and the output is a list of K
topics where each topic is a distribution of all keywords appearing in any
of the keyword documents. For each movie m, the LDA model outputs a
K-vector, < Tm,1, Tm,2, · · ·Tm,K >, where Tm,i represents the weight of topic
i associated with movie m. Also, for each movie m and topic i we have
0 ≤ Tm,i ≤ 1 and
∑K
k=1Tm,k = 1. The larger the weight of a given topic is, the
more likely the movie is associated with that topic.
We can then use movies’ topic vectors to construct pairwise thematic
similarity measures for all pairs of movies. More specifically, for movie m
and movie n, the LDA model outputs topic vectors Tm and Tn, respectively.
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Notice that 0 ≤ sim(m,n) ≤ 1 for any pair of movie m and movie n. The
larger sim(m,n) is, the more similar movie m and movie n are.
For any movie m, we combine the thematic similarity measure with
data on movie release dates from IMDb, and construct a competition mea-
sure for this movie as the number of other movies that were released within
a specified time window, e.g. ±1 or ±2 months, and have a similarity mea-
sure greater than a specified threshold value. For example, in Table 2.5 we
use the number of movies that were released ±1 month within the focal
movie, and have a similarity measure greater than 0.7. In other words, for






I [m, n released within1month] · I [sim(m, n) > 0.7] ,
where I(·) is the indicator function.
A.6.3 Uncovered Topics
Out of 482 movies released in 2012 and 2013, 439 of them contain keyword
information. We run the LDA model with 10 topics on these movie key-
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words extracted from the movies’ IMDb entries. We set the model param-
eters as follows: (1) topic smoothing parameter=0.01; (2) term smoothing
parameter=0.01; (3) number of iterations = 5000. A list of most frequent
words associated with the learned topics is shown in Table A.10.
A.6.4 Additional Competition Results
To check the robustness of the results shown in Table 2.5, we construct
two other measures of competition: (1) number of movies released a month
within the focal movie that have thematic similarity greater than 0.75, and
(2) number of movies released two months within the focal movie that have
thematic similarity greater than 0.7. The results are shown in Table A.11
and Table A.12, respectively.
Comparing Table 2.5 and Table A.11, we can see similar effects of
competition on the sentiment drop with comparable magnitude. There-
fore, the effect of competition on sentiment manipulation remains signifi-
cant with a different choice the threshold value. Comparing Table 2.5 and
Table A.12, we can see the effect of competition on sentiment drop using the
±2 month competition window is much smaller than the ±1 month compe-
tition window, but the effects are still significant. This result suggests that
the closer the release days are between movies, the more drop in Twitter
sentiment there will be, and thus the more manipulation we would expect.
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A.7 Post-Release Sentiment Pattern
In this section we examine whether the post-release Twitter sentiment would
catch up to the pre-release sentiment level. While Figures 2.1 and 2.2 show
that the post-release sentiment of those movies did catch up to the pre-
release sentiment level, Figure A.1 shows an example where the post-release
sentiment did not go back to the pre-release level, which suggests that the
manipulation in the pre-release period might have been high.
We also conduct an additional test and examine if the post-release
sentiment would rapidly catch up in general. For each movie, we calculate
the average sentiment of the time window [t = -10, t = -1] and the average
sentiment of the time window [t = 31, t = 40]. The number in the bracket
indicates the number of days after a movie’s release, where a positive value
means that day t is after the movie release, and vice versa. We conduct a
test between the average sentiment of the time window [t = -10, t = -1] and
the average sentiment of the time window [t = 31, t = 40], and find that the
average sentiment of the time window [t = -10, t = -1] is statistically greater
than the average sentiment of the time window [t = 31, t = 40] (p value <
0.01). This evidence shows that, in general, the sentiment does not go back
to the original level after the release, which suggests that the manipulation
level in the pre-release period is considerable.
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Figure A.1: Twitter Sentiment of Movie The Perks of Being a Wallflower
(2012)
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Table A.2: The Effect of Movie Budget on Sentiment Manipulation: Pro-
portion of Extreme Positive Tweets as the Dependent Variable (t-statistics
in brackets, *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1; extreme positive tweets are



















































Observations 52,829 52,829 52,829
AIC -17812.39 -17948.35 -17967.63
BIC -17785.75 -17903.95 -17905.47
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Table A.3: The Effect of Being a Major Studio Movie on Sentiment Manip-
ulation: Proportion of Extreme Positive Tweets as the Dependent Variable



















































Observations 52,829 52,829 52,829
AIC -17818.57 -17955.53 -17975.05
BIC -17791.93 -17911.13 -17912.89
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Table A.4: Robustness Checks of RD Estimates: Cluster Robust Variance

































































Observations 52,829 52,829 52,829 52,829
AIC -84836.44 -84870.79 -84880.99 -84881.40
BIC -84818.69 -84835.29 -84827.74 -84828.15
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Twentieth Century Fox Film Corporation
Lucasfilm
208
Table A.6: Robustness Checks of RD Estimates: Subsamples (t-statistics in
brackets, *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1; low budget movies are those






































































Observations 22,069 22,069 9,547 9,547
AIC -29960.26 -29976.96 -18985.57 -19009.38
BIC -29928.25 -29928.95 -18956.92 -18966.40
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Table A.7: RD Estimates of the Effect of Movie Release on Twitter Sentiment
Controlling for Total Daily Advertising Expenditure (Robust t-statistics in










































































Observations 4,774 4,774 4,774 4,774
AIC -9594.498 -9597.957 -9603.491 -9619.327
BIC -9581.556 -9572.073 -9564.665 -9567.559
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Table A.8: RD Estimates of the Effect of Movie Release on Twitter Senti-
ment Controlling for Different Advertising Channel Expenditure (Robust





































































Observations 4,774 4,774 4,774 4,774
AIC -9578.483 -9579.769 -9584.660 -9601.487
BIC -9474.948 -9463.292 -9455.241 -9459.127
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Table A.9: Robustness Checks of RD Estimates: Bandwidth Choice (t-






































































Observations 27,188 27,188 43,902 43,902
AIC -54689.55 -54738.32 -78743.17 -78764.46
BIC -54656.71 -54689.05 -78708.41 -78712.32
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Table A.10: Sample Frequent Words in Each Topic (Parameters:10 topics;

















































































































































































Table A.11: The Effect of Competition on Sentiment Manipulation, where
competition is measured as the number of movies released 1 month within
the focal movie and with thematic similarity > 0.75 (Robust t-statistics in













































































Observations 48,139 48,139 48,139
AIC -68097.23 -68161.45 -68216.02
BIC -67860.12 -67906.78 -67943.79
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Table A.12: The Effect of Competition on Sentiment Manipulation, where
competition is measured as the number of movies released 2 months within
the focal movie and with thematic similarity > 0.7 (Robust t-statistics in













































































Observations 48,139 48,139 48,139
AIC -68089.84 -68153.85 -68208.49
BIC -67852.73 -67899.18 -67936.26
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Appendix B
Appendix for Chapter 3
B.1 MCMC Algorithm
Our MCMC algorithm is based on the approach adopted by Rutz and Trusov
(2011) and Rutz et al. (2012). The model can be written in the hierarchical
form:
b|Xbgt,Ω,εbgt



























are error terms in Equations (3.2),
(3.5), and (3.9). We have used 0.001 as the initial value for elements of b.
The MCMC algorithm is described below.
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Step I: Draw b = [β θ α]
We use random walk Metropolis-Hastings algorithm for sampling b (Rossi










































































































































is the likelihood of clicks and installs and is the same as de-






































Step III: Draw Ω
Ω ∼ IW















N = No of observations, νΩ = 10, SΩ = 10I.
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